USSIAN AND WESTERN INTERESTS—*by Count Sforza*

FREE WORLD

The Coming World Order

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DANGERS OF A FALSE PEACE
by Frank Kingdon

THE FUTURE OF COLONIES
by Julian Huxley

THE UNNAMED ALLY
by Louis Lipsky

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

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(In Memoriam Lidice, June 9, 1942)

A candle, short and squat,
Struggled bravely in the twilight,
Till by miasmic breath put out;
But as buttress is to fane
Are the gutterings at its base,
And its wick, thick and stout,
But waits the spark of time
To become a torch,
A flaming torch,
That will run
From hill to hill,
From plain to track,
Till tract and tract
Will glow in its shining light.

EDITH KELLOW

EDITORIAL

IT is sad indeed that the first anniversary of the Atlantic Charter coincides with the worst crisis the United Nations have experienced. One year ago, all men in the free and the subjugated countries applauded the generous principles laid down by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in the new charter for mankind. The Charter was the more remarkable in that one of the two signers, the United States, was not at the time at war with the Axis Powers. But America played a great part in drafting the Charter because the President of the United States understood that in this war more was at stake than a military and territorial conflict between two powers. He realized that whether the United States was at war or not, the outcome of this conflict would determine the freedom or slavery of all nations for many generations to come.

Now, one year later, we are faced with the Indian crisis. Its worst aspect is that the United Nations could not intervene as a body to avoid the regrettable civil disobedience campaign and the equally regrettable arrests of Gandhi, Nehru, and the other Congress leaders. Sincere supporters of democracy have somehow hoped that both India and Great Britain would let the supreme and only existing machinery of the democratic world—the United Nations—arbitrate and decide the issue. After all, England is one of the pillars of the system which was established by the Atlantic Charter and implemented by the creation of the United Nations. She, on her side, ought not to have hesitated to appeal to the supreme council of the Democracies. She ought to have seized this momentous occasion to extend the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the Pacific area.

On their side, the Indian leaders have disregarded historical perspective in their insistence on immediate independence—a perfectly justifiable demand made at a singularly inopportune time—and have had recourse to action which may very well endanger the United Nations as a whole and the future independence of India in particular. It is disheartening that they have seen fit to jeopardize all the sympathy and support which the liberals of the world have so often given to their movement by forsaking these liberals and freedom-loving people everywhere in the hour of greatest need. It is even more discouraging that they, no less than the British, failed to appeal to the United Nations. It is painful to believe that the Indian leaders do not understand all the dangerous ramifications of their present attitude. And yet, what else is one to deduce from their words and actions?

We do not know whether Mr. Gandhi made the compromising statement that was announced as coming from him. If he really planned to negotiate with Japan, as reported by the press, then he proved that, despite his sincerity, he does not measure up to the high stature of statesmanship necessary to cope with present events. How can he really hope to convince the ruthless military clique in Japan, which has waged such cruel war against China for so many years, which is responsible for the shameless behavior of Japanese troops in Hong Kong and other Japanese-occupied areas, that it ought to stop its campaign of rapine and ruin at the frontiers of India? What would he have done, if during the proposed negotiations the Japanese had asked, first of all, for the withdrawal of the United Nations troops in India? And what, if they had demanded a state of "benevolent neutrality," as they did in Indo-China and in Thailand?

The position of Gandhi may be likened to that of one of the prominent appeasers in Great Britain or the United States who would suggest that we cease our war effort until he has had an opportunity to address an eloquent appeal to Hitler. It is easy to imagine what our attitude would be to anyone so innocent and, at the same time, so obstructive to our cause.

One experience with the Chamberlains is enough. We are still paying too dearly for its consequences to let Mr. Gandhi try other confusing and damaging methods of appeasement. Mr. Gandhi and the other leaders of the All-India Congress may refuse to recognize or to admit what is so clear to the rest of the world: namely, that whatever the sufferings of the Indian people under British rule may have been, they can never be compared to the tragic plight of the Chinese and Korean people under Japanese rule, to the lot of those who have fallen under the domination of the Fascists.

The mistakes of the Indian leaders have been equaled by the British. The heroic stand as sole champion of freedom which Great Britain made in the dark days of 1940, the democratic traditions which have established her as one of the most enlightened commonwealths in the world, the voluntary leadership in the creation of the United Nations—all these call upon her leaders to recognize that a new world is in the making. They must realize that India can no longer be considered as the private interest of the British Empire—nor can any other part of the globe be regarded as the private interest of any other country. The United Nations have determined to fight together for the establishment of freedom over all the earth. They have decided to pool their resources, and in doing so, they must inevitably pool their problems. Whatever affects one of them, affects them all; whatever concerns one of them, is the concern of all. Now and in the future, the independence of India will be of primary importance to all the United Nations. British leaders should know this; Indian leaders ought to know this.

This fact was plainly manifested in the interest, approval, and enthusiasm with which the entire democratic world greeted Sir Stafford Cripp's promise of Indian independence immediately after the war. The world understood the reasons for the delay and appreciated the very serious difficulties that would be involved in an immediate grant of independence. It

approved the promise, but it insisted on the urgency of an agreement, because it recognized that the necessities of war supersede all else and that unity and order in India were prime necessities of the war in Asia.

Hence, immediate steps must be taken by both parties in the conflict to re-establish unity and order. We hope that the leaders of Great Britain will realize the benefits to be derived, not only in Asia, but all over the world, from a reopening of negotiations. On scores of occasions during this war, the fighters for freedom have thrilled to the courageous speeches of Winston Churchill. He must now speak again with the same courage and the same eloquence about India; he must make clear that Great Britain has only one major aim—the establishment of freedom by defeating the Axis Powers.

Gandhi, Nehru, and the other leaders of the Indian Congress must speak with the same eloquence and the same consideration of realities. They must not let down their friends and the friends of Indian independence throughout the world by pursuing a course of action which, at the very least, is now creating a dangerous Fifth Column in India, and at the worst, is preparing the ground for the establishment of a puppet government composed of those Indian traitors to the cause of democracy who are today gathered like vultures in Japan, in Germany, and in the Axis-occupied countries. For the sake of the future of India, for the sake of China and all the rest of Asia, for the sake of freedom throughout the world, the All-India Congress must immediately abandon its intransigent attitude and enter upon a policy of collaboration with the United Nations.

But the responsibility for the immediate resolution of this crisis does not lie with the leaders of India and England alone. The situation cries out for intelligent and constructive action by all the leaders of the Democracies in the name of the United Nations. The United Nations as a whole must request the reopening of negotiations. The United Nations must issue a formal guarantee of Indian independence on the one hand, and of the fullest protection of the minorities in India on the other.

The United Nations may well assume, in the name of the democratic forces of the world, the right to determine what ought and what ought not to be done in the future. Upon that assumption they can decide what must be done now, and their decision will serve as the supreme law both for India and for Great Britain. No one in England, apart from the incorrigible die-hards, will resent this initiative and leadership on the part of the United Nations. For there is no country where the ideals proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter and in the Declaration of the United Nations have found greater and warmer popular support.

The order by the United Nations that simultaneously Great Britain shall reopen negotiations with the Indian leaders and that the latter shall cease their disobedience campaign is indispensible to military victory, but it is of even greater importance as a symbolic gesture. It will prove to mankind that the Democracies are capable of unity, discipline, and self-sacrifice. Mankind is waiting for that proof.

Ankle Deep in War

by

ATWOOD H. TOWNSEND

WHOSE war is this? Who are today the champions of the cause of liberty for which we are fighting? The answer which naturally comes to your mind as an American is based on the fact that the Japanese attacked us on December 7, 1941, and that a few days later, all of the Axis Powers declared war against us—but is that the right answer?

Do you realize that more children died during a few weeks of blitz bombing in England than all the Americans killed in action up to July 21, 1942? Do you remember that in thirty-nine days in 1940 the French did twice as much fighting, measured in soldiers killed, as the British have done on all fronts in three years? Do you know that almost as many Jews are murdered every twenty-four hours in Eastern Europe as the total dead of the U. S. Army during seven months of war?

Thus far, most of the killing and dying has been done by "backward" peoples like the Chinese, Ethiopians, Greeks, Jews, Jugoslavs, Poles, Russians, and Spaniards, who together have sacrificed at least fourteen million lives to the cause of human freedom—mostly civilians bombed, starved, machine-gunned, raped, tortured, burned to death—including at least a million children. Against this background, the amount of American (and British) blood spilt is remarkably small. Quite rightly, Elmer Davis has declared, "as a nation we are not yet more than ankle-deep in the war."

There have been strong reasons—political, economic, military—why most of the fighting done by the British and by us has been too little and too late. Before our entry, Britain felt compelled to fight defensively and carefully. For months after Pearl Harbor, most Americans figured in terms of battles to be won in 1943 or later, and forgot that the war was being fought this year. Unquestionably, before the war is won, both Britain and America will pay heavily in the lives of our best and bravest, but it is not possible for us ever to equal the price already paid by other peoples. We shall always owe them more than they owe us. This we must not forget.

There can be no doubt that the American people and the British people are in this fight to the end and that they are prepared to sacrifice as greatly as may be necessary to preserve their freedom and to build a world worth living in. To some week-kneed souls the data in this article may seem depressing; to those of sterner stuff it will give stimulating proof that common folk who love freedom, no matter what the race or nation, are genuinely and sublimely heroic. When we and the British meet the bloody test of the battles ahead, we too will not be found wanting in courage to die for the right.

Winston Churchill spoke of "blood, sweat, toil, and tears." Thus far, our Allies have had practically all the blood and tears, while we have contributed the sweat and toil of industrial production. In this latter field of action, "we have done pretty well, but not well enough," to quote the OWI statement again. In the decisive field of military action, we "have not yet begun to fight."

It is natural for us to be proud of what our own boys have done in the fighting so far, and to forget the millions of foreigners who died for freedom a year or two ago. Such thinking, however natural, twists the facts dangerously out of proportion. We can reason accurately about this immense war only if we take special pains to remember the Chinese and the Poles, the Spaniards and the Dutch, the French and the Russians, the Greeks, the Jugoslavs, and all the others who fought desperately, long before we joined the battle. Unfortunately, many Americans seem to believe that we have a sacred right and duty to take charge

of this war and "to run it right." Furthermore, and even more dangerous, it seems to be generally accepted that we (and the British) will police the post-war world and control the peace settlement.

Some of us believe in all sincerity that God has given world leadership to the white race, that leadership among the whites belongs to the Anglo-Saxons, that America has rightly taken precedence over England, and that control of the United States properly belongs to the business man, thus giving to a few hundred executives of American corporations the divine right to rule over two billion people of all colors, races, and creeds. Some Americans are just as sure of the rightness of this as they are that two and two make four; but other nations look at it differently. (The Nazis and the Japanese reason in the same way but reach different conclusions.)

To a regrettable extent, American (and British) faith in the rightness of our ways, our ideas, and the propriety of our taking precedence has been reflected in official pronouncements and actions. Post-war policing by the Anglo-Saxon powers was foreshadowed in the Atlantic Charter; lend-lease agreements imply acceptance of our ways of doing business. Conferences and councils and commands of the United Nations revolve around London and Washington, with China and Russia vaguely in secondary rank, and with such fighting nations as Poland, Holland, Norway, Greece, and France definitely in the background. This seems perfectly natural to us, but it must seem odd to those nations that have done most of the dying.

Let us look at the record—to determine as accurately as we can who owns this People's War, basing our calculations on four assumptions:

1. *Wars are won by killing the enemy,* and by unflinching faith in a righteous cause (such faith is sometimes called "morale").

2. On the average, *for each enemy killed, one of our men must die.*

3. In measuring each nation's contribution to this war for human freedom, *the only true yardstick is the price paid in human lives* and in unselfish sacrifice (not in dollars or pounds).

4. *Any one life is as important as any other one life.* In a war for democracy the life of a Czech or a Chinese or a Negro counts just as much as the life of a white American. Either we mean this literally, or ours is not a war for democracy.

II

WITH these assumptions, let us count the cost of the war to date in human blood, beginning with ourselves and our most prominent partner, the British Empire:

United States—since Dec. 7, 1941 . . 7,000 dead (3,000 civilians)

- Navy personnel killed at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere 3,420
- Army known dead (OWI summary to July 21, 1942) . . 902
- American seamen lost in ship-sinkings (*The Pilot,* National Maritime Union Journal) 3,000

Philippine Islands—since Dec. 7, 1941 . . . . . 20,000 dead (10,000 civilians)

- Philippine Scouts, U. S. Army, killed in action (OWI summary, July 21, 1942) 479
- Soldiers of the Philippine Commonwealth Army 10,000
- Civilians killed in bombings, reprisals and murder-for-fun . 10,000

Please note that the 16,550,000 "little brown brothers" of the Philippines have given more in human suffering to the war than have 130,000,000 Americans. This fact is worth at least a moment or two of serious thought.

British Empire (white casualties)—since Sept. 2, 1939 . . . . . 130,000 dead (62,000 civilians)

- United Kingdom (estimate to date on basis of House of Commons reports) 60,000
- Dominions (estimate to date) . . 6,000
- India, Burma, and other colonies (estimate to date) 2,000
- Civilian casualties from air raids in Great Britain (Official, summary, April, 1942, and later reports) 45,600
- Deaths in merchant marine (estimated) 9,500

Other civilian deaths (passengers drowned on torpedoed ships, non-military bombed at Malta, Alexandria, Hong Kong, Singapore, Rangoon, *etc.* (estimated) 6,500

British Empire (colored casualties)—since Sept. 2, 1939 . . . . . 13,000 (10,000 civilians)

Native troops, chiefly Indian, killed in Libya, Ethiopia, Malaya, Burma (estimated) . . 3,000

Native civilians killed by bombings, machine-gunnings, and reprisal slaughters in Hong Kong, Malaya, Burma, Borneo, *etc.* (estimated) 10,000

Compared to the total death-price of the war, Britain's actual contribution thus far has been quite small—about one per cent. Compared to what we have done, however, Britain's part is very great indeed. Let us not forget this.

III

NOW we must go back to the real beginning of the pattern for conquest—to September 18, 1931, when Japan began its attack on China with the occupation of Mukden. It is most important for straight thinking to remember that World War II began eleven years ago in far-off Manchuria, and that during ten long years we held aloof, while selling supplies (for a modest profit) to the aggressors—planes, trucks, tires, oil, steel, anything they wanted. You remember, "business as usual."

Four nations—China, Ethiopia, Spain, Czechoslovakia—suffered as laboratories during the years while the fascist war-lords were perfecting their technique of mass-murder. In addition, an innocent, peaceful, hard-working people—the Jews of Europe—were made victims of a deliberate campaign to whip up hatred and cruelty.

Of all the victims of aggression, the greatest sufferer is China. Since September 18, 1931, at least 8,300,000 dead are computed by the most reliable sources. Of these, 6,000,000 are civilians. Yet, these figures do not include the many thousands killed during the seizure of Manchuria in 1931, the attack on Shanghai in 1932, and the conquest of Jehol in 1933. They cover only "the China incident" which began in 1937.

We may estimate that at least 2,300,000 soldiers have been killed—not including guerrilla fighters. The conservative Chinese News Service states: "over 2,000,000." Japanese Imperial Headquarters announced on July 6, 1942, that 2,338,000 Chinese had been killed up to the middle of June. According to Hallett Abend's "Ramparts of the Pacific," 2,550,000 were "the official figures from Chungking" reported to the end of 1941. As for the 6,000,000 civilians dead as a result of the war, the Chinese News Service gives the figures, five to ten millions, most of whom starved to death during the immense migration of almost 50,000,000 people from Japanese-dominated territory to Free China. These figures are supported by the estimates of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the United China Relief. They also include several hundred thousand who have been slaughtered in the bombings of open towns and villages and in the sacking of captured cities.

When we stop to think about it, we all recognize that China is the largest nation engaged in this war, that she has been in it the longest, that she has suffered by far the most. The trouble is that we do not often think about it; and yet, this most significant and undebatable fact must never be forgotten—to date, this has been China's war more than anyone else's.

Similarly, the Ethiopians, proud remnant of an ancient people, had the painful privilege of serving as guinea pigs during an early experiment in bringing a new order of civilization to backward and "decadent" peoples. The following figures give their stake in the war:

Ethiopia—since Oct. 3, 1935 . . . . 65,000 dead (40,000 civilians)

Soldiers killed during the Italian conquest (Oct., 1935, to May, 1936), many by poison gas 20,000

Soldiers killed in reconquest (July, 1940, to Dec., 1941) . . 5,000

Civilians killed during and after the war, including 8,000 slain in reprisals following the attempted assassination of Marshal Graziani, Feb., 1937 40,000

When the history of this generation is written, one of the blankest pages will tell how some of "the best people" in the Democracies of Europe and the Americas encouraged the Axis Powers to sharpen their claws on the bodies of the helpless Spanish people—and this with the blessings of a powerful branch of the church of Christ. Because the Spanish Loyalists dared to die for democratic freedom years before it was fashionable, they have earned the utmost of honor and glory—and a square deal at the peace conference. Here is their record, according to the figures available to J. Alvarez del Vayo, Foreign Minister of the Spanish Republic:

Spain—since July 14, 1936....563,000 dead (163,000 civilians)

Loyalist soldiers killed in two years of war against Franco's fascists and his German and Italian allies.....400,000

Civilians killed during the war by bombings, mass executions, *etc*.....100,000

Civilians murdered since 1938..63,000

Since the collapse of the Spanish Republic following the Munich Pact, nearly every month from 500 to 5,000 democrats, liberals, anti-clericals, labor leaders, and "communists" have been shot or otherwise liquidated. An estimated average of 1,500 for 42 months makes 63,000 Spanish men and women destroyed because they believed "It is better to die on your feet than to live on your knees."

IV

LIKE the Chinese, the Jews of Europe were early victims of fascist aggression. It is conservatively estimated that more than 200,000 of them died during Hitler's campaign of pogroms which began in 1933 and which spread from Germany to Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania, as these countries came under nazi domination. In addition, the following figures are given as the probable minimum dead since the outbreak of the second World War:

The Jews of Europe—
since Sept. 2, 1939.....800,000 dead (700,000 civilians)

Jewish soldiers killed while fighting in the armies of Britain, France, Greece, Poland, and Russia.....100,000

Civilians executed as hostages and murdered in concentration camps of France.....8,000

Civilians killed in nazi-fomented pogroms and mass executions in Hungary, Rumania, and Slovakia.....95,000

Civilians executed in Baltic states and occupied Russia..300,000

Civilians executed, starved, and killed by epidemics in the ghettos of Poland where the exiles from western Europe have been crowded in with the native Jews.....300,000

G. M. Stadler, United Press correspondent at Lisbon reported on May 17, 1942: "In Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, the killing of Jews amounted to an open hunt. . . . Upward of 100,000 met death in these Baltic states alone, and more than double that many have been executed in western Russia." On June 30, 1942, the World Jewish Congress stated in London: "A million Jews have been executed or starved to death . . . 700,000 in Poland and Lithuania, 200,000 in occupied Russia, and the remainder in other nazi-held lands." An official statement of the Polish Government declared (July 9, 1942): "The number of massacred Jews exceeds 200,000." Arthur Zygielbojm, Jewish member of the Polish National Council, amplified this statement by explaining that if those who were starved to death are counted, "we must accept the estimated figure of 700,000. . . . In the ghetto of Warsaw alone, 50,000 died of starvation in 1941. The death-rate is now 6,000 a month. . . . Actually all Polish Jews live in closed ghettos as in prisons, awaiting execution. . . . Even in the ghettos the fight is still going on by contact with the movement outside the walls."

If we reduce these figures to the minimum, this still means that every day throughout the three years of war more than 650 Jews have been shot, beaten to death, starved, dissected alive, raped, burned, hung on meat hooks—destroyed in every painful way known to the Gestapo. And this still goes on, 650 more every twenty-four hours!

According to the most conservative figures

issued by the American Friends of Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak Information Service, at least 7,000 Czech citizens have actually been executed by the German occupation authorities since October 1, 1938 (Munich Pact). This does not include the thousands which have been murdered in concentration camps where scores of thousands of Czechs are kept without contact with the outside world. As early as November, 1939, about 4,000 students were shipped to the prison camp at Oranienburg, which was once the Olympic Stadium dedicated to international friendship. According to President Beneš, only 500 of these youths are now alive. This spring, in the infamous outburst of savage reprisal for the killing of "Hangman" Heydrich 1,379 persons were executed, not counting about 500 in the destroyed villages of Lidice and Lozaky (*Manchester Guardian,* July 10, 1942).

Thus, as the above data remind us, a great deal of dying for freedom was done by the Chinese and Czechoslovaks, Ethiopians, Jews, and Spaniards before World War II officially opened in September of 1939. Those who died in the years before in Dachau and Barcelona, Nanking and Prague are still dead in 1942. Only because they dared to give their lives then is our hope for freedom still alive now.

V

NOT counting the Chinese, whose record has been set down above, the death-toll of World War II is about 8,000,000—nearly all Europeans, two-thirds of them unarmed civilians, including almost 2,000,000 women and children. Here is the honor roll:

Poland—since Sept. 1, 1939....350,000 dead (280,000 civilians)

Soldiers killed in one month of *blitzkrieg*	70,000
Civilians killed during the invasion (30,000 in Warsaw)	80,000
Civilians murdered during the occupation	200,000

These statistics, the Polish Information Center points out, do not include the figures we have given above of the Jewish soldiers and civilians killed in Poland. It ought to be noted that although the Jews constitute only 10 per cent of the entire Polish population, they form almost 50 per cent of the death total. The following excerpt from a statement made in London on July 9, 1942, by Vice-Premier Mikolajczyk substantiates these statistics:

> The number of Polish citizens shot or murdered in the thirty-three months of German occupation amounts to more than 400,000 . . . cases proved beyond all doubt. . . . The majority were murdered in the last few months because the number . . . in July, 1940, amounted to 80,000; by September, 1941, it rose to 100,000; in February, 1942, it reached 140,000; and in the middle of June, 1942, it jumped suddenly to 400,000. . . . In the last four months, according to given documentation, a quarter of a million of persons fell. Of the 400,000 murdered, half were Jews. . . . The reason why the German terror in the last few months was aimed in the most part at young Polish women is simple: In Poland 90 per cent of births occur among mothers of from 19 to 35 years of age.

Denmark—

since April 9, 1940...1,400 civilians dead

"Only a few Danish soldiers were killed at the time of the invasion. . . . As far as is known no Danes have been executed. . . . About 400 Danish seamen lost their lives before Denmark was invaded. . . . Danish seamen [who] have paid with their lives . . . must be somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000." National America Denmark Association.

Norway—since April 9, 1940... 3,000 dead (1,700 civilians)

Soldiers and sailors killed resisting invasion	1,200
Seamen lost on torpedoed ships serving the United Nations.	1,500
Hostages, "communists" and "British Agents" executed, according to the Germans; the total is probably much greater (Norwegian Information Service statistics)	100

Netherlands—

since May 10, 1940..... 52,000 dead (25,000 civilians)

Soldiers killed in four days of resistance	12,000
Citizens of Rotterdam reported bombed and burned to death after the city had surrendered	20,000
Civilians killed in other areas during the invasion.....	3,000

Known executions since the occupation	150
Dutch soldiers killed in the East Indies	7,000
Javanese soldiers killed	7,000
Netherlands Navy losses	1,000
Merchant seamen lost in ship sinkings	1,500

These figures are based on data from various sources. No statistics as to civilian casualties during and since the Japanese invasion of the East Indies are as yet available, or as to the thousands of Jews deported to Germany and Poland and there destroyed.

Belgium—since May 10, 1940.. 18,000 dead (10,000 civilians)

Soldiers killed in 17 days of invasion	7,500
Civilians known killed	10,000
Civilians shot as hostages, "agitators," etc.	200
Merchant sailors lost	300

The Belgian Information Center which gives these statistics has no reports on the many thousands of refugees missing in France. Many of these were machine-gunned along the highways by the invading forces; others transported for forced labor in Germany.

France—
since September 1, 1939....207,000 dead (81,000 civilians)

Soldiers killed in action during six weeks, May 10 to June 22, 1940 (Vichy statement)	125,000
Sailors reported killed at Oran, July 3, 1940	1,000
Vichy French killed in Syria	700
Fighting French killed thus far in Syria, Lybia, on the seas, and in the air	2,000
Civilians killed during the invasion (Vichy statement)	80,000
Frenchmen executed in reprisals (*Life*, May 25, 1942)	1,200

Except where otherwise noted, the sources for these statistics are the French Information Center and the Free French Delegation. There are no accurate figures available as to the losses in the French Merchant Marine, nor do these figures include the colonial soldiers killed in action. The approximate number usually mentioned is 3,000, and this total is probably doubled by the number of colonial troops which have since died in German prison camps. No one yet knows how many thousands of the 1,300,000 French war prisoners have been starved and beaten to death in Germany.

After China, Russia, and Spain comes France, fourth in rank of the fighting nations in this war as measured by the number of soldiers who died with their faces to the enemy. This very important fact most of us have forgotten. When someone tells you that France folded up without a struggle, remind him that 127,000 French soldiers died fighting the Nazis.

Greece—since October 28, 1940.422,000 dead (382,000 civilians)

Soldiers killed in the 5 months of victorious war against the Italians	30,000
Civilians killed in the same period, particularly in the bombing of unprotected towns	12,000
Soldiers killed in opposing the German invasion	10,000
Civilians killed during the invasion, mostly in Crete	40,000
Civilians slaughtered in Thrace by Bulgarians and elsewhere by Nazis	30,000
Civilians dead of starvation	300,000

The *National Herald*, Greek daily published in New York, gives the above as the minimum figures and reports that between 1,000,000 and 3,000,000 Greeks are now dying from disease and starvation.

Yugoslavia—
since March 25, 1941....250,000 dead (225,000 civilians)

Soldiers killed in 12 days of desperate defense	15,000
Soldiers killed in unceasing guerrilla warfare	10,000
Citizens of Belgrade killed in 2 days of bombing, April 6 and 7, 1941	15,000
Other civilians killed during the invasion	7,500

In giving these statistics the Royal Jugoslav Information Center declares that at least 200,000 Jugoslav patriots have been murdered since the occupation—men and boys, women, and even little children—in mass hangings and shootings, in the execution of hostages and the destruction of villages. If some readers find it

difficult to believe that almost a quarter of a million have been murdered in 15 months, they may assume whatever figure they desire—100,000 or 50,000, or even only 5,000, whatever may be their capacity for realizing the horrible brutality with which the fascist forces are combating the unyielding patriots of Jugoslavia. But the Jugoslavs know that their relatives and their neighbors are dead and they are convinced that the murder total goes far above this almost unbelievable figure.

Russia—since June 22, 1941 . . 3,300,000 dead (1,800,000 civilians)

Soldiers killed in action, plus hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war deliberately murdered by starvation, exposure, and disease; plus uncounted thousands of guerrilla fighters killed within the German lines. (On November 1, 1941, the Germans claimed 3,800,000 Russian soldiers killed) 1,500,000

Peasants and villagers, not including the 200,000 Jews liquidated by mass executions, forced migrations, famine, and typhus epidemics (30,000,000 Russian civilians are prisoners within the German lines) . 1,800,000

Supplementing these statistics from the American-Russian Institute and Dr. Max Werner, the losses Russia has suffered are described in these extracts from Commissar Molotov's note of April 27, 1942: "The very first measure of the Hitlerite occupationists . . . was the public execution of employees of Soviet institutions and enterprises, partisans, and citizens suspected of having ties with them. . . . The Hitlerite hangmen invent inhuman tortures when they torment and execute in villages and townships Soviet peasant men and women, collective farmers, individual peasants, and rural intellectuals. . . . They kill children before the eyes of their parents, and adults before the eyes of children; they hunt people down; they kill them with grenades, machine-guns, and fire; they burn people alive and bury them alive; they pour water over them in the freezing cold, turning them into pillars of ice; they mutilate corpses; they vent their fury on the living and the dead, turning them into a bloody pulp. . . . In the town of Novozybkov the occupationists in one night put to death 380 families—more than 1,000 old people, women, and adolescents —and buried dozens of children who were still half alive."

The population of Russia is about one-half greater than that of the United States. The sacrifice of Russian lives to the cause of human freedom is about five hundred times greater than that of the United States. This stupendous fact we must never let ourselves forget.

VI

IF we total these minimum figures we find that almost 15,000,000 citizens of the United Nations have been killed so far. If we were to take the maximum rather than the minimum statistics, the total would be closer to 30,000,000 human beings. We know that the Nazis have a deliberate plan for the extermination of Jews, Poles, Jugoslavs, and Greeks, and for the liquidation of their millions of war prisoners by hunger, cold, and disease. Allowing for these facts, and on the basis of all information gathered during this study, it is the considered judgment of the writer that the actual total of war dead among the United Nations is probably close to 25,000,000, possibly over 30,000,000.

When we look at these figures, we get a quick and clear answer to the question: Whose war is this? This is China's war. In human blood she has bought and paid for a half interest in the better world of tomorrow,—It is Russia's war, with more than 5,000,000 dead entitling her to a large share in the leadership.—It is Europe's war, her interest in the four freedoms purchased dearly with over two and a half million vicitims.—It is Britain's war, with a one per cent share paid for thus far, measured in the same coin.—It is the colored people's war, with over 100,000 dead.—And finally, during the last seven and one-half months, the United States has bought in blood one-twentieth of one per cent of the claim upon the final victory.

In the truest sense, however, this war does not belong to any nation or group of nations; rather it belongs to all the United Nations together, each giving what and how it can. In a broader sense, our victory will be won by and for the common people everywhere, including the decent folk within the Axis nations.

Certain other conclusions follow inevitably

from these data. The British Empire and the United States have no moral right to assume leadership of the United Nations. Thus far, both of us together have done less than one per cent of the dying for freedom. If we mean what we say about democracy, we must accept the equality of the Chinese, the Russians, and the fighting peoples of Europe. Even after giving millions of lives to the cause, we would have no automatic claim to leadership, except in so far as our ability and intelligence, and the earnestness and unselfishness of our plans for a democratic world order win us the respect of our brothers in arms.

This war can be won only by killing our enemies and by making clear that we do stand for real democracy. To kill our enemies we must spend the lives of our own young men at the approximate rate of one life of ours for one of theirs. Already this war has cost at least twice as many lives as World War I, and we must realize that victory will be won only at the cost of American and British lives by the hundreds of thousands, perhaps by the millions. *There is no other way.* Only by facing this hard fact and acting upon it can we establish our second front, not near the Hudson or the Mississippi, but near the Rhine.

World War II belongs to the civilians rather than to the soldiers. Year after year, there have been two civilian deaths for every soldier killed. Most of the dying has been done—not by the trained and equipped fighting man—but by his wife or sister, by his defenseless child, or by his elderly parents. Therefore, it is essential that final control of policy shall be in the hands of the little people who must do the dying, not in the hands of generals or corporation executives (even if the latter are disguised as dollar-a-year men).

We must not expect our Allies to be grateful to us, either now or in the future. From their point of view, this has always been just as much our war as theirs—from 1931 all the way to December 7, 1941. As they see it, we came in very late—almost too late—and have done very little—almost too little. Instead of deserving their gratitude, we shall be eternally in debt to them.

Most important of all, we and the British have no right to assume that in the post-war settlement we must play the major part. Together we form only 10 per cent of the world's population. If we attempt to dictate the peace, we shall unquestionably breed new hatreds and pave the way to World War III. If we do play a larger role at the peace conference than our relative importance justifies, it must be because other nations have faith in the sincerity of our dedication to the democratic freedoms, and confidence in our ability to make these dreams become fact "everywhere in the world." This faith, this confidence, we must not deceive.

Like the minister in "Mrs. Miniver," we must recognize the truth about this war, and say with him: "Why, in all conscience, should these be the ones to suffer? Children, old people, a young girl at the height of her loveliness? . . . Are these our fighters? Why should they be sacrificed? . . . Because this is not only a war of soldiers in uniform. It is a war of the people—of all the people—and it must be fought not only on the battle field, but in the cities and in the villages, in the factories and on the farms, in the home and in the heart of every man, woman, and child who loves freedom. . . . This is the People's War! It is our war! We are the fighters! Fight it then! Fight it with all that is in us! And may God defend the right!"

●

WE welcome to our International Honorary Board Pierre Mendès-France, member of the French Parliament and former Under-Secretary of Finance. An officer in the French Army during the early days of the war, M. Mendès-France went to North Africa after the armistice in order to continue the resistance against German forces. Arrested by order of the Vichy Government, he was brought back to France and condemned to six years in prison. After a heroic escape, he finally succeeded in reaching London and New York. He will leave shortly for active service in the Free French Army.

●

We regret to announce that Mr. Carlo a Prato, member of the International Editorial Board, called to important duties in the Office of War Information, was obliged to ask for temporary leave from our Board.

Pax Germanica
Ein deutscher Mann
Wird die Welt genesen
DEUTSCH LAND
DEU
L.M.

DANGERS OF A FALSE PEACE

By Frank Kingdon

PEACE, if this be any comfort to her, has this much in common with God, that many speak her name and few take her demands seriously. Many a man has won a reputation for piety by being thoroughly negative, and thus never doing anything, which includes never doing anything which can be laid to him as blame. He could be accused of no sin because he could be accused of no action. He never fought a thief, or accused an exploiter of the public's trust, or raised his voice or hand against any living man, therefore he proved that he loved everybody, and was reputed to be godly indeed. "I never heard him say a harsh word against anybody" is an encomium I have often heard, but it always leaves me wondering why the man of whom it is said has never met some of the people I have known, to describe whom commendation would be about as adequate as a lead pencil to depict a sunset. I have a persistent conviction that doing the will of God sometimes involves taking a positive stand, and even occasionally taking thought, and that one's godliness is not necessarily directly in ratio to one's inaction.

The reason for this homily is that I am being continually confronted by public men who demand of me to answer why I am opposed to them when all they have sought during the past few years has been peace. They love peace. They want the United States to live in peace. Peace is their evensong and their matin. Therefore, during the last two or three years they have spoken and voted against any action on the part of the United States that would involve it in anything going on anywhere else in the world. They have served peace, they claim, by a vigorous advocacy of doing nothing. Their logic seems to be: peace is the absence of war; we cannot make war if we are unprepared for it; therefore let us stay unprepared for war and, *ipso facto,* we are at peace. They have refused to vote for the extension of the Selective Service Act, thus preventing us from having a trained army; therefore they are the men of peace, for obviously if we do not have an army we cannot have war. They have safeguarded every American home against losing its loved ones, they argue, because they have insisted that the United States should call no man from civilian life into the armed services. But they ignored every voice that cried of our danger from those who kill and enslave civilians as well as soldiers.

These patriots who now stand on platforms and beat their breasts with virtuous thumps, acclaiming that their muddle-headedness was no more than a sincere attempt to save us from the agony of war, were mistaken in only one point: we do not live in this round world alone. Old Daniel Webster could stand on the floor of the Senate, thrust his fingers in his waistcoat, and thank God that we are not as other men, especially those involved in the bitter feuds of ancient Europe, but that we have the two oceans to separate us forever from the battles that sow the other continents with blood. But his phrases are as outworn as his smallclothes. No modern Senator can echo him with any sense; not even the Honorable Hiram from California, nor the "Gentleman" from Montana, nor the senior Senator from Ohio. We simply do not live in Daniel Webster's world. We are a part of the ache and tragedy of all humanity. The bombs that detonated on Madrid shook our own floors, and the guns firing on Shanghai rattled our own windows.

We do not make peace in our time by confronting with an umbrella the man with a sword. We make peace only by disarming him.

Once the spark is fanned to flame in our day, every man's house is threatened, and the fire will not die until all households are united to put out the blaze and to subdue the arsonist. The trouble with all those who thought that we could stay at peace while the rest of the world warred was that they did not understand the kind of world in which we are living. They were nineteenth century men unable to cope with a twentieth century world. Even while they professed to love peace they betrayed her.

Now we must win the war for which they kept us unprepared. No falser peace could be contemplated than one leaving the issue undecided at this juncture between the men of freedom and the tyrants. Whatever we may or may not say about our enemy, he is in earnest. He may be fanatic, or even psychopathic, but this is beside the point, for he is all out to get what he wants and to make this the kind of world in which he will be sure to get what he wants. We charge him with ruthlessness and cruelty. They sound to us like criminal accusations. But they are the by-products of determination, of a will that brooks no hindrance, and so what to us looks like criminality seems to him to be virtue. We cannot persuade him. We must beat him. He will not let us live or do business our way unless we do. This is why no man is fit to lead us in the making of the peace who does not enter with all his heart into the winning of the war. The peace of the appeaser is not peace at all. It is the interlude between wars. The more clearly a man sees the nature of the war the more lucidly will he comprehend the necessary nature of the peace. A bad peace will generate new and more terrible wars.

There are those, for example, who see this as no more than a struggle for power between nations. They will look upon any peace as good if it assures in their eyes the supremacy of their own nations in the post-war period. They see Germany, the nation, as the devil in the situation, and will be satisfied with any peace that reduces Germany to a broken or a satellite state. Vansittart in Britain is the prime example of their ilk. He maintains that we shall solve our problems if only we break Germany up into little ineffective states after the war. Let us cut this monster into small pieces, he says, and never again shall it be able to threaten the peace of the nations. To those who are moved by vengeance this sounds like a reasonable end for the people that they hate. Actually, however, it can project but two outcomes. First is the end that they think, consciously or subconsciously, it will serve, namely the continuance of their nations in their present positions of superiority. Men find it sweet to belong to peoples that are powerful among the nations, and such men look upon the rise of another state as a kind of impertinence that must be punished, or as a threat that at all costs must be destroyed. When they talk about preserving civilization they mean keeping the *status quo*, and when they appeal to morality they intend to praise a system that keeps them in the place of dominance. They are nationalists of the old order with all the obstinacy and shortsightedness of members of a specially privileged group. The outcome they hope for, therefore, is one in which they will be able to enforce their will upon a world at their feet. Temporarily they may have such a world. What they, in common with all Bourbons cannot grasp, is that such a world cannot last. To dismember Germany is to deny history. She is what she is, and what she is she will be. The triumphs of Bismarck and his successors are too deeply grooved into the flesh and blood of the whole German people for any dismemberment of Germany to produce anything but a restless and festering discontent. They will rebel at any partition in exactly the same way as any other people would rebel at it. So the second outcome of a policy aimed at perpetuating the old divisions of power would be the creation of an area of permanent discontent in the very heart of Europe.

To affirm this is not to assert that nationalism as we have known it must be continued in the post-war world, but it is to recognize that nationhood as a fact in human experience cannot be ignored. The paradox of the peace in a certain sense is that it both has to recognize nationalism and to disarm it. I try to make the distinction in my own thinking by saying that nationality must survive but that nationalism must not. What I mean is that the social experiences through which men identify themselves with specific groups are not only historically real but culturally dynamic. Occasionally an individual comes along who is able to identify himself with all humanity and to find the full satisfaction of his personality in this wide frame of reference, but such people are rare even among men of genius. Most inspired men find their spark in a local habitation and a home, and in speaking for the particular place they know, express something which belongs to uni-

versal experience. Shakespeare was an Englishman, Goethe a German, and Burns a Scotsman. They were men of localities. What in them rose to the level of genius, in most men is the highest inspiration they know. Nationality is one expression of the diversity that gives both character and color to human living. In this sense nationality should be preserved. Outrage is done to actual motivations of the spirit when national bonds are denied. Such dismemberment works violence upon people to such a degree that they will be continuously in revolt against it. Instead, therefore, of a program for the dismemberment of Germany being one that gives promise of peace it is actually only an assurance of continuous war.

II

THE trouble with Vansittart is that he has seen the evil of our times, but he has called it by its wrong name. It is not Germany that has to be dismembered, but nationalism as contrasted with nationality that has to be disarmed. By nationalism I mean the distortion of pride in nationality into a desire to dominate all other nations in the struggle for power. It is nationality turned into a weapon of selfishness, of group advantage over all other groups. As such, nationalism has been the root of many fallacies that have brought our society to its present chaos. National sovereignity, the unlimited right of any people to do what it thinks best for its own advantage, even to the starting of wars, is one. Economic nationalism, that has prevented the free flow of trade through all quarters of the world, is another. Colonization, with its twin evils of ignorance and special privilege, is a third. The whole mischievous theory of strategic boundary lines is a fourth. Just to mention these is to make clear that Germany has followed the evil logic of nationalism with a blinder faith than other nations, but we shall not cure the evil by cutting up its chief exponent. That we can do only by modifying the thing itself.

Evidence for this assertion may be found in the fact that those who fight Germany for nationalistic reasons themselves fall into the snare of the fallacies of nazism. Vansittart is basically accepting the nazi philosophy when he advocates dismembering his fallen foe and reducing his victims to the level of chattel slaves. This is exactly what Germany has done to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and France. He is false to his own repugnance of the methods of the Nazis when he adopts them for his own in dealing with the Nazis, yet he is logical if he proceeds on the same premise of nationalism on which they proceed. We are agreed that we cannot build a good peace in a nazi world. We must recognize that we cannot do any better in any chauvinistically nationalist world, for it amounts to the same thing.

The same tendency of those who think nationalistically to go over to the nazi philosophy is evident among the group who talk about the Germans being endemically brutal. Brutality is no monopoly of the Germans. To contrast them to their disadvantage with the so-called heirs of the Mediterranean tradition is to overlook the patent fact that fascism got its start in Italy under a gangster whose record is less bloody than Hitler's only to the extent that his resources were poorer. Hitler went to school to Mussolini, and both found their textbook in Machiavelli. To divide humanity into Germans and non-Germans, with all the virtues on our side, and with evil in the blood-stream of the Germans, is exactly the same kind of mental process that leads the Nazis to divide the world into Jews and non-Jews. A racial theory of that unscientific kind gains no validity because the terms are changed. It is dangerous and stupid prejudice on both sides. The German people are people. They have not been isolated in history. Their blood flows in the veins of every nation in Europe, therefore, to treat them as a "race" apart is false to history, to anthropology, and to good sense. A peace that is founded upon any such nonsense will be as unjust and unproductive as would be a peace based on the inferiority of any other "race."

Nobody could even think in these unrealistic terms unless he had first fallen victim to the virus of nationalism. The question of a good peace comes down to what we can do about this basic poison. How can we preserve the values of nationality yet save ourselves from the evils of nationalism? This looks like a stupendous question. As a matter of fact, it is not as difficult as it seems. This is not the first time that men have had to find a way of reconciling these alternatives. Seven hundred years ago, Switzerland confronted it and brought into being the Confederation that has lasted ever since. We ourselves had to find an answer to the same problem and we produced the United States. Great Britain has had to deal with the demands of her colonies to be recog-

nized as equal partners in the Empire and has evolved the British Commonwealth of Nations. Each of these unions differs from the others, which shows that not only can the dilemma be solved but that there is more than one way of doing it.

To say that these are not adequate examples because of the homogeneity of the peoples involved, or because of the limitations of territory taken in, is to convict oneself of lack of historical imagination. Switzerland has even overcome the difficulty of diverse languages, for its people speak three different tongues in three different sections. Our own histories have a way of obscuring the bitterness of the events leading up to the Union in their depiction of its glorious attainment. It would do us all good to go back at this stage and remind ourselves of the intense rivalry of the colonies, of their economic warfare, of their threats against each other, and of the trepidation of the smaller ones in the presence of their larger neighbors. Perhaps we have forgotten that Vermont refused at first to come into the Union at all. The Constitutional Convention only just succeeded as it was, and even so strong a Union man as Jefferson would not consent to its conclusions until they were modified by the Bill of Rights. One fact pointed up by the British Commonwealth is that recent warfare does not prevent federal co-operation, for South Africa took her place among the Dominions within a decade of the Boer War.

As for the objection that these instances refer to peoples within relatively restricted areas, we can certainly affirm that modern communications have brought all the nations into closer proximity than that among the thirteen colonies when the Union was formed. They came together because they had the will to do so, a will steeled by the realization expressed in Franklin's familiar phrase that if they did not hang together they would hang separately. Surely it takes no profound philosopher to see that if the nations do not stand together now they will fall together in a civil war of civilization. The federal principle, however it may be implemented, is the proved foundation for an international structure that conserves national values and curbs nationalistic ambitions.

The central decision which has to be made for such a federation of nations is where sovereignty shall lie. No nation, least of all the most powerful nations, is going to give any promise of accepting a restriction upon its own sovereignty unless it knows exactly where sovereignty will rest and what its own safeguard within that sovereignty shall be. There are three decisive controls that count in this connection. They are the making and administration of the law, the courts of justice, and the army. Who shall legislate international law? Who shall sit on international courts? Who shall command international armies?

III

WHEN the war ends with the victory of the United Nations, the actual power will be in the hands of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and China. If the war continues for a protracted period, the United States is likely to emerge as the dominant one of this group. In the immediate post-war period passions will burn with intense desire for revenge, and the young men who return from the army are likely to be the most inflamed of us all. Is it going to be possible in such a time for us to plan calmly for an international order? I doubt it. I venture to say that a peace quickly made will be one ineptly planned. And a peace ineptly planned, as we have all learned to our dismay, is no peace at all, but an outrider of future wars. Therefore, knowing ourselves as well as we do, we should already rid ourselves of the picture of the kind of peace conference that remains in our minds from the last war. Our first job will be to feed and rehabilitate a broken Europe, and to calm down in the process to the point where we can be as wise in our generation as the framers of the Constitution were in theirs. We have to define the answers to a world society's demand for proper laws, fair justice and adequate policing.

On the legislative side, we shall undoubtedly keep our present national legislatures to continue their work within the national scenes. Each country should be left free as far as possible to formulate its own statutes and organization. There will, however, have to be an international congress to begin the development of a body of accepted international law. Such a congress will get its representation partly on the basis of the populations of nations and partly on that of the recognition of the parity of states as states. The formula to reconcile these cannot be a simple one. We found one by giving the House of Representatives a population basis and allowing every state equal representation in the Senate. Should the interna-

tional congress be bicameral this arrangement might be copied. In a unicameral arrangement a formula might be found that provided for a Cabinet in which certain nations would be always represented and others by rotation.

The tradition of an international court already exists and its plan could be taken over with few modifications. Our own experience has shown that such a court wins its own prestige by the character and justice of its decisions.

The form of an international army may very well be already in our world by the end of the war, for we shall probably see the emergence of a unified command of some sort among the United Nations. I doubt whether any blueprint could produce as adequate a plan as war itself will force us to adopt. Moreover, the exigencies of war will move us to accept an international command in military affairs.

Events have their own way of educating us. In 1919, we shrank from any form of international commitment lest it involve a loss of sovereignty. Now we know that no commitment in peace means later involvement in war, and that unlimited sovereignty carries the threat of unlimited aggression on the one hand and total danger on the other. In so far as this has sunk in, we are already prepared for some sort of cooperation among the nations. When it has penetrated deeply enough, we shall seek an actual confederation. When that time comes, the concept of national sovereignty will exercise much less power over our minds. It will mark the hour at which the door of history will begin to swing on its hinges, for then we shall pass out of the shadows of a past which would dictate a bad peace into the real present in the light of which a good peace can be found.

THE forces of democracy have need for men like Guglielmo Ferrero who are able to take thought in the midst of conflict and chaos. Thus, the loss that democracy has suffered in the death of this thinker, whose mental vigor and great-hearted courage were unimpaired by danger, exile, and age, is now greater than ever. Ferrero was one of Europe's finest. He belonged to that category of men who, since Dante, have refused to permit the difficulties of exile to interrupt their self-assigned task of enlightening the world. His works, particularly "The Reconstruction of Europe" and "The Gamble," published during the war, are indispensable to an understanding of the forces which have plunged mankind into its present tragedy.

But it is not only in his books that Ferrero stood as an uncompromising foe to fascism and aggression. He took time from the work of a scholar to throw himself with the ardor of a young man into the fight against appeasement. He saw early and clearly the significance to the world of the aggressions against Manchuria and Abyssinia, and he recognized the mistaken policy of concession in the non-intervention in Spain and the abandonment of Czechoslovakia. Those who were in Geneva at the time of the Munich pact still remember the eloquence with which he condemned the stupidity of that appeasement policy.

We of the FREE WORLD, *who knew that he agreed with every principle for which we stand and who recognized the greatness of the aid which Ferrero would have rendered in the creation of a "people's peace," refrained from including him in the list of our honorary members in order not to jeopardize his position in Geneva where the increasing influence of vengeful fascism threatened his life. Now, Ferrero's memory and work will guide us in our plans for a free world.*

ANGLO—SOVIET *relations*

By A. V. HILL

THE Treaty recently concluded between the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. has given the greatest satisfaction and encouragement to those who have long deplored the continued misunderstanding between the two Governments whose peoples, from their natures and characteristics, could so readily make friends. I have no special knowledge of the squabbles and the differences which produced this unfortunate result: like most squabbles they are probably best forgotten for the present and left to the historians of the future. Just as in the lives of individuals, the best way for nations to end a quarrel or a misunderstanding is not to try to apportion blame or failure, or to argue out how the misunderstanding arose; it is to settle down to do an honest job of work together, preferably work involving muscles as well as brains, on which both sides are keen.

When I heard a year ago of the German attack on Russia, my first reflection was: This will bring Russia back into the community of nations; this, if we live that long, will allow me to see my Russian friends again. One had almost given up hope of a reconciliation, at least in our time.

May I refer to personal experience? Up to 1932, Russian physiologists had come to work with me in England, with fellowships from the Rockefeller Foundation or from their own Government. From 1932, the visits were shut down. In 1935, the XVth International Congress of Physiologists was held in Russia, a highly successful meeting in which the visitors saw much to admire, particularly the hundreds of keen young people who stood around us to see and listen. One hoped then that intercourse and exchange would start again; they did not. And when the XVIth Congress occurred at Zurich in 1938, not a single Russian was permitted to come. This state of affairs was not due in any way to lack of mutual appreciation or understanding on the part of scientific people, and certainly our Russian colleagues did not desire it; many of them would have sold their souls to go and study for a time abroad. It was ordained from above. Much as one deplored it then and since, it may very well be that this policy of isolation, applied consistently to all except those few who were regarded as completely safe politically, was necessary. In the days when industrial and military development were more important than butter, it was essential to maintain that intense conviction of the superiority of their political and economic system, which—added to their traditional love of country—has helped to make the morale of the Russian people so formidable a weapon, so fundamental a contribution to the ultimate defeat of Germany.

Since Britain and Russia became allies in June, 1941, the same difficulty has persisted. No doubt the stickiness has not been all on one side, and some of it has certainly been due to different ideas of secrecy; but even in matters where secrecy was unnecessary it has been impossible to make contact. This has not been due to suspicion on our part of Russian political ideas. In fact, every communist organization in Great Britain has been exploiting Russia to such an extent as to make people utterly tired of propaganda and to impede the development of natural normal relations between allies.

Guns, tanks, and aircraft are now very much more important than butter, and our great collaborator in the enterprise of defeating Hitler may well have been right in fearing the effect on morale of a sudden change in his policy of isolation before a definite agreement had been reached. We have had to say to ourselves that patience was necessary; that the suspicions of a quarter of a century could not be removed in a few months; that the price of failure was so heavy and the value of success so great that we must go on working away to

achieve the understanding which, so far as the people of the two countries themselves were concerned, would be so easy and profitable once they got to know each other.

At least the opportunity has been offered, by the skill, patience, and tolerance on both sides of the negotiators of the Treaty, of getting together more closely. We can let bygones be bygones, until at any rate we are in such a good humor with one another (when Hitler has been liquidated, if not before) that discussion will not lead to bickering. Not only do we intend, together with our Allies and particularly with the United States and China, to ensure the utter destruction of Hitlerism, but also "to work together in close and friendly collaboration . . . for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe."

A vast change has occurred in Britain in the common man's appreciation of Russia and of the achievements of the Soviet Union. It is obvious that we have much to learn from a system that has utilized so efficiently, in circumstances so grim, the natural virtue of a great people. This does not mean that we think that this system as a whole could be transplanted here; nor does it mean that we underestimate what we ourselves and others have done in peace and war, in technology and in social improvement. What it does mean is that we are anxious both to collaborate and be friends.

I have been very fortunate for many years in friendship, comradeship, and collaboration with a multitude of Americans; and I am entirely convinced that the first and fundamental principle in seeking for an international order based on decency, humanity, toleration, and scientific common sense, lies in the organized and deliberate co-operation of the British Empire and the United States. One's hopes that Germany could be induced to join in that co-operation have been twice shattered. Germany clearly needs a long process of psychological readjustment following defeat before she can become a safe and decent neighbor. One's hopes that Russia would come in seemed like a mirage, always receding, but now at last there appears to be a prospect of reality.

In China, the United States has long had a special interest in commerce, in medicine, and in education, and many of the best and wisest people in China have intimate knowledge of America. Co-operation between China and the English-speaking countries will not be difficult. If these four peoples can agree to pull together and to go on pulling in spite of the occasional roughness of the road, then a recurrence of the present world disorder may be made permanently impossible, and we may hope to reach a state in which the skill, pugnacity, and enterprise of healthy men can be better employed than in mutual destruction of each other's institutions.

That our present enemies have achieved so much is largely due to the skill and ruthlessness with which they have spread mistrust and disaffection and exploited treachery. The process has been going on for many years and in many countries and is still hard at work. In the United States now, through their agents and friends, they will certainly be exploiting the hesitations and doubts of Americans about communism in order to create any difficulties they can. The fact that Britain is now bound by a treaty to the Soviet Union to collaborate in peace as well as in war, will doubtless be used to throw doubt upon the stability of our political institutions—we shall be said to be infected by the virus of bolshevism and to be unfit company for the healthy individualists of America.

To my American friends, if I may, I would say—do not believe this nonsense. The Communists in Britain now are exploiting to the utmost the opportunity offered by Russia's magnificent military, industrial, and moral achievements; but their propaganda, like a drink which is too sweet, taken in excess is beginning to defeat its own ends by making people sick. The ordinary, sensible people of Britain are too attached to their own way of life to be willing to exchange it wholesale for another. They are ready to learn from Russian experience, enterprise, and ideas, as they have been very ready to learn from America in recent years, or from France through our many years of chequered history. But Britain is no more likely to "go communist" now, as a result of the Treaty, than it was to adopt prohibition in the days of that peculiar adventure of American ideology, or than Russia is today to set up a House of Lords or to permit conscientious objection to military service. When propaganda designed to spread disaffection among the Allies is put out, it is their duty to inquire not whether it is true, but the nature of its origin; the latter they will generally find disreputable.

The stage, therefore, is now set for collaboration with the Soviet Union by sensible people

in Britain and America. The primary object of that collaboration is the defeat of Germany, Japan, and Italy, and the utter destruction of Hitlerism. In that destruction the Russians will certainly not be sentimental and we had better not be either. The cancer must be completely removed. We shall have failed, however, in our object of longer range if the collaboration ends as soon as the surgical operation is over and the patient is coming round. There is no hope for the future of civilized man if isolationism is to be the prevalent and characteristic mood of peace. Collaboration is the natural healthy state of the human family; isolationism, whether in Britain, Russia, or the United States, has shown its folly and futility, in producing the present lovely example of the very thing it set out to avoid.

RUSSIAN INTERESTS *The* WESTERN INTERESTS

Danger of Silence

BY CARLO SFORZA

THE United States is indeed a human society presenting the most extreme antithesis: here, many more wealthy people than in any other country have whispered for months among themselves—and some still go on whispering: "If only Hitler and Stalin bleed each other white. . . ." But at the same time, it is here that a rare spectacle of political maturity has taken place concerning Russia. In spite of the fact that racial and political prejudices may have added virulence to natural and healthy patriotism, a hundred and thirty million Americans have instinctively agreed, after Pearl Harbor, to impose upon themselves the most disciplined silence concerning the lack of military collaboration by the Russians in the Pacific. A few perfidious insinuations from certain conscious or unconscious nazi agents who feign to hate Japan so bitterly that they have no hatred left for nazism or fascism have simply confirmed the general rule. The plain, honest American citizens thought only: *The Russians fight against the common enemy as no one else does in the present phase of the war; how can we dare to ask more from them?*

But if the instinct of the nation was wise when, without any official pressure, it voluntarily decided to keep silent, the duty and the interests of the statesmen and of the diplomats are different. Because of the very fact that the nation remains tactfully silent, they must speak—not in public, but confidentially—to their colleagues of the other nation. To speak, to speak frankly is always an advantage even when no agreement is reached; a conversation may dispel shadows, suspicions with no basis in the realities. What imperiled the peace of Europe during the criminal nazi-fascist invasion of Spain was the silence, the official silence. It grew into a sort of obsession; after a while, nobody dared to break it, fearing to have to learn too much.

It is hardly necessary to add that the conversations which are needed now should be kept confidential in order not to raise excessive hopes; moreover, even if kept secret, they would help to create growing reciprocal confidence among the leaders. (The 1918 slogan, "open diplomacy," is a healthy and wise ideal as far as ultimate diplomatic aims are concerned; it is childish and unnatural if applied to intermediary exchanges of views for it would render more difficult the acceptance of compromises which the jingo public would brand as national retreats.)

Let us not forget that one of the main causes which rendered possible the crime of the second World War has been the lack of confidential conversations between the Anglo-French, on the one side, and the Soviet on the other. It is no use now to dig into a turbid past:

errors, tricks, reticences, incorrect silences existed on all sides. But how is it possible to forget that when a Balkan terrorist—armed with a *parabellum* which Mussolini's agents put into his hands—killed King Alexander of Yugoslavia in Marseille in October, 1934, those who had hired the assassin well knew what they were doing? For, with Alexander and the French Foreign Minister Barthou, something much more important than two men was killed: the plan for the organization in Eastern Europe of a system of mutual assistance. The murderer of Alexander and Barthou is still probably in jail—unless Hitler and Mussolini have forced Vichy to give him his freedom. But the man who killed the Barthou plan, and with it the peace of Europe, is "in power"; his name is Laval.

Four years later, in Munich, the Britain of Neville Chamberlain and the France of Georges Bonnet delivered to Hitler the Sudetenland which had always belonged to Bohemia and never to Germany. Czechoslovakia became defenseless, and a few months later, Hitler, in spite of his solemn engagements, invaded it. Russia, which had pacts with France and with Czechoslovakia; Russia, which was a great Slav Power; Russia, which was a direct neighbor of the betrayed Czechs, was neither consulted nor informed. These are offenses that a great nation does not easily forget. Russia ended by forgetting; and she did well—all the more so since her leaders had been guilty of dark Hitlerian intrigues and plots of their own.

But what matters today is to do all that is necessary to have such an unsavory past buried for ever and ever. And what is necessary is simple but—for diplomats—difficult at the same time: not to shut our eyes to realities, to study with courage all the sides of realities.

I shall give an example of the realities which have not yet been grasped in all their various nuances. These realities affect the interests of Russia in Asia and are based on certain future contingencies in which Russian conceptions will differ from those of Great Britain and of America. If we study these interests, we must come to the conclusion that while Russia will not again change her position in regards to nazi Germany and will fight—such at least is my firm belief—the nazi peril so long as the Soviet armies can resist, those who know the realities in Asia cannot help thinking that Russian views on that subject may easily diverge from those of the Western powers. To see this and to admit it is not only an act of intellectual sincerity, but also an act of respect for a great power like Russia which, quite naturally, holds views and conscious or unconscious aspirations of her own that do not coincide with the traditional American or British views regarding another continent.

In reality, for Russia there is only one reason for solidarity with the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific: the safety of Vladivostok and of the northern part of the island of Sakhalin, the southern part of which belongs to Japan. If the Japanese Prime Minister General Tojo said with commendable frankness on July 28, at a meeting of twenty thousand bowing Nipponese in Osaka, that the final aim of Japan is "the destruction of the United States and Great Britain," it is evident for the Russians that the conquest of Vladivostok and of the northern part of Sakhalin is a necessary part of the plans of the Japanese Army—all the more so since the Asiatics have long memories and they well know that Russia has been in possession of Vladivostok only eighty-two years, hardly a moment according to the oriental yardstick; just as they know that its original legal possession is of a most dubious character.

But from other points of view, some Soviet diplomats or geopoliticians may some day begin to study the possible advantages of overturning the situation in Asia, just as army general staffs study in peacetime the most contradictory schemes of theoretical warfare. For example, they may consider not only a more complete hegemony in Mongolia and a sphere of influence in Tibet—so near to India—but even the achievement of the oldest of Russian dreams: a port or ports in the free warm waters of the Indian Ocean by means of penetration in Afghanistan and Beluchistan.

It would be foolish to charge those Russians with disloyalty who would begin some day to ponder on such problems. History is full of such cases. I may recall that the Italians were during thirty years the most loyal partners of the Triple Alliance, which for them was simply an instrument of peace and a defense against the old Austro-Hungarian rancors and that our loyalty was not tarnished in the least by the fact that we—with our long Italian historical instinct—knew that the Hapsburg monarchy was doomed and that its Italian territories were bound to make some day more perfect the natural frontier *"che Italia chiude*

e i suoi termini bagna," as Dante says. The case is not quite analogous but analogous is the necessity to speak, as we offered to do ten times before 1914, to Goluchowski, to Aerenthal, to Berchtold, who did not deign to admit that it was in their interest to speak more than in ours. (For the record I must say that once Aerenthal did discuss this with me—then a very young diplomat.)

In Asia, and perhaps in other regions, certain potential problems exist where Russia has supreme interests. Is a complete silence excusable because of the present tragic plight of the war? Perhaps, if our hearts are pessimistic. No, if our hearts are burning with faith and will. Let us remember how frequently we have seen what happens to two old intimate friends when they begin to avoid certain embarrassing issues. The silence ends by severing even the most forceful links; and the two friends end by hating to see each other.

In no event, in no hypothesis—and I am thinking now of the best and of the most dreadful ones—must the loyal friendship between Russia and the Western powers be imperiled. But this friendship needs to be cared for all the time; already the Anglo-Soviet treaty of June, 1942—that promise—has lost much of its moral force because silence followed.

The Russians are men as we are and in spite of the intolerable, artificial "seriousness" of almost all the Communists, their reactions to similar impulses are identical to ours. (Even their diplomats feel as do most human beings of the Western species.) The beginning of contacts and understanding, confidential but sincere, can only be beneficial even if no alliances result from these contacts. Those who, in obedience to Hitler's orders or in credence of Hitler's propaganda, dream day and night of the "danger of communism" ought to desire these contacts more than anyone else—at least they would want it if they were endowed with some imagination, because by means of these contacts, and only by such means, will it be possible to bring the Russian world again into the community of nations.

Recently the able Minister for Foreign Affairs of a government-in-exile began certain *pourparlers* with the Soviet Government for an eventual post-war convention based on the most orthodox and conservative principles of reciprocal guarantees of frontiers, *etc.* If I am well informed, he was discouraged by one of his great Allies. Must we come to the conclusion that the Democracies have become like certain *dannati* of Dante's "Inferno," walking eternally with heads turned backward?

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THE TRAGEDY OF GREECE

An Editorial

THERE is nothing original in the complaint that Hitler has disregarded all the rules of international law and all the standards of decency that constitute the higher qualities of our civilization. But it is impossible to refrain from uttering a protest against the conscienceless and inhuman conduct of the Axis invaders in Greece which threatens to exterminate the entire Greek nation before this war is over.

This deliberate policy of starvation has already exacted 300,000 victims by the most conservative count, and has now brought more than 2,000,000 people to the point of death. A recent communication from our State Department declares: "Reports reaching the Department from Greece have portrayed conditions of suffering from inanition and death from starvation appalling almost beyond belief." These conditions, which not three nor three score mercy ships will really alleviate, spell out for posterity the infamy of Hitler. To the sad roll call of Jews, Poles, and Czechs, whose extermination has been determined by the Nazis, we must now add another valiant victim, the great and glorious Greek nation.

COLONIES IN A CHANGING WORLD

BY

JULIAN HUXLEY

THE world is changing under our eyes. To the accompaniment of much bloodletting, burning of crops, destruction of buildings, hunger, disease, and torture (but also much bravery, devotion, ingenuity, efficiency, and hard thinking), the institutions and ideas of a historical epoch are on their way into the discard. Unlimited national sovereignty, laisser-faire liberalism, unrestricted capitalist enterprise, neutrality, the police state, free trade are swirling irrevocably down the cosmic drain.

Lease-lend, the sharing or leasing of strategic bases, new conceptions of national service, large-scale integrations and regulations of economy, the concept of the state as a positive agent for initiating and planning social welfare—these are throwing up hints of the world that is to come.

In such a confusion of change, the colonies are bound to be involved. The world's conscience is beginning to grow a little uneasy over the fact of one country "possessing" another as a colony, just as it grew uneasy a century or so ago over the fact of one human being possessing another as a slave. The inter-war disputation between the "have" and the "have-not" powers is wearing a bit thin. To discuss colonies in those terms is to regard them exclusively from the point of view of the advanced powers, as so many pieces conferring prestige or wealth or strategic advantage in the game of power politics. It is beginning to dawn on us that the real "have-nots" are the colonial peoples themselves, struggling along in a morass of economic backwardness, a darkness of ignorance, a purgatory of ill-health, from which it has taken the Western world nearly two millennia to emerge, onto its present level of relative civilization.

The mercantilist view of colonies as milch-cows to be exploited for the benefit of the metropolitan power, when looked at firmly in the light of post-depression economics, is seen to be as shortsighted as it was selfish. Not merely to provide a moral basis for their dependent empires but to increase general prosperity, the standard of living of the native colonial peoples (nearly an eighth of the world's population) must imperatively be raised. The principle of trusteeship sounded rather noble when applied to mandates in 1919; but now, even if it were to be adopted for all colonies, it would look inadequate. Positive aid is required, and the only possible substitute for imperialism is seen to be the development—political and social as well as economic—of the areas now classed as colonies. What is more, the development must be undertaken internationally. The separate possession of colonies was an inevitable consequence or extension of the game of power politics as played by independent sovereign states; whatever international framework is superposed upon nationalism after this war, it must concern itself with the colonies as well as with the advanced nations on which the colonies depend.

But first we must know just what we are talking about in discussing the future of colonies. There is still in the United States (perhaps as a historical hangover from the War of Independence) a tendency to call the Dominions colonies. When, almost ten years ago, I published a book on problems of Central Africa, one of the reviewers seriously asked why the British Government did not insist on the abolition of the color bar in the Union of South Africa. He apparently was ignorant of the

fact that the Union of South Africa is an independent sovereign state, and that Britain has no more say in its internal affairs than does the U. S. A. in the internal affairs of Brazil or China. Even today American newspapers often refer to Dominion troops as "colonials"—a practice which must certainly cause either mirth or resentment in Australian, South African and other Dominion quarters.

Colonies in the proper sense of the word are politically dependent territories, administered from the capital of colonial power. They have their own governors and legislative councils; but there is almost invariably an "official majority" on the council, consisting of local civil servants and administrators. There is little representation of the native population on the council, and that little is in most cases indirect, often through a white missionary (as well as via the Commissioner for Native Affairs), and general policy is imposed from London, Paris, Brussels, and so on. This applies also to the mandated territories, in spite of the slight degree of international supervision exercised over them by the League.

Colonies in their strict sense of the word can be still further sub-divided. In the first place, there are the relatively advanced colonies which are clearly destined in the near future to follow countries like Iraq and to emerge from colonial dependence into the condition of partial or complete self-government. Syria, Palestine, and the Philippines are obvious examples, while Ceylon and Burma are clear candidates for a fairly speedy attainment of Dominion status. Ethiopia, after its brief interlude as an Italian colony, has now been restored to independence, but (as with other somewhat backward territories) its independence will be qualified for some time to come by a certain amount of help and tutelage from the white man.

Northern Africa constitutes a special area. Already before the war, Algeria and northern Libya were for most purposes integral parts of France and Italy respectively: Algeria in fact was virtually a French *département*. In any case the whole of the north African littoral, with its hinterland back to the Sahara, is historically a part of the Mediterranean economy and culture and may be expected to become linked with increasing closeness to the European system.

Among the remainder, a number have been retained as colonies wholly or mainly for strategic reasons. Gibraltar, Malta, and Hawaii are the most obvious cases, while Aden, Guam, Hong Kong, and the illicitly fortified Japanese mandates in the Marshall and Caroline Islands are other examples. Cyprus, British Malaya, Dakar, and many other territories are of value as much for strategic as for other reasons: The strategic importance of the West Indies and Newfoundland for the Western Hemisphere has been acknowledged in the arrangements made for leasing bases to the United States, and the Anglo-American occupation of Iceland has *de facto* converted that island into a strategic colony of the United Nations, the Malta of the North Atlantic. The future of strategic colonies will depend primarily upon the arrangements made after the war for guaranteeing international security. The most likely guess seems to be that they will develop, through a stage of pooled strategic strong-points shared by some or all of the United Nations, into truly International bases at the disposal of whatever security league comes into existence. In any event, purely strategic colonies constitute a small fraction of the total, and the strategic aspect of other colonies (for example, Singapore in British Malaya, or Dakar in French West Africa) will clearly be dealt with from the angle of security.

Even when the advanced and the strategic colonies are eliminated, the bulk of colonial territories remain to be considered—the whole of tropical Africa including Madagascar, the West Indies, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, New Guinea, Greenland, and various islands in the Pacific. They all share one characteristic —cultural, social, and economic backwardness.

II

BRITAIN is the greatest colonial power. In Britain during the war, in spite of all the urgencies of the military situation, there has been a great revival of interest in the colonial question. Different groups naturally arrive at different solutions; but it remains true that the general direction of opinion is remarkably uniform. First, it presupposes a necessary minimum of international organization to guarantee security from military aggression and to promote economic stability. It rejects the pooling of colonies under an international body. Instead, it envisages the adherence of all colonial powers to a colonial charter, the raising of administrative and labor standards by a series of international conventions, and the general supervision of colonial administration by an international

Colonial Commission, with advisory, research, and grant-giving powers, but without executive authority. Thirdly, it regards the development of the tropical colonies as one of the major economic priorities before the world, only less urgent than the reconstruction of the devastated areas of Europe and the Far East. Before the world can begin to be prosperous, its backward areas must be provided with the necessary capital equipment, including not only the material basis for prosperity, but the equipment of their inhabitants with health, knowledge, and skill. And the colonies include almost all the most backward areas of the globe. Indeed, we can say that the problem of colonies is primarily the problem of abolishing tropical backwardness. Colonies would not have become colonies if they had not been so backward.

The question is how to raise their mode of existence at optimum speed toward a new level; a level where their standard of living will be as high as that of other countries, where they can govern themselves and stand politically on their own feet, and where they can contribute their full quota to the general prosperity and the cultural life of this planet. I have deliberately used the phrase *optimum* in place of *maximum* speed. In the case of advanced societies, it suffices to prescribe the desirable direction of movement; for tropical areas, it is also necessary to discover the optimum rate of change. When the advance to be made is not merely from one level of civilization to the next, but from a pre-mechanical, analphabetic, primitive tribal society, operating in untamed natural surroundings, to a technological and highly educated civilization which has largely controlled and even created its own physical environment, it is extremely easy to move too fast: change, like food, must be provided in assimilable doses. Equally, it is easy for change in one field to get quite out of step with other sets of changes, so distorting and disturbing the whole process. Thus in some areas, concentration on the economic exploitation of colonial areas has resulted in enormous labor migrations which have not only drained the native reserves of the menfolk needed for subsistence agriculture and a balanced life, but at the other end have brought into being a dingy, discontented, and atomized black proletariat, which, on any standard of ultimate human values, represents a regression from traditional tribal existence.

The favorite solution of the liberal thinkers and the idealist constitution-mongers has been the immediate pooling of all colonies under the administration of an international authority. This, however, is in reality not only impracticable but undesirable. No international authority which we can contemplate as possible in the near future, could be adequate to undertake the full executive responsibility demanded of an administration, and the existing colonial powers would rightly refuse to hand over their responsibilities to such an organization. Furthermore, colonial administration is a difficult business, demanding a homogeneous staff with its own traditions and accumulated experience. The handing over of administration to a mixed international staff unsupported by strong central machinery would in many cases cause a retrogression in the handling of native problems, and this might well have quite serious effects in some areas. The future of the native peoples, not the satisfaction of the claims of European powers to prestige or to rights of exploitation, should be the primary objective.

The problem is to combine a national machinery of executive colonial government with adequate international regulation; granted that administration remains mainly in the hands of the existing powers, how are we to ensure more uniform and rising standards of administration, how to promote an increasing measure of self-government, and how, in the interim before full self-government is reached, are we to strengthen international interest and international supervision?

III

ANOTHER widely mooted suggestion has been the universal adoption of a strengthened Mandate principle. After the last war, the ex-German colonies were transferred to other powers, not as outright possessions, but as Mandates from the League of Nations. The system involved the formal acceptance of the principle of trusteeship. The Mandatory Power was to administer the mandated territory in the interests of the native inhabitants until such time as they were capable of self-government, just as a trustee administers a ward's estate until he comes of age. Largely under the influence of Lord Lugard, this simple idea of trusteeship was gradually replaced by what he called the Dual Mandate. Under this concept the trustee preserves a dual responsibility—toward the native inhabitants, to encourage their progress toward greater prosperity and self-government,

Map of Colonial Possessions before World War II

—Drawn specially for FREE WORLD by Marthe Rajchma

and toward the rest of the world, to make the resources of the area generally available. The Mandatory Power had to give an annual account of its stewardship to the Mandates Commission of the League, a body which included representatives of non-colonial as well as of colonial powers.

The mandate system did produce certain valuable results. It has on occasion prevented undesirable action. The French, for instance, made one or two attempts to extend to their Mandates their strongly protectionist imperial system, with the trade of the colonies tied to that of the metropolitan country, but this has always been successfully resisted by the Mandates Commission. The standard of administration demanded in a mandated territory has inevitably had repercussions on the colonies of the same power, notably in spilling over into contiguous colonial areas. It has always aided public opinion, both at Geneva and perhaps even more in the home parliaments, in keeping governments up to the mark.

The suggestion has therefore been made that all colonies should be proclaimed as mandates, held in trust for their inhabitants on behalf of the world at large, and that at the same time the Mandates Commission should be strengthened both in its research and secretarial staff and in its powers. There are, however, a number of objections to this course. In many quarters, not only in ex-enemy countries, the mandate system as introduced in 1919 was regarded as little more than a pious veneer for annexation. Then the term has become, rightly or wrongly, associated with the idea of transfer of territories from one power to another, which would be bitterly resisted by various colonial powers as well as being undesirable in itself. Again, in certain quarters, including the educated natives of various colonies, it has acquired a connotation of inferior status. And finally, the principle of trusteeship itself is regarded as inadequate to modern conditions. Lord Hailey, the author of the great African Survey, and now intimately associated with the framing of a general line for British colonial policy, has said in a recent address that the idea of trusteeship is too legalistic and negative, too much a survival from the laisser-faire epoch. Government today must be positive, must take the initiative in an active policy of development and welfare. The trustee, in fact, must be replaced by the educator and the guardian.

For these and other reasons it seems best, while perhaps retaining the mandatory principle for the existing mandated areas, to include it within a wholly new system. This system must be as comprehensively international as possible. It is not enough for one or two colonial powers to adopt the guardianship principle of development and welfare. For one thing, it is no good blinking the fact that some colonial areas are by no means well administered, either in the sense of efficiency or in that of promoting the welfare of their inhabitants. The world's conscience will not long continue to tolerate any such gross inequality of standards. What is more, inequality of standards is economically unsound and politically dangerous. Inefficient administration and insufficient development interferes with world prosperity. And inequality of treatment will, sooner rather than later, create a sense of political grievance. Malays, Negroes, Melanesians—all the colonial peoples are rapidly and inevitably reaching a level at which they are capable of a simple but heady brand of political thinking. In the so-called Dark Continent, for instance, fifty years ago the Negro millions still lived their tribal lives as ignorant of the word *Africa* and its implications as were the vast majority of Indians a century ago of the implications of the word *India*. Today, however, there is a rapidly growing minority who think of themselves first and foremost as Africans; and the Italian annexation of Abyssinia, together with the fact that the white men have fought two wars among themselves in the last twenty-five years, is now in the background of the native mind from the Sudan to the Cape, from Tanganyika to French West Africa. Africans can see just as far beyond their noses as other people: and inequality of treatment in neighboring areas, perhaps more than any other type of injustice, is likely to produce a resentful and dangerous type of Africanism, in place of the healthy African patriotism and ambition which it should be the business of the colonial powers to encourage and to guide.

IV

WHAT system then should we aim at setting up? In general, it should subserve the dual aim of development and of internationalism. Coming down to detail, in the first place it is desirable that the new conception of positive guardianship should be internationally expressed and publicly proclaimed. This would probably be best accomplished by the promulgation of a

Colonial Charter, which would be for the colonial peoples what Magna Carta was to Medieval England or the Declaration of Independence to the infant United States. Such a charter should be jointly proclaimed by as many as possible of the United Nations; it would be difficult for any of the colonial powers to stand outside for long.

The charter should be neither detailed nor lengthy, but need affirm only such general principles as the following: First, colonial dependencies are not possessions but are held in trust or guardianship. Second, the primary aim of the guardianship is to help the colonial peoples as rapidly as possible toward self-government. Thirdly, its other major aim is the development of the colonial territories, first and foremost for the benefit of their own inhabitants, but also for that of the rest of the world. Fourthly, the guardianship is to be exercised jointly by all the advanced nations adhering to the charter, but its administrative responsibilities are to be delegated to powers with colonial experience. Fifthly, colonial status implies no inherent or permanent inequality: No such inequality exists, and equal status and equal opportunity for all peoples and races is the goal to be realized as quickly as possible. Sixthly, all posts in the colonial services, up to the highest, shall be open to the local inhabitants, subject only to selection for efficiency; and the educational system of the colonies shall have as one of its prime functions the training of men of local race for such posts. Seventhly and finally, all nations adhering to the charter shall have equality of economic opportunity in the colonies, and also equality of all other types of opportunity, subject only to the need for maintaining efficiency of administration.

The best method of implementing the charter and of ensuring a steady raising of standards, will probably be by a series of international conventions. The organization for handling such conventions lies ready to hand, in the shape of the International Labor Office (though in some cases other types of international instrument, such as the Congo Basin Treaty, may be preferable). The I.L.O. already has a colonial section, which would merely require strengthening. If it be asked what the conventions would cover, we can answer forced labor, labor conditions and welfare in general, and opportunities for employment and education. The great advantage of the method is that it is a progressive one, which can contribute to a steady raising of standards in relation to changing world conditions. Its effectiveness would be increased if means were found to associate local organizations, such as agricultural co-operatives, say, or bodies concerned with social welfare, with the detailed application of the conventions to particular areas.

Secondly, even if executive responsibility is left in the hands of powers with colonial experience, their administration can be to some extent internationalized, and it can be subjected to international supervision. A small proportion of technical posts should immediately be thrown open to qualified men of any nationality, and the proportion should be gradually but steadily increased. The actual selection should be left in the hands of the power concerned, for otherwise it could not well continue to assume executive responsibility. As time went on and the system proved workable, it could be extended to administrative posts as well. Meanwhile, a growing number of increasingly important posts would become fitted by inhabitants of the colonies themselves. Thus there would be parallel progress toward international government and toward self-government; and even if in some cases international government takes the lead, its share in actual administration will all the time be growing quantitatively less and that of self-government quantitatively more.

International supervision and regulation, however, will be needed at the outset, both to ensure proper standards and also to give some degree of responsibility to the other powers and some outlet for their natural desire to participate in colonial affairs. This could be provided in the form of a colonial section of whatever international political organization comes into being after the war: let us call it the Colonial Commission. Some people are still obsessed with the idea that we should attempt to lay down now, in as much detail as possible, the formal constitution and organizational machinery of any such body. This I am sure is wrong, and a wasteful diversion of will and energy. Whatever organization does spring up, will grow bit by bit if it is to endure and is in any case quite certain to be different from any present theoretical imaginings. What we ought to define are the broad functions of such a body: once we are clear about these the machinery for their realization can be brought into being. One major function should be

planning. A second is advice. And the third is financial help. The experience of large-scale development organizations, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority in this country, shows that a set-up of this kind, although without executive authority (the T.V.A. has executive authority only in connection with its dams and power plants, not in matters of health, agricultural improvement, education, recreation, and so forth), can be extremely efficient in supervising and guiding development along right lines.

There are various prerequisites. The whole program depends on securing the co-operation of the executive organizations concerned. For this, the central authority must be prepared to act as a general catalyst and as an organizer of joint action whenever several separate organizations are concerned in a project. In the long run, it depends also on popular understanding and backing: for this, co-operation with the agencies of education and of public opinion is needed, and local bodies and communities should be encouraged to contribute to the plan and to feel a sense of participation in the forward swing of development. Then the planning must be based on ample research and survey; the advice must be based on detailed field knowledge; and the financial help must be based on an ample supply of men of first class caliber, to go where the problems are and to persuade the executive authorities to use the money to best advantage. Thus all we need say at the moment about the Colonial Commission is that it should have attached to it a strong international staff of research workers and advisers, and should have allocated to it a considerable share of the central fund which must be at the disposal of any future League or other international organization that is destined to endure.

The separate colonial powers will no doubt have their own funds for colonial development and their own staff of experts and traveling advisers, such as Britain, for instance, already possesses. There should be no more difficulty in combining these with the resources of the Colonial Commission in a common program than there has been difficulty in pooling the resources of, say, the Land-Grant Colleges, the State Universities, the forestry and agricultural services of the Department of Agriculture, and the 4H Clubs with those of the T.V.A. in securing a sane agricultural development in the Tennessee Valley area.

There remains the function of reviewing progress and of detecting any failure of the colonial powers to live up to their executive responsibilities. Something of the sort is performed for mandated territories by the Mandates Commission; but its function is confined to discussing the reports which it is the duty of the Mandatory Powers to make. It would seem best that detailed review, including any inspection which might prove necessary, should be kept in the hands of the International Labor Office. This in its turn could report to the Colonial Commission on any matters concerning general principles or demanding political action.

Some such general set-up would seem best adapted to reconcile the divergent claims of the colonial peoples, the colonial powers, and the other advanced nations, with the obvious need for international responsibility and guidance, in a practical scheme of step-by-step advance.

V

I HAVE left to the last the most urgent problem—the raising of standards of life in the backward tropical colonies. Though this is primarily an economic and social problem, it has its political aspects. It concerns the political future of the colonies themselves, since political aspirations toward self-government must be built on the foundations of prosperity and education. And it concerns the political future of the advanced nations, since in the joint development by them of backward areas is to be found the only possible substitute for imperialism in the tightly-knit unit world of after the war.

Let us first try to picture more in detail some of the hard facts which are included in the phrase "tropical backwardness." It is not easy, for the life of most colonial peoples is lived on a different level of history from ours and is measurable by quite other standards. The tropics are in large part just emerging from primitive tribal existence; at best, they are still mainly in the barbaric phase of culture—pre-scientific, pre-technological. They are almost entirely lacking in the apparatus of modern civilization. The task of development is immense—nothing less than the capital equipment of the tropics for civilized living. But if we can carry it through, we shall have benefited ourselves as well as the native peoples of the colonies. While they are in their present backward state, they cannot provide good markets for the manufactures of advanced countries;

they cannot make any adequate contribution to the industrial and cultural life of the world; and even as a source of cheap labor they will be inefficient and unreliable so long as they remain unhealthy and uneducated. In the last few decades, economists have realized that mercantilism is a short-sighted policy which in the long run cannot pay; today they wish to substitute constructive development for mercantilism, the building up of new resources and new potentialities for the immediate exploitation of what is now there.

Let us take a look at the extent of the job which this new policy implies. In the first place, the idea of the tropics as a luxuriant region, effortlessly producing abundance and riches, is a fable. Almost the only tropical regions which are prosperous are some of those endowed with mineral wealth. Soil erosion, absence of necessary mineral salts, pests, and parasites are common. In any case, the tropics are to a large extent still physically untamed and unequipped. Railways, motor roads, ports, bridges, warehouse and storage facilities, processing plants, marketing services, dams and reservoirs, power plants, forestry, agricultural and veterinary services—these are in their infancy in most areas and must be provided on a generous scale before the colonies can take their proper place in world economy, where they can act as a stimulus rather than a drag. In addition, encouragement must be given to light and secondary industries, for only so can a reasonably balanced economy grow up in colonial areas.

But human resources are just as important as material resources. By and large, the inhabitants of tropical colonies are miserably equipped with health, energy, education, and technical skill. The noble savage, the magnificent human animal endowed with the health of which civilization has robbed us degenerate whites—that is another myth. The tropical peoples as a whole are unhealthy peoples. In the tropics, vital statistics are very dubious, but we know enough to say that death and disease rates are of a different order of magnitude from those which applied science has made possible in the Western world. To take but a few examples, African infant mortality ranges from 1 in 4 to 1 in 2; probably every adult Negro is infested with one or more kinds of worms, usually including hookworm, and often with malaria as well; in some areas up to 90 per cent of the population suffers from venereal disease; gross malnutrition as well as vitamin deficiency is frequent. The white man in the tropics curses the native for his laziness. But if the native were once rid of parasitic and infectious disease and given an adequate diet, he would not merely be more energetic: his entire personality would be transformed.

Improved health would provide the physiological basis for a new advance: education is needed to provide the mental basis. The tropics are as backward in education as in health. Over most of Africa, not 10 per cent of the children ever go to any school; and not 10 per cent of the schools are anything but the most primitive sub-elementary bush-school (hymn-singing, the catechism, and the rudiments of the three R's). When the so-called primitive is given his chance, he can learn as well as anyone else. He can acquire mechanical skill, as exemplified in the workshops of the Belgian Congo; intellectual skill, as is to be seen in the Gold Coast; military proficiency, as has been demonstrated in Ethiopia during this war by the black troops from Nigeria and East Africa. For the realization of the people's latent abilities, home background and some general culture are needed as well as schools. But, given two or three generations of good education and of outlets for those who have been educated, the people would be as radically transformed in mind and capabilities as they would be in body and energies by proper health and diet. Tropical backwardness, economic, political, physical, and mental, is not an inescapable and permanent fact of nature; it is a temporary phenomenon which can be remedied if we are willing to make the necessary effort.

VI

WHAT measures should be taken to lift the tropical countries and their inhabitants out of this slough of backwardness? It is clear that the task is too large, too complex, and too long-term to be left wholly or even mainly to the free play of private initiative. Aid in colonial development must be in large measure international. The first prerequisite is an exhaustive survey of resources and needs, backed by adequate pure research. Anthropology, water-power, mineral and forest resources, soils, erosion, agricultural products, transport and marketing needs, home economics, health, population trends, the prospects of export and home industries—all need to be surveyed in a much

more comprehensive way than has yet been done.

Next comes the financing of development. This can be done in various ways. Colonial profits and revenues will only go a short distance. Loans and grants-in-aid, both from the separate colonial powers and from the international Colonial Commission, will be of importance. And private finance, largely guided into desirable channels through some international investment board, can still play a major role. Already the British and American authorities are considering ways and means for setting up international finance agencies, among whose functions would be the promotion of development in backward areas. For the actual job of carrying out development, special agencies and methods will be needed. Existing colonial governments can continue doing much valuable work. Then we may envisage the setting up of more organizations of the type of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation in the Sudan, where co-operatives of native producers are organized with the aid both of private finance and government aid. We shall require a careful organization of marketing agencies for all products which are regulated by international schemes of commodity control. And we shall certainly need special long-term planning and development agencies of rather new type.

One valuable suggestion, which will apply to those numerous tropical regions where all-around development is needed for a longish period before commercial profit can be expected, is to set up agencies rather of the type of the T.V.A., but adapted to regions of greater backwardness, and under some international control. Their function would be social as much as economic and would involve the transformation of every aspect of life—a task which obviously requires long-term planning as well as large-scale capital investment. We may call such bodies Regional Development Agencies.

For other regions where a profitable external market is already, or will shortly be, available, a different type of body is needed, which we may christen the International Public Concern. Their shareholders should be given a minimum rate of return on their investment by international guarantee. In return for this, a maximum rate should also be laid down; all profits in excess of this must be returned to the area, and a certain proportion must be set aside for social, educational, and health improvement (somewhat as with the Miners' Welfare Fund in Britain). This compulsory ploughing-back of any excess profits is essential if the development of the area is to proceed at a reasonable rate. Finally, as such concerns are bound to exert a dominant influence on all aspects of native life, it is essential that they should operate under welfare and conservation regulations approved by the Colonial Commission.

There are many other aspects of colonial development which it would be interesting to discuss, but space permits me to mention only two. First, it is very important that there should be a well thought out population policy for backward areas. As health measures bear fruit, we may expect a formidable spurt of population growth in areas such as tropical Africa; and population pressure is one of the main causes of economic backwardness in countries like India. Thus the provision of birth-control facilities should be a recognized part of the colonial health program. Finally, we must do our utmost to secure a continuity of cultural growth, even for the most backward peoples of the world. At present, in most areas the old tribal society and its values and ideals are being rapidly destroyed, and nothing solid is being put in its place. The detribalized native too often gets the worst of both worlds, acquiring a rather unpleasant veneer of imitation white civilization grafted on to roots of tribal ignorance and superstition.

This war is a symptom of a major historical transformation which will pursue its inexorable course whether we like it or not—a transformation toward a world that will be more socialized, more planned, more internationally organized than the nineteenth century world that is fading out. But if we cannot prevent that transformation taking place, we can help to guide it. We can see that it is achieved either in a totalitarian, Hitlerian, way, or in a democratic, co-operative way. In the former case, the new world order will be based on inequality and on domination by force; in the latter, on equality and on mutual help. In regard to colonies, nationalist imperialism could not help being tainted with inequality, exploitation, and forcible domination. The alternative is to treat the colonial peoples as human beings like ourselves, to be guided, helped, and developed toward future political and cultural equality. The responsibility for this rests not on the few colonial powers, but jointly on all the advanced nations. Once this alternative is chosen, all else is a mere matter of machinery and will follow in due course.

NAZI ARMY of CIVIL WAR

BY KARL O. PAETEL

THE National Socialist party knows very well that the German Army is at its beck and call only so long as the basis of power of the state is not called into question. The Nazis long ago created their own army, today numbering about half a million men. Heinrich Himmler, the *Reichsfuehrer SS,* placed a special military organization, armed to the teeth, at the disposal of the nazi movement and the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor—the *Schutzstaffel SS* or Elite Guards, and the *Waffen SS.* They are the executioners of the party's dictates and behind the scenes they are forever locked in struggle with the army generals. Occasionally this jockeying for position becomes visible even to the outside observer in some individual conflict. So far the Elite Guards have always carried off the honors, steadily increasing their influence.

This party army is today deployed partly along the home front, partly in the theaters of war beyond the borders of Germany. As recently as March 15, 1942, in his Memorial Day address, Hitler spoke of the "*four* pillars of the German war power"—the army, the navy, the air force, and the *Waffen SS*—thus ostentatiously underlining the independent character of the Elite Guards.

The original *Schutzstaffel* of the National Socialist party, or SS, the so-called Hitler Shock Troops, had been founded in 1923 by Lieutenant Berchtold. In 1925, they were reorganized into fifteen main units, and today there are thirty-nine, scattered over Germany and the occupied territories, and corresponding to the present German Corps areas. Today the *SS-Verfügungstruppen,* (Garrison SS) and the *Totenkopf-Verbaende* (Death's Head Units) of the *Waffen SS* are ready for any critical eventuality. These units are always so disposed as to be remote from their native provinces—Bavarians in North Germany, Prussians in Austria, *etc.*—and they are permitted virtually no contact with the population.

These 500,000 militant Nazis are equipped with every weapon needed for a civil war, and their organization parallels that of the regular army. A *Sturm* corresponds to a company; a *Sturmbann,* to a battalion; a *Standarte,* to a

regiment; an *Abschnitt,* to a division; an *Oberabschnitt,* to an army corps. Their task is not only to keep the home front in check, but also to serve as the backbone to the front line troops, in the sense of keeping them "in line" for the Fuehrer. The special units going to the front are under the command of General Karl Wolff, of the *Waffen SS,* and Group Leader Juettner, Chief of the Elite Guard *Kommando-Amt,* the Field Command of the *Waffen SS;* the home front was supervised by Obergruppenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich, Chief of the Elite Guard Security Service as well as of the Government Security Police.

The nucleus of the Elite Guard arm is formed by the *Verfügungstruppen.* Like the Death's Head units, they are, in the words of Heinrich Himmler, meant for the "theater of war inside Germany." As early as 1937, in an address before German officers, Himmler declared: "In any future war we shall have not only a land front, a sea front, and an air front, but a fourth theater of war as well—Germany itself. This inside theater of war will be the decisive one."

During the course of the war, these units of the Elite Guards have been used at the fronts in Poland, Norway, and Russia, and have sometimes suffered grave losses. This party cadre succeeded in the undertaking in which Roehm's Storm Troops failed. They formed an actual crack formation, owing allegiance only to the Fuehrer, equal in training and equipment to the regular army, available to the nazi leadership when the regular army showed signs of breaking.

The *Verfügungstruppen* consist of heavy and medium armored divisions, motorized lightly armored reconnaissance units, motorized artillery formations, and special pioneer and intelligence sections—all of them in training and quality of arms at least as well organized as corresponding army units. The Elite Guard officers rank with those of the regular army in every respect. They are thoroughly indoctrinated National Socialists, most of them graduates of the special party schools, sworn to service for twelve years. Even today they have attained a level that has more than once enabled them to assume regular army functions, though they were not career soldiers. Elite Guard Hauptsturmbannfuehrer Willi Brandt became one of the most important editors of the *Militär-Wochenblatt,* outstanding German military weekly. Another graduate of the *Verfügungstruppen* is the well-known Feld Marshall General Rommel, German commander in chief in Libya today.

The equipping of the Elite Guards with heavy arms began even before the war. The *Leib-Standarte Adolf Hitler,* commanded by Hitler's friend, Sepp Dietrich, and originally stationed in Berlin, embraced three motorized battalions that could also be used on foot. The *Standarte Deutschland,* located at Munich and at one time commanded by SS-Standartenfuehrer Steiner, who recently fell in Russia, had a nucleus of four battalions of sharpshooters equipped with motorcycles. The *Standarte Germania,* at Hamburg, had three battalions. The *Standarte Feldherrnhalle* (named after the scene of the first Nazi fighting in 1923), the *Sturmbann Nürnberg,* and other units are similarly organized. The Elite Guards also have their own combat intelligence, assault pioneers, and other small units loosely attached to the *Verfügungstruppen,* to be used alone or in combination. (The *Standarte Feldherrnhalle* was originally a regiment of the SA, but it was always garrisoned, even in peace time, and was organized just like the SS. For the most part, it was taken over into the parachute units at the outbreak of the war; its units were used in Crete, for example, and the remainder was used as a special battalion on the Russian front.)

II

OFFICIALLY, the Elite Guard units mentioned are outside the army proper. Certain other special units, however, are incorporated directly into the army. Thus the present General Goering Regiment, now subject to the Air Ministry, gradually grew out of a Special-Purpose Police Section under Major Wecke, which in 1933 carried out numerous actions for the Gestapo. It had been established by Goering on February 23, 1933, in his capacity as Prussian Minister of the Interior, and was stationed in the south of Berlin to counteract "enemies of the state." During the months following the nazi seizure of power, this unit was greatly expanded. Thus two machine gun companies were added in March. Two months later, headquarters for the group were established in the old Prussian Cadet School at Lichterfelde near Berlin. In September, it was given the colors of the Old Guard Chasseur Battalion and the new name State Police Group Gen-

eral Goering. It was placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Jacobi and its training was taken over by the Reichswehr. Its strength then was one group staff, two battalions staffs, eight companies, one company of mounted police, and one motorcycle, bicycle, and signal section each, stationed in the Berlin suburbs of Spandau, Charlottenburg, and Reinickendorf respectively. Early in 1935, an anti-tank company, another signal section, and a section of engineers were added. Late that year, the unit was placed directly under Goering, as Air Minister. A parachute troop section and a light anti-aircraft battalion were formed, later to be made into an independent parachute regiment and a heavy anti-aircraft battalion. New machine gun and pioneer sections were also added. In 1938, the unit was given the name of General Goering Regiment. Today it contains one regimental staff, three anti-aircraft battalions, one searchlight section, and one infantry battalion. It was this regiment that furnished the core for the German parachute troops. It received, along with the *Begleitsbataillon des Führers,* once commanded by Rommel, the specific duty of the "protection of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, and of the Commander of the *Luftwaffe*" (Goering). Its main function was that of systematically infiltrating a cadre of militant Nazis into the German air arm.

Another formation composed of tried and true Nazis is the Regiment Greater Germany, which is directly under the army command. It grew from the former Berlin Guard Regiment, formed by the Reichswehr command under the Weimar Republic and then consisting of soldiers enlisted for a term of twelve years. The companies took turns in serving one year each in Berlin, but the officers' corps remained the same. Originally, the Berlin Guard had eight companies. On September 15, 1939, it was reorganized as the Infantry Regiment Greater Germany. It embraces four battalions consisting of twelve infantry companies, four machine gun companies, one field artillery company, one anti-tank company, and special units, together with reserve formations.

Like the General Goering Regiment and the *Verfügungstruppen,* the Regiment Greater Germany is made up solely of volunteers who must enlist before their twentieth year for a term of twelve years. Entrance requirements are in keeping with the high Elite Guard standards. Enlisted men are promoted to sergeants after two years. The Regiment Greater Germany is a crack outfit enjoying all the privileges of the former Guard Regiments and therefore co-ordinated particularly closely with the nazi system. The official duty of the Regiment Greater Germany is the "protection of the Capital," but above all it, too, represents a cadre of trusted Nazis within the army.

In the course of the war both the Goering and the Greater Germany Regiments have been used at the front. Since February, 1941, they have been conducting recruiting campaigns to expand and replace losses. But the bulk of both regiments remains stationed in Berlin or at the "Fuehrer's Headquarters," where it is at the disposal of the nazi leadership. They are motorized and highly mobile, and they represent a Praetorian Guard that can take instant action, at the first sign of unrest, until the Elite Guards can mobilize their full strength for civil war. Thus the *Waffen SS* has not merely the old SS Formations at its disposal, but within the army, the air force, and the SA it has its special troops, in order to have nuclei of resistance everywhere.

In addition to the *Verfügnungstruppen* of the *Waffen SS,* there are still other special formations for checking the enemy within—the Death's Head Units. In 1933, groups of one hundred men each were picked from the concentration camp complements and organized into these Death's Head Units under Elite Guard Obergruppenfuehrer Eicke. Since June 30, 1934, these units have exclusive control over all German concentration camps, among other things. Originally, their strength ran to about 25,000 men, each enlisted for a term of four years. When the war broke out, the old groups of one hundred furnished the core for some thirty special Death's Head *Sturmbanns.* Supported by the so-called People's Intelligence Service, a special new vigilante organization formed in 1940, and by Heydrich's Elite Guard Security Service, the Security Police, and the Uniformed Police commanded by Obergruppenfuehrer Daluege, this organization is the executive arm of the Gestapo and the Council for Inner Defense, founded on September 5, 1939, at Himmler's proposal. Here is but one sample of Death's Head activities. At the slightest evidence of opposition, such as hostile slogans chalked up in factories, a Death's Head Unit has been known to take possession in numerous instances. The plant is then quarantined and the Death's Heads furnish "protec-

tion" to the Gestapo during the ensuing investigation, subsequently escorting the culprits to the concentration camp.

The head of the Elite Guards himself is quite well aware that the activity of the Elite Guards meets with suspicion and hostility among the German people. In 1936, Himmler published a pamphlet entitled The Elite Guards as an Anti-Bolshevik Fighting Organization, in which he cynically stated: "I know that there are millions in Germany whose stomachs turn when they behold the black uniforms of our Elite Guards. We understand that and we do not expect to be loved by too many. Those who love Germany will respect us. But those who have a bad conscience shall fear us."

Himmler has built himself still another special Elite Guard organization—the *SS-Wirschaftsring* (Elite Guard Industrial Circle) which grew out of the Cologne Industrial Club in 1933. This organization gently but firmly reminds industrialists, men of wealth, noblemen, *etc.*, that a monthly subsidy to the all-important work of the Elite Guards would have a marked effect on their standing. The victims pay up, and the size of their donation dictates whether they receive a certificate identifying them as patrons of the Elite Guards an honorary Elite Guard badge, or, indeed, even an actual commission in the Elite Guards (entailing no active service). Baron von Neurath, Ribbentrop, the former Minister of Economics Schmidt, and still others found it expedient to become honorary Elite Guard officers, thus actually becoming puppets of Himmler. One of the most important patrons is the well known Rhenish industrialist Albert Voegler.

III

ONE of the causes of the blood purge of June 30, 1934, was the demand by the generals that the Reichswehr remain the "sole arms bearer of the nation." Today half a million superbly armed fanatical Nazis, owing allegiance only to the Fuehrer, stand beside the regular armed forces. Partly outside the army, partly inside, they represent a power that cannot be left out of account in any speculations concerning "action by the generals."

The very existence of this nazi army proves that in the years of underground fighting between the Army High Command and the party, the Nazis have won one victory after another. The struggle between the Elite Guards and the generals has passed through several stages. The Elite Guards won their first great triumph in February, 1938. When certain generals opposed Hitler's plan to march into Austria, Himmler furnished the pretexts for getting rid of them—evidence of General von Blomberg's marriage "beneath his class" and of General von Fritsch's homosexuality. True, the latter was exposed as a forgery before an honor court—but the Elite Guards had succeeded in eliminating men irksome to them.

In September, 1938, the German General Staff hesitated to take action against Czechoslovakia. Seventeen generals were promptly retired. When Hitler's and Himmler's optimistic predictions were borne out, Himmler's confident, Elite Guard Obergruppenfuehrer Karl Hermann Frank, was entrusted with the executive power in Prague, beside the conservative Baron von Neurath, put in for show. As early as 1938, Himmler had his way, and the injunction against party membership by officers was dropped. Himmler proved himself indispensable. In 1938, the Gestapo suddenly arrested Baron von Forstner, a major in the air force and one of the few first World War fliers decorated with the highest German order, *Pour le Mérite*. The charge was "plotting against the security of the state." In the summer of 1939, the same fate was suffered by two captains of the Regiment Greater Germany and by Major Henning of the General Staff. Thus the activities of "Section RW," but recently established within the Elite Guard Security Service by Colonel von Witzleben, were amply justified. As a reward for Himmler's vigilance, the Gestapo was now admitted to army barracks, where it had been banned before.

Early in the Polish campaign, General von Fritsch fell during a minor skirmish under obscure circumstances. There was no end to rumors that the Elite Guards had had a hand in his death. Last winter General Udet crashed in his plane. In the blood purge of June 30, 1934, he had escaped execution by the merest chance and he was known to have counseled against the war with Russia. His fate was shared by Major Moelders, top German flying ace, who had protested the expropriation of Catholic Church property. There were persistent whispers denying that these deaths had been accidental. Shortly after Elite Guard Fuehrer Werlin was made Inspector General



of motor transport, General Todt, Minister of Munitions, fell victim to another plane accident. In January, 1942, when the conflict between Hitler and the Army High Command was at its height, General von Reichenau died of heart failure. Rumors asserted that his death followed a visit by a delegation sent by Elite Guard General Karl Wolff to demand more power for the Elite Guards in the Army.

As in the case of earlier conflicts between nazi and army leaderships, the Elite Guards took advantage of the latest violent quarrel in December, 1941, to strengthen their influence. The Elite Guards had put forward broad demands: assignment of a large number of command posts in the Army High Command to Elite Guard officers; subordination of Army Intelligence to the Elite Guard Security Service; subordination of army reserves to the *Waffen SS;* the right to replenish Elite Guard effectives in any number from other army formations; the creation, within the framework of a special ten-division Elite Guard army, of a separate Elite Guard air force running to several thousand planes and directed by Himmler. So far Obergruppenfuehrer Hans Adolf Prutzmann, liaison man between the Elite Guard head and the high command, has failed to gain all these demands. But this latest quarrel was resolved by a compromise—a compromise in favor of the Elite Guards. During the winter of 1941-42, there was an intensive recruiting campaign on behalf of the Elite Guards throughout Germany. The very strict entrance requirements, proof of "Aryan" extraction back to the year 1750, *etc.,* were somewhat relaxed. It may be assumed that the *Waffen SS* received substantial reinforcements during these months. True, the *Verfügungstruppen* today at the front, especially in Russia, are officially incorporated into the respective army groups. But since this introduces Elite Guard officers into the staffs, Elite Guard influence in the army is strengthened. These officers are under dual authority—the army and the Elite Guards—and they constitute the nazi control within the army, charged with eliminating dangerous opponents and foiling any plots. This Elite Guard network within the army is woven closely. Ordinary privates complain that great care must be taken with slightest criticism, since one can never know whether or not one's fellow is a Gestapo or Elite Guard man. Reports from France insist that even General von Stuelpnagel is under constant Elite Guard observation; even his mail is checked.

The conflict between army and Elite Guards has been revealed most clearly in the occupied territories. Brauchitsch is known to have protested the Elite Guard terror in Poland to Hitler. His protest was ignored. In Norway, the country of "our Nordic brethren," where the psychological situation is particularly difficult for the army of occupation, the army made a definite attempt to dissociate itself from Elite Guard practices. An example is found in the Secret German Documents published late in 1941 in London by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to Parliament. This document contains facsimiles of Army orders concerning the attitude to be taken toward Norwegians, including the following:

> December 13, 1940. From the German Commander in Chief in Norway. . . . I again order all Army personnel to hold aloof from all domestic political strife and not to meddle with matters that are the exclusive concern of the Norwegian people. German soldiers and officers have no busi-

ness at riots, mobs, demonstrations, and fights arising from political causes. All men are to be promptly instructed to depart instantly from the scene of such incidents, lest they be involved as innocent by-standers in situations that are undesirable both for the Norwegians and the police charged with maintaining order.

As in Germany, the "Black Hundreds" of the Elite Guards have become the symbol of terror throughout the occupied territories. Obergruppenfuehrer Wilhelm Raediess in Norway, Brigade Leaders Rauter and Fritz Schmidt in the Netherlands, Obergruppenfuehrer Karl Hermann Frank in Czechoslovakia, and Brigadier Raeder in Belgium—these men became prototypes of the oppressor. During the past winter, Elite Guard forces in every occupied country were reinforced to quell the rising flames of revolt. In Belgium and northern France, the only occupied territories where responsibility is vested in the hands of the military authorities, the army was enjoined to proceed relentlessly against any sign of opposition. A year ago the people in the occupied countries were still telling each other: "If the eagle is on the chest, it's all right, but if it's on the sleeve—run!"

IV

LEGALLY the Elite Guards occupy a unique position in German law. Actions taken by the Gestapo and by Elite Guards in line of duty are not subject to ordinary German jurisdiction. Neither the Elite Guards nor the Gestapo can be enjoined by a judge. On May 2, 1935, the courts of Prussia held that the Gestapo was not subject to legal control. On February 10, 1936, this was reiterated by a decree in Section 7 of the Prussian Code: "Orders and business of the Gestapo are not subject to revision by the courts." A special law of November 9, 1935, specifically vested any Elite Guard with the right to defend his honor and the honor of the movement, arms in hand. Whenever he feels himself attacked or catches a civilian in an act he deems inimical to the interests of the country, an Elite Guard may instantly resort to arms. No judge can punish him.

The oath of the Elite Guards reads as follows: "We vow fealty and valor to Thee, Adolf Hitler, as Fuehrer and Chancellor of the German Reich. We give allegiance and obedience unto death unto Thee and the leaders Thou namest. May God be our witness!" This oath is to Hitler alone—there is no mention either of Germany or of the people.

In the Elite Guard Catechism Himmler declares: "You may rest assured that we could not have formed this corps, sworn to unity, without conviction and faith in a God above us who has created our Fatherland, our people and this earth, and who has sent us our Fuehrer." Thus Hitler's divine mission is postulated as a basis for allegiance.

Nazi racial and prehistorical "research" is often wrongly regarded as no more than a joke. Actually it serves the Elite Guards as an extremely concrete political weapon. Strict principles of selection are to set up a "master class" from the German people as a whole. Even the Junker caste of former days never attained such heights. This elite of half a million, oriented entirely to its own laws and morality, is to lose all sense of allegiance and obligation to the "racially bastardized" remainer of the German people. Prime motive of all thought and action is no longer the fate of the people as a whole, but the maintenance of a privileged position.

Unlike the Storm Troops, who, as "political soldiers" of the nazi movement, were to include representatives of every stratum, the Elite Guard organization was built up by Himmler along definite racial principles. According to his views, the Elite Guards were to represent the "Nordic cream of the German people." In

addition to a Settlement Bureau, a racial Bureau was organized, to decide on the acceptance of recruits. Purity of race had to be proved much more strictly and much farther back—to the year 1750—than for government posts, before a Race Commission consisting of physicians, race specialists, and Elite Guard leaders. Appearance and type were to approximate the ideal "Nordic" man. Minimum Height for Elite Guard in general is 5 ft. 8 in., for Hitler's bodyguard 5 ft. 10 in. Special leadership schools take care of the mental and physical indoctrination of the Elite Guards.

On December 31, 1931, a special "Marriage Order" was published by the Elite Guards. It prescribes that all men must obtain approval from the Elite Guard command before contracting a marriage and provides for the discharge of those that fail to obtain the permission of the Racial Bureau. At the beginning of the war this Order was made even more rigorous. Elite Guard brides not only had to present their pedigree as before, but had to submit to special Elite Guard physicians for intensive "racial control." In a special appeal, Himmler baldly demanded that German women and girls cast aside all petty bourgeois hesitancy and secure propagation of the Nordic elite by permitting Elite Guards and soldiers on furlough to beget children even out of wedlock.

This appeal too had a political basis. All mothers of such nazi children are supported by the Elite Guards, who maintain special maternity homes. Thus the bonds by which hundreds of thousands of Elite Guards are already tied to the nazi leadership are to be supplemented by the "bonds of blood" with which their new families are now joined. In former times the masters of the East-Elbian noble estates reserved to themselves the *ius primae noctis*—the right to deflower the bride of any of their serfs—creating, as it were, a biological link between master and serfs to bolster the patriarchal order. Similarly today, on the fringes of militant nazism, there is to be created in the families whose children have no individual fathers but whose support and godfather is the Elite Guard, a stratum of Elite Guard serfs. In the leadership schools and the "Faith and Beauty" camps organized by Woman Leader Scholz-Klinke, nazi youth is being groomed for this fate.

—Translated by Heinz and Ruth Norden

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AT LONG LAST

An Editorial

THE large scale Commando landing of the United Nations in France is the best news we have had for many months. Whatever the outcome of this operation will be, its military and political significance cannot be over-estimated, for it shows that the long-awaited offensive of the United Nations is in sight and proves by action rather than words the often-voiced determination to fight this war to a victorious end. It gives long-awaited relief to our Russian allies in their darkest hour. It offers encouraging proof to the people of the occupied countries that the United Nations will strike a well-prepared and decisive blow against the Axis Powers. Last but not least, it has lifted up the spirits of all the people in the Democracies who have felt frustrated and humiliated by the defensive strategy of their leaders.

We, who have stressed so often the importance of political war, wish to congratulate as an outstanding feature of this offensive the splendidly conceived and executed propaganda effort in the hourly broadcasts from Great Britain to the French people. We know how thrilling are the statements which come out of the muted radios of France asking the French people to wait until France and the Allies will call upon them for action, recalling the promise that Great Britain and the other United Nations would meet the enemy on the Continent, and inspiring the impatient victims of nazi oppression with the fulfillment of that promise.

CO-OPERATIVES *vs.* STATEISM

By James Peter Warbasse

AN age is dying before our eyes. What kind of a new age is being born is wrapped in mystery. The uncertainty of outcome is due to lethargy among the peoples of the world. "Wise politicians," said Demosthenes, "ought not to await the *event* to know what measures to take, but the measures which they have taken ought to produce the *event*." This ancient injunction is disregarded today when people have the means to mold events to their liking but leave the decision regarding the future in the hands of dominant and aggressive individuals. An economic system which has brought great blessings, which has promoted invention and the arts, which has advanced the wealth of the world is approaching the end of its reign. This end is coming about because individualistic competition to get the difference between the cost and the selling price is failing as a motive of business. The competitive animosities which it creates among individuals expand into international hostilities, giving rise to destructive and costly war.

In the absence of planful thinking on the part of the people, and partly as a result of three-fourths of a century of socialist propaganda, political governments are stepping into the breach with attempts to solve the problem. Essential businesses which fail to make profits, to pay dividends and interest, to give adequately compensated employment to labor, and to supply consumers with their products are being supplanted by political government in business. The sequence is simple. The government makes surveys, gives advice, and then provides control and regulation; commissions are set up; government loans, government gifts, and government ownership then follow. In the United States, shipping, banking, railroading, and agriculture were far advanced on this road before the war, and now all industry is rolling down the broad highway toward stateism. This is natural in the absence of plan and purpose on the part of the people who as consumers need things, and are not getting them. The inadequacy of uncontrolled profit-making industry to meet the situation in the emergency of war becomes a flagrant cause of the advancement of the state in business. A growing stateism is apparently upon us and cannot be stopped until the end of the war. It will become dominant and fixed upon the world if not checked or directed into other channels at the end of the war.

There are those who believe that this expansion of the political state to take the place of individualistic ownership in business is desirable. There are those who approve of the sort of socialism going on in Russia, Italy, and Germany. Europe has been so obsessed with the ideals of socialistic organization, and the reformers and planners for the future so commonly turn to centralized political government to solve economic problems, that a socialistic economy may be expected to follow the war. But the socialist vision of a good, all-dominant political state, animated by the spirit of democracy, serving the people as workers first and then as consumers, implemented by conscientious and efficient public servants, free from autocracy, bureaucracy, and privilege, represents wishful politics. One is safe in advocating it because it is to be dreamed but not seen.

In the United States it is different. The great masses of people here dread the ex-

pansion of state functions. The working-class very largely is opposed to socialism. The farmers are socialistic chiefly in so far as they can get money and other aids from the Government. Business men, the most influential element in the country, are hostile to socialism. Yet even here the expanding power of government cannot be denied. How might that power be used to promote private ownership and private business? How might the potent state prevent its own expansion? How might the Government itself save the economic power of the people from being swallowed up by political bureaucracy? If private ownership and private business cannot be saved so long as they are committed to the making of profits, how might they be saved when they are addressed to the single purpose of supplying human needs? The important work in this field must be done, as it always has been done, by the people organized voluntarily for purely economic action. This must be external to the political state. In the economic field the people have gone far and apparently are going farther.

Examples of this possibility are seen in the consumer co-operative associations. Before Europe was catapulted into the present war, every country had a well developed co-operative movement through which the people were directly supplying their needs. In Great Britain, where this form of business began, the membership of the consumer co-operatives amounted to over 9,000,000 families or about one-half the population. Each year during the war the membership has increased, indicating that in times of economic distress the people turn to this kind of business for relief. In 1941, the 1,065 retail societies distributed £300,000,000 worth of goods to their members. Their two co-operative wholesales supplied their retails with £173,000,000 worth of goods. The one hundred and fifty different manufacturing industries, owned by the English and Scottish wholesales, produce most of the essentials as well as luxuries used by their membership. This production includes foodstuffs, clothing, hardware, house furnishings, chemicals, watches, jewelry, radios, and automobiles. They own olive groves in Africa, 34,000 acres of farm lands in Great Britain, and 35,000 acres of tea plantations in India and Ceylon. They are the largest tea business in the world. Their flour mills are the largest in Europe. The assets of their banking department are £123,000,000. Most of the industrial life and accident insurance in Great Britain is written by their Co-operative Insurance Society. In 1914, co-operative societies of Great Britain had 148,000 employees. During the depression years of 1929 to 1933, they added over 32,000 employees. This was while profit business was throwing thousands of workers out on the streets. Now the British co-operatives have over 333,000 employees. In the Scandinavian countries, Finland, and Switzerland, the expansion of co-operation is similar to that in Great Britain, and aims to supply all consumer needs. In the field of public utilities, the consumers are supplying themselves by this co-operative method with electric power and light, water, gas, transportation, radio service, parks and playgrounds, housing, recreations, schools, libraries, and hospitals.

As one studies the abilities of the people as consumers to supply directly their immediate personal needs such as food, clothing, and housing, and as one observes their success in the larger fields of big business and public utilities, it is not difficult to conclude that when co-operatively organized, people can perform for themselves every useful service performed by profit business and by the political state. A century of expansion of co-operation, reaching every country in the world, easily leads to this conclusion.

In the United States, this method of business began among the farmers. The primitive farm family represented the consumer co-operative society. The family produced for their own use almost everything they needed in food, clothing, housing, and the luxuries. They sold little and bought less. Today the consumer co-operative movement in the United States is largely a farmers' movement. It began with small organizations of farmers supplying themselves at cost with farm necessities. Then it extended into the towns. There are now in the United States over 18,000 consumer co-operative societies with stores, retails and wholesales, banks, insurance, housing, electric supply, telephones, medical service, restaurants, burial service, and many other undertakings. Some of the wholesales supply town and city stores; most of them supply farmers' retails. Among these wholesales is the Co-operative Grange League Federation Exchange doing over $100,000,000 business a year, the Eastern States Farm-

ers' Exchange with $26,000,000 business in 1941, and Southern States Co-operatives with $17,000,000 annual business. The co-operatives of the Farm Bureau of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Indiana, and other states are among these wholesales. They own large manufactories for the production of feed, fertilizer, and other farm supplies. In the course of time they add household and personal needs to the commodities supplied and later engage in banking and insurance. Industrial workers and city people are developing successful co-operatives. The Eastern Co-operative Wholesale, with warehouses in New York and Boston, serves a membership of town societies. The 10,000 co-operative banks or credit unions in the United States are largely composed of town members.

The Consumers Co-operative Association of North Kansas City, Missouri, may be cited as an example. It began in 1929 as a wholesale by the federation of twenty-one small retail associations. These put together enough money to buy some oil tanks for wholesale storage. Then they bought a lubricating oil factory. Step by step the wholesale grew. It is now composed of 512 member-owner retail associations in ten states. This wholesale now is a large producer of lubricating oils. In 1939, it built a model gasoline refinery in Kansas which turns out 100,000 gallons of fuel products every twenty-four hours. It constructed 92 miles of pipe line to its own oil fields, and has drilled eight new wells in the past year. This year it purchased a second gasoline refinery and is negotiating for a third which will make possible supplying all its members' needs for fuel oils. It has recently bought a canning factory and gets vegetables from its farmer members. It built a paint factory which, by its savings, paid for itself in six months. It conducts a wholesale grocery business to supply its members' stores. This Association has published a document entitled "Factories Are Free" which shows how all the vast production plants of this co-operative are passing into the ownership of its members at no cost to themselves. Before the war, this Association was shipping petroleum products to the co-operative wholesales of nine European countries including Esthonia, Bulgaria, Belgium, France, and Scotland. This was supplied to these societies at cost in better quality and at a lower price than they could get in Europe.

II

CO-OPERATION is neither new nor untried. It may be thought of as the primitive way—it is indeed the simple and natural way—of supplying human needs, making use, however, of the modern devices of business, science, and invention. The methods of the co-operatives date back to the Rochdale Society of England a hundred years ago. They are: (1) democracy of control, implemented by one vote for each member irrespective of stock ownership; (2) not more than the current legal rate of interest paid to capital; (3) commodities and services supplied at the current market price, and the difference between cost and distribution price returned to the consumer members in proportion to their patronage; (4) business done for cash; (5) neutrality or nonparticipation in fields in which people are divided in opinion; (6) allocation of a part of the surplus savings for co-operative educational purposes; (7) federation with other co-operatives; and (8) membership open to all. All this means that people who need things unite in the spirit of mutual aid to assist one another get the best possible access to the things they need.

In the United States the consumer societies are federated in the Co-operative League which is a member of the International Co-operative Alliance. Before the present war the Alliance was composed of the national co-operative societies of forty countries with 100,000,000 members in 200,000 distributive societies doing a business of $15,000,000,000 a year. The forty-three national wholesales in the Alliance had a total business of $9,000,000,000. Their imports amounted to $275,000,000 yearly. Sixteen district co-operative wholesales of this country constitute National Co-operatives, the national wholesale. This organization is a member of the International Co-operative Wholesale Society. The year's imports and exports of the I.C.W.S. were $250,000,000, involving a large catalog of commodities. The international commerce carried on by the I.C.W.S. represents a kind of nonprofit business that promotes peace. The conflicts of profit business represent the constant war, and it would seem that peace cannot be arrived at by agencies bent upon keeping the war going.

The co-operative method asks for free trade and the abolition of passports, visas, and the

In addition to the consumers co-operatives, whose activities are shown in the above chart, there are nineteen regional co-operative wholesales federated in the Co-operative League and also members of the National Co-operatives. National Co-operatives reported a business of $82,624,650 in 1941, a record year which showed a 40.5 per cent increase over the preceding year. This business was done through the 2,479 local member co-operatives distributed throughout the United States. The largest organizations in point of membership are Indiana Farm Bureau Co-operative, 100,000 members; Consumers Co-operative Association, 125,000; Farmers Union Central Exchange, 160,000; Midland Co-operative Wholesale, 180,000.

other political obstacles to free intercourse among peoples. It is a commerce which is not seeking profits or markets to exploit, but represents the friendly transportation of commodities within one great organization from the place where they are plentiful to the place where they are needed. The vessels owned by the I.C.W.S. engaged in this commerce may be looked upon as the real argosies of peace. The International Co-operative Alliance is the largest economic federation in the world. It is a nonpolitical league of peoples, which has held its international congresses in many countries since 1895.

The stability of this co-operative way of business is well authenticated. The failures in co-operative business are incomparably fewer than in profit business. Manufactories owned by these societies rarely fail. Some of them are the largest of their kind in their respective countries, as is the case with the consumer-owned flour mills of Sweden and Switzerland. These co-operatives manufacture textiles, clothing, shoes, hardware machinery, chemicals, furniture, electric appliances; they produce such raw materials as coal, lumber, coffee, and foods. Labor employed by these co-operatives is more secure in its position. Unemployment and the ups and downs of economic cycles do not characterize co-operative business. Forces that stabilize society, allay discontents, and promote security are forces that prevent war. National peace is the first guarantee of international peace. A healthy society does not promote the disease called war.

III

IN the modern political state which has not yet developed autocracy to such a degree that it has become fixed upon the people there is a race going on between co-operation and stateism. The result of this race, or of this struggle of co-operatives versus stateism, will determine the future world we live in. And it is the people who must determine which of these forms of society will win the race.

Private industry, run for the purpose of making profits from the consumers, may be approaching the end of its dominance; but private industry set up by consumers for the purpose of directly supplying their own needs, and not for the purpose of making profits from others, enjoys a continuous expansion. People thus organized begin in a small way and learn how to carry on business for themselves as both owners and customers. As the organized supply businesses of co-operative consumers succeed, as they master retailing and expand, the retail associations federate into district and national supply organizations or wholesales. Thus the members and owners develop experience in big business. In time the wholesales enter the manufacturing field. Next they reach back to the sources of raw materials. These organizations of consumers are bulwarked in democracy. Without democracy they fail. The genuine co-operatives are neutral in politics, in religion, and in all other matters which divide people into factions. They thus aim to constitute a common ground upon which all people may unite.

Experience in co-operative organization teaches that where people do not have initiative, they may profitably be given outside initial help in instruction, money, and guidance. The money is loaned. Co-operative wholesales do this in starting new retail groups. These groups are guided by experts who watch them and show them how to operate. At first, the majority of control resides in the outside organization. As the group learns how to carry on its business effectively and begins to make payments on the interest and capital indebtedness, its members take over more and more control. When they have proved their competence, the outside control gradually fades away, and an independent self-helping group remains.

The Government can do what the co-operatives are doing in lending money, guidance, and assistance to untrained groups. In housing, for example, the people who need the homes can be organized. This has more to offer than the prevalent method of political municipal housing in which the houses become part of the paraphernalia of the politicians. The history of co-operative and municipal housing in Vienna, Copenhagen, and other European cities shows the contrast. The same contrast is now developing in some American cities. The socialist influence among welfare workers and reformers has tended toward the easier political way. As the municipal apartment houses become perquisites in the hands of the politicians, we may expect to pay the price.

Similarly in medical and other services, in-

stead of setting up politically controlled branches of the Government to supply these needs, the people who require such services can be shown how to organize and administer them co-operatively. They ought to contribute such capital as they can supply, as well as their time and energy in the form of labor, in order to lift these undertakings out of the class of state help and convert them into self-help. In the long run, money spent on education, organization, and guidance to help people create institutions can be made to go further and to gain greater results than money spent in providing relief for such people. Obviously, when people are encouraged to do things for themselves their efforts are self-perpetuating. They are enabled to create more values in wealth and human character.

At present the United States Government furnishes some practical aid to nonpolitical co-operation. There is a great volume of co-operative literature published in the form of pamphlets issued by the Departments of Commerce, Labor, and the Interior, as well as by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. Nevertheless, the interest of the Government in consumer co-operation is merely a by-product of its concern for private business. Consumer co-operation has been promoted by the Government largely for the reason that it helps the individual in his efforts to make more money in his occupation. Thus the promotion of farmers' co-operative purchasing associations has behind it the purpose to give the farmer lower costs of production in order to increase the difference between his cost and selling price. It was the farmer himself who discovered the social significance of co-operatives and was moved to consider them in terms of his domestic needs as an ultimate consumer.

In view of the fact that the platforms of all the major political parties contain planks approving consumer co-operation, it is natural that the Government should feel free to give its help to this movement. It has set up many services on a partially co-operative basis, of which the Rural Electrification Administration and the Farm Security Administration are the outstanding examples. The first of these has already organized nearly a thousand co-operatives to supply the members with electricity. Many of these are nursed and controlled by political officials who prefer that the members shall be beholden to them. Many such associations may be wholly capable of running their own business, paying their interest, and in due time paying off the government loan, if the Government would withdraw its officials and let them assume complete responsibility. The latent capacity for self-help among these farmers is very real. The same is true of the Farm Credit Administration's co-operative developments. There are branches of the Government which have to do directly with the existing co-operatives. The number and efficiency of these co-operatives are steadily growing. They are centers around which a more stable economy may develop. The co-operative schools are making their contribution. The Government can extend its educational work with the view of teaching the people how to improve themselves in self-reliance by using the standardized methods of self-help.

The Government's organization of the unemployed in 1932-35 into self-help co-operatives was a fine example of what can be done to lift men out of the field of the indigent and set them on their way to self-respecting and self-controlled labor. It was proved that money allocated to the unemployed can be administered better and made to go farther when pooled and administered together than when each individual on relief got his stipend and went his way alone. These people formed co-operative organizations and discovered administrative ability among themselves. Out of closed factories and cast-off resources they set wheels humming. They manufactured shoes, clothing, and furniture. They produced and packed foods. They distributed goods to themselves. The more they did and the more experience they got, the less money they needed from relief sources. These people became so successful in helping themselves that big business, especially shoe manufacturers and food canners, exerted its influence in Washington and the whole thing was stopped. Then these men, with their hunger for self-respecting work, had to give up their co-operatives. They were again unemployed, out on the street, each receiving his dole from relief agencies. The big businesses which had entailed this extra expense upon the taxpayers continued their protest against high taxes, while they sold to these unemployed the things the unemployed had formerly obtained at cost.

IV

AFTER the war, the United States must send help to Europe. The co-operatives in this country have experience in this field. The Co-operative League has already called upon the Government to make use of its facilities when the time comes. Foods, and other necessities, whether from philanthropic, profit business, or Government sources, can be consigned to the American co-operatives for shipment. These shipments can best be directed to the co-operative consumer societies of Europe on a business basis to be paid for by long term credits through an international co-operative bank. In the countries invaded and oppressed by the Axis Powers, the co-operative movement is ready and waiting to expand into action as soon as the Axis oppression is removed. These societies represented before the war a majority of the working people of the European countries. They know how to distribute foods without using the profit method. They have been recognized and respected by their governments. After World War I, the French Government placed the distribution of certain foods in the hands of the co-operatives. The Italian Government turned over to them the distribution of meat and potatos. At the present time, Kooperative Forbündet, the Swedish consumer co-operative wholesale society, has been asked by the Swedish Government to take complete control of the distribution of all imports in all fields of business. The important thing is that reconstruction and relief measures put in operation after the war should not be temporary and makeshift devices as heretofore. Relief should be supplied by methods which are workable, which have been proved, and which are capable of continuing as a part of the permanent economic post-war structure. Planning such as this is the present need. The mistakes of the last war should teach their lesson.

The discussions and planning now prevalent among reformers, economists, and diplomats provide for a re-establishment of political states after the war to solve the problems of the day. The plans seem to favor more highly socialized states than ever. The hope to rehabilitate Europe by making use of devices of the sort that once wrecked Europe is to repeat the practices of 1918. Political devices for solving economic problems have failed. Economic problems are best solved by economic means. History teaches nothing else. The opportunity now is offered to make use of methods for the supply of human needs which are based on mutual aid and self-reliance. Democracy has its chance to go into operation in the economic field where it is most effective. The political governments of such enlightened countries as the United States can serve these ends in the interest of democracy. The state itself can make use of the means that move away from stateism.

ESSENTIAL FINDINGS

I

Planning for the future democratic world order is an essential wartime task and an aid to the war effort.

II

Today, men have a greater and more basic interest in a world order than ever, but there are still strong centers of resistance, particularly against concrete measures of international organization.

III

The soundest method of establishing the world order is the gradual transformation of the United Nations into a permanent international organization.

IV

Submission to an international agreement for the settlement of disputes, common resistance against aggression, and economic co-operation, to be enforced by an international organization having legislative, judiciary, and executive powers, is the fundamental principle in the establishment of the coming world order.

V

Admission of the various nations to the international organization would be based on the acceptance of the rules of international law and of a government tending toward the freedom of its citizens.

VI

In addition to being subject to national law, each citizen will have rights and duties within the framework of international law.

ROUND TABLE

No. 10

As usual, the FREE WORLD *Round Table is international in character. Representatives from Latin America, the Far East, Europe, and the United States are seated around the table. William Allan Neilson, former president of Smith College and now chairman of the Executive Committee of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, is presiding.*

The other participants are Frank Aydelotte, president of Swarthmore College and of the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton and director of the War Issues Course of the War Department Committee on Education and Special Training in the first World War; S. R. Chow, professor of International Law and International Relations at the National Wu-Han University and member of the Legislative Council of China; Pierre Cot, former Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of France and Minister of Aviation, Commerce, and Industry in various Cabinets; Clyde Eagleton, professor of International Law at New York University and chairman of the Studies Committee of the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace; Mordecai Ezekiel, Economic Advisor to the Secretary of Agriculture; John P. Lewis, managing editor of PM; Li Yu Ying, president of the National Chinese Academy and one of the founders of the Chinese Republic; Enrique de Lozada, professor of Political Science at Williams College and assistant to the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

The subject of the Round Table has been subdivided into three broad topics which are put in the following questions: Is planning for the future a war time job? Is humanity ready for world order? What are the essential principles and methods of world reconstruction?

The Coming World Order

WILLIAM A. NEILSON—Gentlemen, I think several of you here have already taken part in some of the Round Tables, and those who are new, like myself, will learn by experience.

I confess that in the first place, I wondered that it was supposed necessary to discuss the first question at all; but on further consideration, one can see that there are detailed things to consider about it, even if one has a negative answer to give to it.

It seems to me that there is a very considerable division between the people who are known as expert in political matters, who have become thoroughly aware of the necessity for discussion of the post-war world, and the great mass of the people who are still very far from being acutely aware of the necessity for hard thinking on this subject. Therefore, I open the subject with the query: Is it our business, during the war, to plan for the future?

CLYDE EAGLETON—Well, I think that it is decidedly our business now. I can give you several reasons for that, but in general, I would like to say, first, that the public needs to realize that the process of making the war, of reconstructing after the war, and of building a permanent world order, is a continuous process. These are all parts of the same thing. For that reason, we should be studying ahead now. Moreover, I can argue that a statement by the United States that it would be willing to participate in the building and maintenance of a permanent world order would be a very important part of the strategy of winning the war itself, because it would encourage our friends in Europe and elsewhere, because it would discourage our enemies, and perhaps shorten the war by some months or years, and especially because it would build up national unity and morale in the United States.

In the second place, the tasks of reconstruction are simply so enormous that we could not begin to solve them unless we plan ahead, establish the principles, set up agencies. If the businessman wants to avoid post-war depression, unemployment, inflation, and so on, he could do it if he would plan ahead. I must not take time on that because we all understand that point, but also, the building of the permanent world order itself is such a tremendous task that we will have to plan ahead for it.

The American people are already thinking that way. We have had Secretary Hull, we have had Vice-President Wallace, we have had Mr. Willkie and Mr. Hoover and Mr. Dewey. All that indicates that we are thinking that way. The emphasis should be, I think, upon the idea that this is a continuous process and that the United Nations are organizing now to end the war and they should organize for the purpose of reconstruction and building of a permanent world order.

NEILSON—You think that possibly a negative answer to that question would be that some people might be afraid that the introduction of the issues of the post-war world would create division now? I myself don't feel that that is sufficient ground for a negative answer, but I think it is a very real risk.

JOHN P. LEWIS—Whether we like it or not, planning for the future is an any time job. Whether we are consciously planning or just letting our opportunities slip, the effect of our day's thinking is felt tomorrow. Right now we are at war, and the kind of peace we win after the war is going to be determined by our thinking during the war, whether or not it is conscious planning.

The social outlook with which we approach the peace table is not going to be one whit broader than the social outlook we have achieved in the city of Detroit, U.S.A. during the war. We are not going to make any gains at the peace table that we have not made prior to the peace table in Chillicothe, Ohio. What I am trying to say is that I do not think any miracles

can be achieved at the peace table. Any gains that we are going to be able to make in re-writing the order of this world are first going to have to be made on the home front. If our people at home have not grasped the idea of Henry Wallace's "quart of milk per child per day" before the war ends, they certainly are not going to write a peace based on a quart of milk per child per day.

MORDECAI EZEKIEL—There is one point to be made in that connection beyond the point which Dr. Neilson made, of raising embarrassing differences of opinion that we might not want to take up until later, and that is, that for many people, thought about a post-war period can almost be an escape mechanism from facing the harsh realities of the war.

There is a very keen interest in after the war. In fact, during the last year or two, practically all of the requests I have received to speak have been on that subject. There is some danger that many people may let that interest in good times after the war distract their attention too much from what needs to be done today.

All those, such as ourselves, who are thinking about the first steps toward the right kind of post-war world and rightly emphasizing the morale aspects of a correct statement of the kind of post-war world we want to create, must still at the same time, every time, emphasize that we must not neglect in any way any step to help win the war. The time and thought put on the post-war problems can only be the fraction of one per cent that can be saved from the immediate war effort. We have to put every bit of energy we possibly can into seeing that the war is won, and then along with that, start building up the necessary steps to ensure that the peace is won, too.

ENRIQUE DE LOZADA—May I say that the fact that we are thinking about the future is in itself a stimulus for a war effort, because we are emphasizing a democratic world order? If we do not win this war, the fascist world order, the order that we are opposing will be imposed upon us; and, therefore, the fighting spirit is increased by knowing what we are fighting for.

EZEKIEL—Well, if you could get sufficient agreement as to what it meant—take, for example, the area of creating a world free from want. Of the four freedoms that the President mentioned, three of them are freedoms that democracies have always enjoyed, but democracies have never really enjoyed freedom from want, so there we are promising something we never had before.

I am afraid that the great mass of people, even in this country, believe that after the war is over, on the economic side we will have a depression greater than any we have had before. If we could make them feel that the Government was sincerely determined and prepared to take the steps to prevent that depression, it would be a very real morale factor; and yet the argument as to what steps to take would reveal many of the disunities, as Professor Neilson suggests, behind the wartime unity, or rather, I should say, the partial wartime unity.

NEILSON—I should like to hear from outside of the United States on this subject.

S. R. CHOW—On the question of planning now, I think that planning is a very slow process. It requires hard thinking. It is an elaborate process. If we do not start now, we may not have a chance to do it after the war, when we are faced with the many issues that have to be settled immediately after the war.

As to the point which Professor Neilson raised, about the fear of disunity, perhaps brought about by the controversial issues involved in post-war reconstruction, I think that kind of controversy is inevitable after the war. If the controversies do arise, it is better that they rise now than to let them arise after the war, because now, at least among the United Nations, we are bound together, we have got to be united to win the war. But once the war is over, I think disunity could be brought about more easily by a controversy than now. If certain controversies do arise, we cannot break up. However, once the war is over, when we come to discussing those controversial issues, disunity may arise and then it may be very difficult to unite again.

The trouble is that some of the statesmen or leaders, even in the United States, may not be convinced of the existing need. I have just read the speech by Lord Simon. He said that now with Rommel in Africa, with Goering in Russia and the Japanese in the Far East, it is no time for statesmen to devote their thoughts to a post-war program or post-war reconstruction. The psychology of certain political leaders does not show their conviction of the necessity for planning now.

DE LOZADA—Planning the future is in my opinion part and parcel of the prosecution of the war. One of the organic weaknesses, it seems to me, on the side of the United Nations

is the fact that there is no unified planning which in itself would constitute the best bolstering of the morale of the people. This is particularly true in Latin America.

FRANK AYDELOTTE—I agree with this most emphatically. Indeed, I should go further than the question suggests and say that the organization of some kind of association of nations to replace the League is in itself a wartime job, and that steps taken now toward the formation of such an organization, based upon the United Nations and profiting by the experience of the League, would assist very greatly in winning the war as well as winning the peace.

The obvious nucleus for such an organization is the United Nations, but there should be an open invitation to other countries which are now neutral to join. It is my opinion that the impulse to join an international organization which took upon itself the task of not merely winning the war, but also of arranging the peace, and organizing the world after the peace, would be very strong, and that many countries which were not prepared to join the ranks of the United Nations merely for the purpose of waging war, would feel that they wished to enroll for the sake of having their part in this long range program.

NEILSON—Do you think this will include members of the League of Nations?

AYDELOTTE—I believe this to be true of a great many countries which are now maintaining their membership in the League of Nations. I should like to see the new organization work in the friendliest possible collaboration with the League, and the two groups should eventually be merged. At this moment there are probably some tasks connected with the planning of the peace which could be better done by the League of Nations because of its technical organizations which are still intact. I see no difficulty in assigning such tasks to the League since the members of the two groups would be largely the same until such time as the League and the newly formed association were combined.

NEILSON—What steps would you suggest in the formation of this new association?

AYDELOTTE—The leadership in a more close-knit and permanent organization of the United Nations should, of course, be taken by the four strongest powers: China, Russia, Britain, and the United States. Full account should be taken of the experience of the League. The many good features of the League should be imitated and preserved, and its weaknesses should as far as possible be avoided. Its greatest weakness, lack of armed forces with which to deal promptly with an aggressor, would in the very nature of things be avoided in the new organization since it is at present fully armed and is rapidly acquiring experience in dealing with aggressors in all parts of the world. Another defect of the League which I should hope would be avoided would be the unanimity rule, and the difficulties which result from it in connection with peaceful change. The problem of assigning to the members of the new association quotas of representation in its legislative body upon the basis not of population, but of their total strength, is not insoluble, and could be settled upon something like the same lines which fixed the quotas of payment of member states to the budget of the League. This system of representation and majority votes I should hope would be a first introduction of the federal principle into the new organization, and this might, as time went on, be extended.

PIERRE COT—I would like to emphasize what has been said by another speaker. Of course, there are some disadvantages in discussing post-war reconstruction problems now, and I quite understand that, but it seems to me that it is better to have the discussion now in order to retain unity of the people than to wait until the end of the war, because disunity now is not so probable but disunity after the war is more likely. It would encourage people to get back to isolationism in certain countries and bring them under the influence of reactionary policies in other countries. That is my first argument.

My second argument will be the following: It seems to me that it is very important to discuss war aims, not perhaps for public opinion in the U. S.A. alone, but for public opinion all over the world, and principally in the occupied countries in Europe, in Russia, and in China, so that the people may know what those aims really are and what they mean. It is necessary to give them these aims and to make clear what they are fighting for. We certainly all understand the necessity for getting the support of the peoples in the occupied countries, and to transform this war into a kind of—not, perhaps, a revolutionary war, but at least a political war, and we cannot get their support if they don't know exactly what they want after the war.

My third argument is that by considering this problem while conditions are developing,

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we are able to educate the people. The people of America are today much more ready to accept controls than they were, say one year ago. They will be even more ready to accept other controls a year from today. This applies to the discussion of war aims and plans for the future.

LI YU YING—I am one of those who believe in planning for the future during the war. We have many reasons for this and I shall mention only two of the more essential ones. First we must consider the element of time. After the war, it will be too late to think out and prepare the solutions of the many post-war problems. Secondly, we must recognize that this war is not like those of past history when men fought blindly and were killed for kings and emperors without knowing why nor what the future had in store for them. Today we must know clearly what we are aiming at in order to have sufficient energy to carry on and win the war.

NEILSON—These various questions are not really entirely separate, and the second question—

EAGLETON—Before we leave this one, may I get in one point that Mr. Ezekiel suggested?

NEILSON—Surely!

EAGLETON—One of the things that has been worrying me lately is the fear that we are not presenting to the people the difficulties of the problem that lies ahead. I have been lecturing around the country a good deal and very frequently a man will rise from the audience and say (with original inspiration), "What we've got to have is an international police force to stop a Hitler or these Japanese."

That is all to the good, but when I ask that fellow, "Has it occurred to you that that international police force might stop the United States, too?" he is considerably jolted.

Now, what I am afraid of is that this fine enthusiasm that is developing now will disappear at the end of this war under the impact of the Senator Lodges and others who reveal these difficulties, unless we discuss the difficulties right now and get them acquainted with them so they won't quit when the time comes.

COT—It is a process of education.

EZEKIEL—May I make one additional comment on this point? I think this question of discussing the peace can be phrased in terms not only of winning the peace, but also in terms of assuring the farmers and the workers and the soldiers of the world, of the United Nations, that the war is going to be worth fighting; that it won't be fought in vain, like the last war, but that we are taking steps now to make the war really worth winning.

II

NEILSON — The question as to whether humanity is ready for world order, whether there are certain changes in public opinion that must be brought about first and what forces must be put to work for it, really follows very closely from this question of whether we should plan for it now while we are still at war.

LI—Is humanity "ready" or "not ready"? This has been, it is, and always will be a complex question because "ready" does not only refer to quality but also to quantity; in other words, it is a question of degree.

I remember, so far as China is concerned, that before the Revolution, the Rightist parties believed the Republican regime was premature; that before the war against Japanese aggression, the best military experts were unable to foresee exactly the extent of the Chinese effort made during these five years. It is not easy to predict the state of "ready" or "unready," because the imponderables have a large role to play along with many other important factors.

If a state of evolution is judged premature —or if it is premature—every endeavor should be made to make it "ready." It is a matter of education. It is one of the "used and unused" applications in the process of evolution. There-

fore, one should not wait for that which is "ready," but see to it that it is made "ready."

I wish to add also that I do not believe in two extremes, i.e., humanity is not "ready" for world order or is "ready" for world order. On the contrary, I believe that humanity has always been "ready," and at the end of 3,000 years, humanity will not be really ready. In other words, my belief is there exists no line of demarcation. But in supposing the start is at 0, going toward 100, humanity is forever marching toward a world order or a democracy. Man from his origin has always been a social animal, and mutual assistance has always been the rule, not only for civilized man, but also for the savage and for animals of the lowest class, as so authoritatively shown by Kropotkin in one of his remarkable works.

LEWIS—Humanity is just as ready for world order as it is for world disorder. It has got to be ready for world order if it doesn't want to go through a blood-letting like this every couple of decades.

EZEKIEL—I was just going to ask whether there was elsewhere any organization corresponding to the Gallup Poll which we have in the United States and possibly not quite so completely for England? Is there any such index of humanity's point of view in other countries? I think, as far as the Gallup Poll goes here, there is very clear indication that the mass of the American people are convinced at this time that it is necessary not only to win the war but also to take some responsibility for the peace, which is a great change from the opinion of twenty-five years ago.

NEILSON—I have just been informed by the Editors of FREE WORLD that they have received a report from Sweden where a branch of the International Peace Campaign recently held a national conference of 250 delegates representing such organizations as the Federation of Trade Unions, the National Co-operative Society, and the Farmers Union—organizations which include the majority of the Swedish people. Despite the Government's warnings, this meeting held a two-day discussion on the place of Sweden in the future world order, and the delegates concluded with a statement, representing the desire of the nation, that no country can exist in the future unless there is a free and democratic world.

COT—That is the best answer to the question.

EZEKIEL—Also, it should be noted in terms of other countries that Russia has for many years made strenuous efforts to get something like workable collective security, and the leading exponent of that point of view in Russia is not altogether in a low position today.

NEILSON—Do you mean—

EZEKIEL—The present ambassador to the United States—Litvinoff.

COT—We had some experience with Schwernik, Secretary-General of the Soviet trade unions, who came very regularly—in fact, to every one of the meetings which Lord Cecil, Dolivet, and I organized from 1934 to 1939. He was one of the strongest advocates of an effective organization for collective security.

EZEKIEL—Whatever the opinion or thought is in the newly evolving countries, that is, China and India, and possibly in the South American countries, it will undoubtedly be a much greater force in world affairs in the next twenty-five years than it has been in the last twenty-five years. I wonder how far they have visualized it and what their visualization of this problem is?

DE LOZADA—As one representative of the South American countries, I may say that it seems to me more utopian to believe that mankind will make progress according to the prewar patterns of society rather than that it will do so through the new concepts of world organization. If the horrors of this war do not



Li Yu Ying *Pierre Cot*

arouse in humanity the desire for world order, then it is hopeless to think that such order can ever be attained. The individual as such, no matter what his degree of culture or education, cannot but be eager to live in an orderly world, protected against the horrors of war which are the unavoidable consequences of world disorder.

CHOW—I just want to say that there are two forces working for the creation of international order. One is world consciousness. I have recently read an article by William Allen White in the *Atlantic Monthly*. He has made a study of the editorial writings of the newspapers on their attitude to world affairs. The result of his study is very encouraging. He showed that in America nowadays the newspaper editors are better informed about world affairs than they were at the end of the last war.

In China, I think the same tendency may be discerned. At the end of the last war, when the League of Nations was created, I think very few of the Chinese leaders, not to say the general public, took much interest in or knew very much about what was meant by the League. A few intelligent people, like Mr. Li and a few others, were enthusiastic about the League of Nations, about its creation. However, nowadays the situation seems to be very different. Now, in the Chinese newspapers or magazines a lot of interest is shown in post-war world problems. We have many organizations taking great interest in the world order. I think the newspapers in China now are better informed on world affairs. Therefore, I think world consciousness is a force which is working for the creation of the new world order.

Secondly, I think economic forces are working in the same way. Everybody knows that nowadays there is close economic interdependences in the world. Not only in the "have-not" countries do they want some international program for reconstruction, but even the so-called "have" countries have to work out some post-war economic program to solve many of the problems in reconstruction.

NEILSON—I think advance has been made in public opinion in all of the countries as a guide to international co-operation, but I feel from what both Mr. Ezekiel and Mr. Chow have said that there is a risk of our being a little bit too much encouraged by that, in comparison with twenty-five years ago.

I recall very well, in the middle of the last war, the agitation in this country, led by President Taft and Mr. Lowell of Harvard, in what was then called the League to Enforce Peace, which was a league definitely to use force. There was hardly any objection to that. At the moment of the Armistice in 1918, nobody doubted, or I should say that three-quarters of the American people believed in the League of Nations, and one knows what happened to it in two years.

Consequently, it seems very important that we should work toward getting a public opinion which not only is vaguely sentimental toward a peaceful world and some kind of force that is going to keep it at peace, but also that they shall count the cost and make up their minds to stand that cost.

III

EZEKIEL—There is one comment I should like to add to what Dr. Neilson has just said, and that is, that in addition to developing public opinion, getting accustomed to working institutions is also important, and in that sense we come back to the first point. To the extent that the United Nations' machinery can actually develop beyond the stage of an idea and develop into working procedures which become established and recognized so that people not only get used to the *idea* of international co-operation but also get used to the *fact* and the existence of international co-operation, it will make it far easier for some of those institutions to carry over into the post-war period.

NEILSON—Yes, get some of these things laid down.

EZEKIEL—Yes, and in getting the actual operating institutions working and known and in custom and in use, so it is not a change from an autarchic pre-world war to a co-operative post-war world, but it is your principle of gradual evolution, gradually developing for the future as you go along.

COT—Yes, to create the agencies which will continue the work, not only to be bound by general treaties such as the Atlantic Charter, but also to create the kind of organization which will continue and develop.

EZEKIEL—And those agencies, as yet very fragmentary, are being created—the Joint Food Board, the Joint Shipping Board, and so on. Of course, today, the agencies are perhaps too much Anglo-American agencies. We need to broaden them to include Anglo-American-Rus-

sian-Chinese, and others of the United Nations.

NEILSON—What kind of agencies would you suggest?

COT—You have the technical agencies, but, of course, you have to create those agencies and the political agencies also. I quite agree with Dr. Ezekiel that we have to consider that most of the present agencies are only British and American, and it seems to me very important to extend them, to develop them vertically, but also to extend them to Russia, for instance, because we have to consider all the problems, not only from an Anglo-American or even European point of view, but from a Chinese and Russian point of view.

EAGLETON—What Mr. Ezekiel said means that the United Nations—I am not interpreting you, sir, this is my own view—is that the United Nations should set up agencies for the conduct of the work which can be carried over into the reconstruction period after the war, and people thus will be used to it, the administrators will be used to it. In that connection, I have found that the people do not seem to realize that we are already in an international organization. When I say to an audience, "We are legally in the United Nations, bound by treaty, bound in support of the Atlantic Charter, we are already in this international organization," they are surprised. They have not realized it. The idea, I should say, is to develop that through creating agencies which will carry on—

AYDELOTTE — Immediate action for the organization of a real world association based upon the United Nations would, I think, have three great advantages. It would assist in winning the war, it would give some guarantee of international order in the long period which many people think must ensue between the first ending of hostilities and the final organization of peace, and it would, finally, be much easier to do now than after the war is over, because as experience has shown, the attitudes of the populations of various countries tend to be positive, in favor of action, in wartime, and negative, seeing the objections to every act, after the danger of war is over.

In the first place, I think the contribution which such an organization could make to winning the war is hard to overestimate. It would naturally make for unified command and the necessary co-ordination of efforts in various parts of the world. It would give all the nations concerned in the war a chance to have a voice in such decisions which are political rather than military. It would, as I have said, attract the support of nations now neutral, and it should tend to undermine the morale of the Axis Powers. It would create an atmosphere in which it would be much easier to solve the problem of allocation of supplies and raw materials to nations not actively engaged in fighting.

The second reason I have given, the maintenance of order between the ending of the war and the final organization of peace is equally important. Various public men have indicated that it may not be advisable to have a peace conference immediately at the end of the war, but that a period, perhaps of some years, should intervene. It seems extremely probable that this war will not end all at once, as did the last one, but that there may have to be an extended and intense military effort after the first of the Axis nations has capitulated before the last succumbs. No other ending seems likely in a war which covers the entire globe.

This gradual ending of hostilities, this period of mopping up, is certain to offer endless opportunities for misunderstandings, disputes, and confusion if the forces opposed to the Axis consist of only a loose confederation as at present. If they are organized as a unit, and if the conflict is treated as a single war, it will be easier to allot forces to various theaters where they are needed and at the same time to begin the work of relief and peaceful reconstruction, because all these activities can be controlled by a single grand council. Instead of waiting for some years after hostilities cease before we arrange the outlines of peace, it would seem much better to arrange those outlines while the war is still in progress, so that when peace comes the problems which it brings already have received some thought and some plan of action will be in readiness.

It will be, in the third place, much easier to organize the world under the stress of war than would be the case after the Axis Powers are conquered and danger no longer threatens. We know by our day-to-day experience the immense difference in national psychology in wartime and in time of peace. While the danger of war still threatens men feel the importance of taking active steps, not merely to meet it, but also to prevent its recurrence in the future. In time of war one nation is ready to combine with another to meet the common danger. It seems to them that this international good feeling must always continue, but we know by

the experience of twenty years ago how quickly it evaporates once the war is over, and how quickly weariness replaces enthusiasm. That may be the case this time unless our constructive policies are implemented by solemn agreements made while the people and their leaders are still in the co-operative mood. In time of war men see the importance of making those sacrifices which are necessary for the best interests of civilization in the long run. Once the danger is passed, petty material sacrifices loom larger and eventual spiritual advantages tend to be forgotten.

For all these reasons, it seems to me, that not merely planning for the future, but acting to realize those plans, is a job which can be better done in wartime than it could ever be if it is left until the war is over. The fundamental purpose of an international organization is to maintain law and order and deal with unjustified aggression. An international organization formed now would gain valuable experience in performing that task and would have that experience to draw upon in the case of military aggression in the future.

IV

NEILSON—The methods that we are looking for have been indicated to a considerable extent in the field of economics, but when I come back to the phrasing of this question, "Is Humanity Ready for World Order?" I confess that the thing that troubles me most is the question of race equality.

I cannot say that I believe, knowing my fellow countrymen here, that we are ready for world order as that implies racial equality. I think the greatest change in the attitude of this country that we have to make, if we are going to have a world order, is in taking literally and absolutely what is fundamental in our Declaration of Independence, to the spirit of which we have given lip service for a hundred and fifty years.

We do not believe in race equality in America, and they do not believe in it in England. When I say "they," I mean the very large section of the population. I am not prepared to say half or any fraction, but there is a very large body of persons of great importance, politically and socially, who do not believe in these things. There is an element of hypocrisy in the whole of our publicity for the war effort.

EZEKIEL—I might say parenthetically that the traditional American, almost unconscious, attitude, that any American was *ipso facto* a better fighter than any yellow man, has certainly taken a very severe trouncing in recent months, both in seeing the kind of fight that China put up and—

NEILSON—To be quite fair, Mr. Ezekiel, I don't think that is purely a white weakness or the weakness of the Americans or any other people. I never lived in a country that did not believe that its men were equal to five of the neighboring country's.

EZEKIEL—I was just noting that there are some questioning of traditional ideas at least on that score.

NEILSON—Inside of the country in which I was born, you will find that an Englishman feels that about an Irishman, an Irishman feels that about an Englishman, and a Scotchman feels it about both—and he is right, of course! But that is a comparatively common weakness, and it is being corrected, as you say, by the achievements of the Japanese and others.

What troubles me is our going on pretending that we have accepted the principle of racial equality, with regard to the people of the Pacific, with regard to our Negroes, with regard to any minority groups at all, when we know that we have not won that battle at home.

EAGLETON—I don't think that it is fair to put it that way; I mean, I myself do not believe in racial equality. I don't think it is to be put that way. I don't believe in equality for anybody, for that matter. It is not a matter of race. I would rather put it in these terms, that there should be no discrimination because of race.

NEILSON—That's right.

EAGLETON—I don't think you can bring everybody, racial or not racial, up to equality, and I doubt very much if China, for example, in this international organization, would ask for equality of representation with the United States.

NEILSON—Well, that is all I meant. I mean, that is a fundamental fact of human nature, that men shall be treated as individual men, according to their value irrespective of accidents of birth, geographic or other. I don't think that you have brought in any difference of opinion there.

EAGLETON—Well, your statement was positive and mine was negative. You asked for racial equality.

NEILSON—Yes, but you didn't ask me for

my definition of that. It is identical with yours.

COT—I should support the positive definition—but it would take too long to present the argument—because it seems to me that the negative definition alone is dangerous from a political point of view.

EAGLETON—But you can't get the positive thing, of actual equality.

EZEKIEL—I was going to say that in any case, the mere statement on racial equality is a rather abstract statement of the problem. In the immediate post-war world we are not going to have to deal only with Teutons and Russians and Chinese and Americans, as just native genera, but we are going to have to deal with Teutons who have had twenty years of exposure to Hitler's education, more or less, and with Japanese who have had a hundred years of exposure or more to the Japanese tradition of the military conquest. Thus the things that we do with respect to races will be conditioned not only by what the inherent scientific differences between the races are as races, but between what they are as cultural entities, as matters stand now, so that any complete autonomy—for Germans, for example, as Germans—I very much suspect will be greatly tempered for a long period of time until they have had a chance to be re-educated and outgrow all the things on which they have been misinformed.

NEILSON—But that is very different from the underlying difficulty that you know I was talking about.

EZEKIEL—Yes, I realize that.

CHOW—When you come to the question of racial equality, I think this problem touches on the fundamental principle of world reconstruction. Of course, China stands completely and wholeheartedly for the equal rights of nations or races.

It is one of the paradoxes that the Japanese, the most cruel oppressors of Asiatic peoples, have been and still are the champions of national or racial equality. At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Japanese delegation proposed to insert a clause on equality of nations in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Of course, that proposal was rejected by President Wilson. Everybody suspected the sincerity of the Japanese proposal. Still, that principle of national equality or racial equality could not be contested.

NEILSON—Did Mr. Wilson give his reasons?

CHOW—I don't remember that. But the Chinese delegation, otherwise in complete opposition to the Japanese, did make a stand for that proposal. Of course, nobody can compel a country to open its territory to unlimited immigration. But what the Japanese and Chinese insisted upon was that if there were to be any policy excluding foreigners, that policy must be applied equally to every friendly nation within the family of nations. However, the fact is otherwise. In the United States and in the British Commonwealth of Nations, the immigration laws—both the immigration laws and the national laws—are especially discriminatory against certain aliens, and I think this state of affairs must be remedied after the war; otherwise, there will be a constant cause of friction among friendly nations.

I will just cite a recent instance to illustrate this point. There were more than a hundred Chinese air cadets on their way to this country for training. When they passed through South Africa, because they came by boat, they stopped at Capetown and the captain went to the barber shop, on landing, for a haircut. The barbers refused to cut his hair for him. All the young men (there were about twenty of them) knew nothing about this kind of discrimination, so they asked, "Why?" The local people said, "Our customs, our conventions, are against cutting hair of Asiatics, yellow people." Finally, the police intervened, and they got the haircut.

When those men landed here, they talked to us about that. Of course, they were indignant about it. They said, "We are supposed to be fighting the war on a united front, but we are discriminated against in that way, we are humiliated." The problem is very difficult because there is a psychological background which must be overcome. It is a problem which must be considered immediately. Of course, I don't think that you can do anything immediately to improve this matter, but still, that fundamental principle must always be kept in mind.

NEILSON—I agree with you! I think there is small chance of getting progress in this matter during the war and immediately after the war.

CHOW—The sooner the better.

EZEKIEL—I think it should be recognized, however, that you are dealing here not with the problem of passing laws, but the problem of changing men's minds, and that you cannot change men's minds for them.

NEILSON—The state of humanity, which I was talking about here.

EZEKIEL—Yes. I believe that it is very

hopeful that, despite the discrimination of the United States, of which, of course, the Negro discrimination is by far the worst, there is a great deal of progress being made. I think it is quite a sign of the times when a Southerner feels called upon to speak up to defend discrimination. Before this, he would not have thought of defending it; he took it as something in the natural order of affairs. Now, they are becoming (if you want to put it that way) uncomfortable about it, and while anyone born in the South would say that social equality is a long way off, there is certainly a great deal of progress being made toward economic equality, which, after all, is tremendously more important. It is the economic discrimination that has made the position of Negroes in New York City so exceedingly bad compared to the rest of the population.

EAGLETON—That progress is due, I think partly at any rate, to the constitutional clause that says, "There shall be no discrimination on account of race."

EZEKIEL—The constitutional clauses do not enforce themselves.

EAGLETON—No, that is not enough, but—I am thinking in terms of building this international government—I don't believe you could put into this constitution a clause saying, "There shall be racial equality," but you might put in a clause saying, "There shall be no discrimination."

NEILSON—Yes, I would accept that amendment.

EZEKIEL—Yes. At least you could put it there, perhaps, in the same way that the Federal Government does, that in so far as any office of trust or honor under this larger world government is concerned, all races shall be equal, without attempting to impose—

EAGLETON—You couldn't say they would be equal, but you could say that no one shall be discriminated against.

EZEKIEL—I am trying to distinguish between saying that in the affairs and offices and activities of the international government, whatever it shall be, there shall be no discrimination, and to impose it on the smaller units by saying that there shall be no discrimination in any of the constituent states.

EAGLETON—That would be a tough job.

EZEKIEL—Do you see my point? You simply start by saying that there shall be no discrimination in the activities of the international government.

EAGLETON—In other words, an international bill of rights.

CHOW—I think at least there should not be any discrimination against the nationals of friendly countries simply on account of race or color.

V

EZEKIEL—I think that it would be only realistic to recognize that the concepts of the kind of world order that are either feasible or desirable—and this may be getting into the third question—differ over a very wide range.

I have recently, for example, heard a candidate for Congress in this next election make his entire campaign speech on the subject, "We went over and licked them last time but we didn't keep them licked. This time, after we lick them, we'll keep them licked for all time after. They'll never have another chance! We must keep an army there and pin them down." And I am afraid there is a pretty powerful force of opinion that feels that military domination, not even short of a world police force, is the only possible way of keeping the disturbers down; that is, they want to deal with the symptom rather than the causes.

We may find that even behind this feeling of taking responsibility is a feeling that the responsibility is just to continue the state of

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military dictatorship, except that it would be a democratic dictatorship instead of totalitarian, when you come right down to it.

EAGLETON—Doesn't the answer to this question really depend on how much humanity suffers? There is nothing original in this point of view; I mean, the American people were waked up by Pearl Harbor more than they were waked by any and all the lectures we could give.

I am not worried so much about other states of the world as I am about the United States, because some of them have suffered so much that there is not very much doubt that they will take an international government; but I am worried about whether the United States will do it.

COT—I quite agree with you, but at the same time I am obliged to point out that in certain countries internationalism will provoke nationalism, certainly. That is why I consider that, as far as Europe is concerned, the interest in an international organization is certainly developing very fast but at the same time, I am obliged to recognize the existence of an unresolved hatred which will certainly develop and will create nationalism. I believe it is possible to have a better international feeling, but at the same time, we must remember that the atrocities of the Hitlerian soldiers are creating a feeling against Germany.

NEILSON—This touches to some extent the third point we want to consider. What are the fundamental principles of world reconstruction? Some of these, of course, have been touched on in our discussion of whether human nature was ready for world order, but here is an opportunity to state what we believe to be the fundamental principles of this world order that we have been discussing.

DE LOZADA—These principles cannot be found elsewhere than in a democratic ideology. They are the very simple and fundamental precepts stated by President Roosevelt in his four freedoms. These four freedoms do implicitly restrain the obsolete notion of national sovereignty, because the world order of the future must be predicated on the welfare of the individual over and above the notion of the national state.

As to the methods, the experience of the League of Nations can yield many valuable teachings. For instance, that no world organization can work with such a rule as the unanimity rule. Likewise, 50 years of Pan-American intercourse, particularly the years of the Good Neighbor policy, can also give us valuable guidance not only in matters of method but also in the much more important realm of the philosophy which should inspire world organization.

EAGLETON—I would like to offer the fundamental principle, and see if you agree. That is, that no nation can be its own judge. There must be a community judge.

EZEKIEL—Would you be willing to amend that slightly to say that no nation can be its own judge in all things?

EAGLETON—Yes, you are right. Heretofore, under the principle of nationalism, national sovereignty has extended without limit.

NEILSON—Does that mean it cannot be its own judge in disputes with other nations, or do you mean in internal affairs?

EAGLETON—We are talking of the development of an international government now. I mean the relations to other nations or to the international government, either.

EZEKIEL—Of course, your problem comes in defining in advance what are internal affairs and what are international affairs. The changing concept of sovereignty, of things that the nation agrees in advance to leave to outside judgment, is not internal.

EAGLETON—Well, I think all the other things derive from the judge. He has got to have a law. If you have a law, you must have a lawmaker. If you are going to bring states before a court, you must have police. If you are going to enforce the decrees in a court, you have got to have police. The other things evolve from it.

EZEKIEL—I agree with you that everything evolves from it. That would cover, in a sense, sins of commission, but there are always sins of omission, internally, which might destroy world peace. In order to be effective, world order involves an effective world economic fabric. Neither can be independent of the other. The economic fabric may depend much more on what the dominant nations do internally than what they do internationally.

LEWIS—I do not know any better charter than that set down in broad form by Roosevelt and Churchill on the Atlantic. It has been amplified in some detail since by Henry Wallace's speech and by Cordell Hull's more recent speech.

Now is the time to gather the factual information on which a just reconstruction of the

world can be started—the facts about people and raw materials on which any reconstruction must be based.

One absolute prerequisite of a democratic peace for the world is a more perfect democracy at home. Now is the time we have got to win that battle and do something about the racial and religious prejudices which impair our democratic progress. Now is the time to consolidate the social gains that make a democratic life worth while to the individual and to see that these movements are in a position to move forward at conclusion of the war. On the labor and social front we are making sacrifices during the war. We have got to see that these sacrifices are not made precedents for stopping progress after the war.

Now is the time to apply an equality of sacrifice that can become the basis of real democratic equality when the war is over.

I believe our first job in meeting the challenge of world reconstruction is to make our democracy at home so effective, so dynamic, so workable that it will itself point the way to the bigger job.

EZEKIEL—It would be hard for me to conceive of any international body which could effectively insist that the United States take internal steps to provide continual full employment and continual full industrial activity, and yet the fact of the United States and England and Germany and Russia (which has already been doing it) are taking effective steps, simply each to maintain full internal employment and full activity, may be fundamental if they and all the other countries are to maintain world peace. Agreement on a positive program might be very difficult to get through the international political structure.

NEILSON—What would be your solution, Mr. Ezekiel?

EZEKIEL—Well, I am not trying to bring a solution at the moment. I was just trying to indicate categories of the problem.

EAGLETON—I have always said there is nothing easy about any phase of international government.

VI

NEILSON—How does the question of immigration fit into what you have just been saying? Do you regard that as an internal question? Do you expect international agreements about limitation of immigration or freedom of immigration? There have been some statements, for example, that have said there shall be free immigration on all frontiers for everybody. Does that seem to you a feasible project at the present moment?

EZEKIEL—Offhand, complete free trade, going back to laissez faire completely, seems to me a very impractical idea. I doubt very much if the nations of the world are going to do that after the war. Some form of agreed and regulated and co-ordinated world trade is certainly possible.

In the same way, I would say that complete personal freedom of ingress and egress, that is, doing away with the idea of visas to pass national boundaries, as the most extreme point, seems to me to be considerably probable. Complete free trade is perhaps essentially too much ahead of the times, but that is just an offhand comment on this phase of the matter.

NEILSON—Before the last war, we went around most of the world without a passport.

COT—With the exception of Russia.

NEILSON—Yes, but you could go anywhere through Europe, in Canada, and so on. Of course, you couldn't take up permanent residence, but you could move with free egress and ingress. I came first to Canada when we were implored to come to Canada, and we had our passage paid to come to Canada. Canada wanted immigrants and opened her doors without much discrimination to almost any class of people, anywhere. But twenty years later, they were fussy about it and would hardly take in even foundlings.

EZEKIEL—Of course, there is an anthropological school, or rather, a biological school, that believes that problems of pressure of population are never solved by immigration, that the problem of overpopulation that cannot be solved by access to markets as well as to raw materials will have to be solved by education and birth control. Italy, for example, for many years had exceedingly high emigration, and yet an exceedingly high birth rate at the same time. Therefore, I think that the approach to the immigration problem, perhaps, should not be so much in terms of solving the pressure of population as in opportunities for all peoples to share in what the world has to offer, instead of some peoples, because they happen to start in an unfertile or uncongenial place, being bound to it.

CHOW—Your President seems to regard the immigration problem as a domestic problem.

NEILSON—I raised that question, but it has not been considered.

CHOW—That is why President Wilson made his reservation in Article XV of the Convenant of the League of Nations. But really, I think, in fact, the immigration problem is not a domestic problem. It affects international relations a great deal. Therefore, I think after the war, we should not regard the immigration problem entirely as an internal, a domestic problem, but that it must be dealt with in the international sphere.

NEILSON—Of course, there are two quite different things in connection with the immigration problem: One, that of treating all foreign nations on the same principle; and the other, free immigration. On the second, I agree with Mr. Ezekiel when he said it was not feasible at all. I don't think there is any use in attempting to put into any new world order a principle that the frontiers of every nation shall be free for anybody to cross and stay there as long as he liked.

CHOW—But the principle is a fundamental principle. That problem certainly will arise after the war. The immigration policies are connected with the economic policy, too. For instance, in those overpopulated countries such as China, Japan and India, the economic conditions are much worse than in the United States or Canada or Australia. Australia is able to support several more million people. On the other hand, China has had to support four or five hundred million, and India more than three hundred million. That problem certainly will arise after the war. You see, you want to maintain your high standard of living; you want to maintain your high standard of wages; so you exclude the people from the overpopulated countries. And the people of the overpopulated countries, economically, are in a worse state. They cannot afford to have high wages, so the products of their labor, according to your view, are cheap. Their labor is cheap labor or forced labor or slave labor, so you want to exclude that kind of product, produced by slave labor or by cheap labor, in order to avoid competition.

In that case, you create a vicious circle; because they are overpopulated, their labor is cheap and they produce cheaply. Their product is produced by cheap labor, so you have to exclude their product. But then the labor will be cheaper and cheaper.

COT—You exclude the labor and the product, both, on the same ground.

NEILSON—Mr. Chow, what is your solution?

CHOW—Oh, I am not offering any solution!

NEILSON—We are laying down the fundamental principles.

CHOW—I just raised the principle. This economic equality is connected with equality of nations or races. For instance, when President Roosevelt talked about freedom from want, the desire of every nation for a decent living for their inhabitants, and Vice-President Wallace wants every child to have a quart of milk—in those overpopulated countries, how would you solve the problem of freedom from want? Who is to give the child the quart of milk, while most of the population is struggling to make a living which is far below the standard of a minimum subsistence level?

EZEKIEL—I would like to ask, in this respect, how far you feel that problem is likely to be affected or helped by what I believe is coming to be a generally accepted principle: that after the war, the progressive nations, the nations that are best endowed with wealth and materials, will have to assume a very great responsibility for aiding in the development of the other nations? That is, if your people in China, with modern farm machinery and modern farm methods, could produce as much or more food, say, with only one-third of the people that now work on land, while the two-thirds set free from the land with modern machinery could turn out a very large industrial production, couldn't you, even within the borders of China, go a long way toward creating for your people a modern standard of living?

CHOW—Oh, yes, but that takes time. That, of course, is one way of solving the problem. But still, I do think that the absolute closed-door policy maintained by the American and British nations cannot go on as before.

EZEKIEL—Well, that really comes back to what you were saying before, that, in effect, you would want this charter of this hypothetical world state (not yet defined) to say that in any immigration restrictions set up by any country, the immigration policy shall not discriminate but shall treat all other countries on an equal basis, or all other races. That would be your stand?

CHOW—Yes, that is the fundamental thing, that we should not have any discrimination against the people of any nation simply because of race or color. But still, you are not solving the problem completely. You have to give eco-

nomic aid to the "have-nots," to develop their industries in order to maintain their population. But I still think, even then, you cannot maintain an absolute closed-door policy so far as immigration is concerned. You see, that looks rather queer, for instance, in Australia or in Canada. You simply adopt a "dog in the manger" policy.

NEILSON—Do I understand that Mr. Ezekiel would think of improvements in technique in agriculture and so on, as falling within the sphere of international activity?

EZEKIEL—Well, yes, I was thinking of a sort of permanent Lend-Lease policy with a peaceful objective, going beyond technical cooperation to perhaps a continuing policy of very large exports of capital and materials, for a long period after the war, to help increase productive power for themselves on the part of the backward nations of the world—backward in the economic sense, in economic development. It would be a sort of reversed colonial policy, not the well-to-do nations draining the poorer nations of whatever they could produce, but instead, using part of the surplus for which we have difficulty in normal times to find effective investment outlets here at home, and instead of putting so much into public works at home, putting the same in equivalent works abroad.

COT—But do you believe that it is an international problem and that it will come from international planning, or that it will be only a recommendation to the big countries?

EZEKIEL—I believe that if it could be handled through an international organization, it would be much less likely to lead to subsequent trouble than if it were simply handled directly.

EAGLETON—Wouldn't it be more palatable to the American people if it were handled that way? I hear some of them saying, "Oh, now we've got not only to pay for the war, but to pay for all the reconstruction all over the world." If we did it through an international agency, we might take it more easily.

COT—I believe we all agree that it is necessary for the international organization to have some control so far as economic, political, and perhaps social matters are concerned. If we proceed on the suggestion of Mr. Eagleton of considering all these problems from the point of view of international law, we shall see that they are dependent upon each other. The second point to consider would be the necessity for international economic planning; and after that, it seems to me that Dr. Ezekiel's point that Africa and the backward peoples ought to be taken into consideration.

NEILSON—Shall we move, then, to the Dutch East Indies and Africa?

EZEKIEL—May I enter just one sentence of explanation on what Professor Cot just said? Many Americans misunderstood what economic planning means. So, in agreement with what he said about the need for international economic planning, I should like to note that economic planning is not any more synonymous with socialism than it is synonymous with a well-adjusted capitalism.

COT—Oh, yes, but what I wanted to point out is the necessity for an international agency—I don't know of which particular kind—taking over a sort of general control of all this province. It was only to put what you were saying into terms that applied to Europe, because it seems to me that it is very important to consider the problems not only as they affect America and China, but also as they affect Europe. The necessity for international control upon economic life must be considered if we are ever to achieve this freedom from want which was spoken of before.



Clyde Eagleton

VII

NEILSON—May I ask Mr. Eagleton to say how far he thinks this question of the "orphan" colonies and the rest, is dealt with by the Atlantic Charter?

EAGLETON—That's a mean one! The Atlantic Charter speaks in terms of self-deter-

mination. Just this morning I was reading somewhere an interpretation of that, which would indicate that every colony in the world should be free to determine for itself and be independent. Well, now you can't interpret the Atlantic Charter that way. The trouble with self-determination is that nobody knows what people are going to do the determining. My contention is that you have got to have an international authority, in the first place, to say which people can do the determining.

NEILSON—Even in the case of the people of India, for example?

EAGLETON—Yes, anywhere. And speaking of India, so far as I can see, India is only a geographical expression. How can you say that the people of the All-India Congress—that particular group of people—have the right to determine for themselves? If they do, why not the Moslems? Why not the Untouchables? Why not every separate individual in India, if you want the *reductio ad absurdum?*

NEILSON—Mr. Nehru and Mr. Gandhi are seeking now to impose that on the world, but there is a very large part of the country which refuses to go along with them.

COT—It seems to me that there is a formula—I don't know whether you all will agree with it, but in my mind, it is a good formula—that is, to consider that in a new world, in a free world, we would replace the authority of the Big League powers by an international authority. In other words, I am not shocked when I see that a people, a nation, is not able to govern itself, but I am shocked when I see that only England or France or, let us say, America or China, are put in charge of these people.

It seems to me that the fundamental basis for progress would establish that the backward peoples, or the colonial peoples, should be helped in their development, not by a particular nation, but by an international agency, and that this international agency will be in charge of them, to help them, to develop them and to say under what circumstances and at what times they will be able to become entirely free or partially free.

EAGLETON—Which ones is the international government going to be in charge of? Is it going to be in charge of all colonies?

COT—You have to get an international agency, which may not be the same for all the colonies; but I consider that we have to have a general rule and that we must say that no colonial people must be governed by one nation.

NEILSON—That is, international mandates instead of individual mandates.

COT—Yes, not the system of the League, which was a system of individual mandates.

NEILSON—How do you feel about that, Dr. Chow?

CHOW—I think this problem is very complicated. I myself am rather skeptical about the international authority for all colonies. There are certain territories that can be put under international restrictions; there are others that may be suitable for mandates given to a single mandatory power; and others may still remain under their own ruler, but with some kind of supervision or control by the international organization or world organization. I do not think there can be one solution for all the colonies.

NEILSON—Would you agree with Mr. Cot's suggestion that in no case should it be an individual mandate?

CHOW—Oh, no, I disagree with that!

EAGLETON—I would agree that there should be international administration for colonies, but I don't know which colonies. I am not sure that I want to take them all. How about Alaska? Are we going to consider it a colony that should be put under an international administration?

NEILSON—Is Alaska called a colony?

COT—No, it is not a colony. I call it a colony when you have a discrimination between the master race and the people in the colony.

EAGLETON—Then there is another point that comes up. The Atlantic Charter says we seek no advantage, territorial or otherwise, but depending on what happens after the war, some states, even the United States, might want to seize certain points or keep certain points for strategic purposes. Are we going to except those from the general list of colonies?

COT—The problem is, if you want an international order, I believe that as far as the treatment of the natives is concerned, you have to consider that it will be done by an international agency. I know the difficulties of the problem, but it seems to me that if you make strategical exceptions or other exceptions, it opens the door to all colonial operations. If you take the British colonial empire or the French colonial empire, you will find a strategical reason for every bit of that colonial empire. There are excellent strategical reasons for all the French colonies, and that is also true of the British Empire!

LI—May I say that the experience of the

League of Nations with a mandate system supports Mr. Cot's contention? You know that, despite the great hope which had been placed in it, the mandate system was really the first great farce of the League of Nations. When there was any difficulty in a colony which the Mandate Commission of the League tried to investigate and correct, you had a representative of the government, usually the governor, arrive with all the material. No other member had any data nor any power of investigation. There was no staff able to control—

NEILSON—No observers?

LI—No, no observers. The official presented a report and, of course, what could the complainants say? We read in the paper that they were Leftists or Nationalists or Extremists, or whatever, and then it was finished.

COT—You see, Professor Chow, there is a real question here of democracy, and it goes beyond the question of self-determination. The fact is that it is extremely difficult to have democracy in an imperialistic country. The colonial elements in every country are the first wing of reaction. That is true for England, and even much more true for France, because the colonial officials have an anti-democratic mentality by the very nature of their functions. They function in a non-democratic way—

NEILSON—Do you mean the administrators?

COT—Yes, the administrators. They have family; they have influence; they contribute money to the newspapers and to schools. They can create a lot of things. They have military power. Take Spain, for example; after all, the democratic struggle against the legal Government of Spain started on a small colonial basis in the Foreign Legion in Morocco.

LI—If we can have an international federal government with democratic aims, we shall do much to solve the colonial problem.

NEILSON—You would say, then, that a democratic form of government must be a condition of membership in a world organization?

EAGLETON—Suppose we state it, not in terms of requiring a democratic system in every state, but suppose we let the international government lay down certain rules, certain principles, which all states must observe. Those principles may lead to the necessity of democratic procedures within states. But I would hate to say that the United States, having been born out of a revolution for the purpose of asserting our right to the kind of government we want, would deny that to any other state in the world—the right to build the kind of government they want. I would say that every state, no matter what kind of a political philosophy it has, must be subject to the rules and requirements of the international system. I suspect that that would inevitably lead to a great deal of democracy.

NEILSON—Does Mr. Eagleton's statement imply the acceptance of some kind of minimum bill of rights by all nations?

EAGLETON—I had that in mind, but that is a very different problem. That gives me an opportunity, however, to say another thing I have been wanting to say. In all the plans that are being discussed today, there is more emphasis on the individual human being than ever before, especially the plans that are coming out of England, which seem to me to be especially farsighted. This is different from the situation in 1919, when we were thinking in terms of sovereign nations. We are thinking now more in terms of individuals.

If your international government is to survive, it may be necessary, on the one hand, for it to protect individuals against their own national governments in certain fields, such as, for example, freedom of information and expression. I mean, it is a little hard for me to see how an international government could survive if, within some of the states, a Hitler had the opportunity to misuse information and propaganda, or to restrict it in such a way that he could build up an antipathy against, an opposition to the international government.

It may be essential, then, to build up in your international state certain restrictions against the sovereign state, on behalf of some of the individuals. However, I would like to get on the other side of that, while I am on it. The state exists for the welfare of the citizens. I think that is a generally accepted proposition.

COT—Except in Germany and Italy and Spain.

EAGLETON—Well, it is generally accepted. But today, the state is incapable alone of advancing the welfare of its citizens. Therefore, I say the individual must not only expect protection from the international government, but he must go further than he has been accustomed to going in the past—thinking of the national government as the ultimate—he must accept and build up a loyalty to the international government which is to give him this protection.

Now, it seems to me we are getting down to something pretty fundamental there. We are

reducing it to individual, human rights again. We are changing the old concept of international law, that it deals only with sovereign states, and we are saying—

COT—That is a most important observation, the most important that has been made around this table, because it is real. It comes from a realization of international law, and from all the concepts of international society, and even of society and even of states and of government. It seems to me that you have on the one hand, the increasing dependence which makes it impossible for an individual to support himself, and on the other hand—

EAGLETON—This is a revolution to make the private citizen a person in international law.

EZEKIEL—Of course, you are saying there that for the international order, whatever it may be, when its constitution comes to be written, it shall be written in the same terms as the Constitution of the United States, which does not say, "We, the states, in order to form a more perfect union," but, "We, the people, in order to form a more perfect union." The act of union should be an act of union of the people of the component states.

EAGLETON—I don't know whether I would go that far, to begin my system, but I want more protection for the individual.

EZEKIEL—That is precisely the argument that Lincoln used for the retention of the Union, that the Constitution was written for the people and not for the state.

COT—Yes. If I can come back for a few minutes, I would say that all this discussion about democracy means, in my opinion, that we must make very clear that what we are saying is not a weapon against Russia, because many people say that we must transform this world, we must evolve a democratic system, and draw the conclusion that we are speaking against Russia.

It seems to me that we have to make it very clear that we are speaking not about any particular form or kind of democracy, but that we are speaking in terms of something which is a progressive development to democracy, and at the same time, we must recognize that Russia already has this trend. Certainly, the Russian people are more free today in many ways than they were under the Tsarist regime. Secondly, the Russian Constitution of 1936 is probably one of the best and most democratic constitutions in the world. I know that it has not been

John P. Lewis

applied entirely, for certain reasons, but I think we have to recognize that perhaps we will be saved as a result of this suspension of democracy in Russia.

It seems to me—I am not speaking in definite terms, but it would be very dangerous and it would be very unfair to draw the conclusion that what we said about democracy is against Russia. It would be the same if some people would draw the conclusion that we were talking about the United States because we said a few minutes ago that equality did not exist in fact in the United States.

CHOW—To make the issue much clearer, I would ask, do we all agree that in the post-war world order, the adoption of the practices of a democratic regime would be the essential condition for entry into the world organization, or any regional organization?

EAGLETON—No.

COT—Not in these terms. It is too definite.

CHOW—How about Japan and Germany?

EAGLETON—It seems to me that we could find a formula. If we consider the functioning or the working of this international order in every nation, we will have a kind of trend toward free government and free institutions. But to say that it will be all over the world—

CHOW—Do you require the substance of

democracy, if not the form of democracy? If you prescribe certain rights or duties or principles that every state should observe, and those principles or rights or duties are confined to democracy, will you then require substantially democracy?

EZEKIEL—Of course, what you are really saying is that you will have an international bill of rights, enforced by the international authority, so that none of the component nations, once they have entered into that association, can thereafter deny those rights to their citizens, in the same way that the Bill of Rights operates in the American Constitution. That is really what you said.

CHOW—But the essential idea of democracy, the main part of democracy—for instance, in a country like Japan or Germany or Soviet Russia, I don't think their policy strictly conforms to those standards.

NEILSON—We will concede that freedom of speech, freedom before the law, economic development, and so on, are a necessary part of our electoral system, if that is what you mean by democracy. The whole system of legislation could be different and yet you could have freedom of speech and equality before the law.

CHOW—But in any of those countries that do not have freedom of speech, they will, perhaps, never have freedom of speech.

NEILSON—Well, take a case that is altogether outside of the countries that we are discussing. I remember, a couple of years ago, discussing with Mr. Streit his definition of democracy as the test for admission to his union, and I said, "What are you going to do about Turkey?" Turkey was not in such condition then. I knew that he was interested in Turkey, and Turkey was progressive then, having made great progress in its own way. I said, "Are you going to exclude Turkey from the goodwill nations, since its form is entirely different from ours, but it has achieved great progress?" He completely dodged the question. He said, "Why, are you interested in Turkey? I lived there and I liked it very much," and so on. He never gave me an answer. Now, it seems to me that you have to make your arrangement. Let Turkey take its own pace, so long as we are sure of its international good will and its general direction.

CHOW—We don't require any strict democracy as a condition to joining the world order, then?

EAGLETON—Furthermore, I can't be sure that democracy is the ultimate and perfect form of political organization.

COT—It depends what you mean by democracy.

EAGLETON—I don't think we can petrify political development at this stage.

VIII

EZEKIEL—I wonder if we don't have a little confusion here, by mixing up in our thinking or our discussion, something like an ideal or a perfect form of world organization with the immediately obtainable form—right after the war or the first few years after the war. Some of our discussion has been almost—and I suppose I myself contributed to that—in terms of an ideal United States of the world, regardless of whether it would take a hundred years to get there. I think now we are talking in terms of, after all, what might be reasonably done following this war.

COT—Of course, it must be put in terms of necessity.

EZEKIEL—I mean, even ten years after this war, after we work away from the reconstruction period, it will still be a gradual growth.

NEILSON—What about the states who do not join the United Nations or the new order of organization?

EAGLETON—There ain't gonna be any such animals.

NEILSON—That is what we hope, but, you see, when we say that these are the conditions for admission, then, if you don't want to accept them, they stay out. There are a number of governments that may prefer to stay out. Would the Round Table agree that the establishment of conditions which will serve to enroll other countries or areas that are not originally members is a matter of international concern? We can't let mad dogs run around loose as we did in the past, so it is really a matter of international concern.

CHOW—Can that be assumed? I mean, can it be assumed that all the nations will eventually become members of the new organization?

NEILSON—Or mandates. There will be a German mandate.

COT—Given to the master race, the Chinese people.

CHOW—For instance, if there are one or two countries that will never come up to standard, the standards that have been set for the members, such as the Asiatic countries—

EAGLETON—What I had in mind was my hope that the United Nations, when they are victorious after this war, and assuming that they will be, would simply take over and run the world for a period of time, for a transitional period, and that they would compel other states to obey and that they would ultimately change this United Nations system to a permanent world order in which every state must be a member and must submit to the regulations laid down by the international government.

EZEKIEL—I wonder if you won't modify that concept slightly, to say that at the end of the war, you will have three groups of nations: First, the United Nations that have won the war; second, the Axis group that has been defeated in the war; and then, a third group of unknown size that has stayed out of the war. Certainly, so far as the nations that have won the war are concerned, they will form the core of your new group. Presumably, you will construct the definitions of your new world order so that they will all be ready to participate in them, because they will be the supreme ones, but the defeated nations will automatically, in effect, be forced to qualify; that is, following your line, I think, they will really remain in subjection until they are ready to qualify as members of the other group. Therefore, your real problem is the third group, those who have to develop these institutions whether they like them or not, because they do not have any choice. Your third group will be the doubtful area. Apparently, now, that will be the South American countries and possibly one or two neutrals left in Europe.

EAGLETON—But probably it will not be necessary to use coercion against them, because in such a world order, they would practically be compelled to fit in.

NEILSON—The economic pressure would be enough.

EZEKIEL—Of course, right there is where you are going to get some difficulty with internal problems in individual countries. For example, how far will the Good Neighbor policy of the United States toward all Latin-American neighbors be duplicated by a Good Neighbor policy toward those that are not going to participate?

EAGLETON—Then there will be a United Nations policy, not a Good Neighbor policy.

EZEKIEL—Well, you can see where some of the problems will arise.

NEILSON—Undoubtedly, a number of the problems dealing with these fundamental principles could be discussed indefinitely. I gathered in the discussion of our first point, of planning the future as a wartime task, that we were in general agreement that in spite of the risks of disunity, it was inevitably a wartime task, and that it had, in addition, considerable war advantages.

The question as to whether humanity is ready for a world order seemed to bring forth the general opinion that it was partly ready and partly not ready, but that we had to take advantage of certain definite aspects of it which were favorable to it, and we were greatly encouraged by the fact that we seemed to be farther on than we were twenty-five years ago.

In the fundamental principles, I think there was general agreement with Mr. Eagleton's initial statement, that subjection to a world court—although he didn't use that phrase—was absolutely necessary, and that involved a statement of international law, and, finally, a body of force that would bring into existence the decisions of such court.

We went on into these fundamental principles and dealt with the question of whether the members of such a reconstructed world would all be democratic nations, finding difficulty in our definition of democracy, and being, on the whole, not inclined to put the requirement in terms of democracy but rather in terms of willingness to submit to an international agreement for the settlement of disputes and the avoidance of war, followed up by a large measure of economic co-operation, leaving such questions as immigration rather vague, realizing that the United Nations or their successors could not enforce free frontiers upon every nation, but might insist upon equality of treatment in the restriction of immigration.

LI—Apart from the many governmental suggestions you gentlemen have considered, I wish to add some about the importance of private organizations. It seems to me that governments will go as far as public opinion will desire. Therefore, some friends and I have been working for a long time on the international organization of public opinion, establishing a real federal structure. We have even started organizing such a group, which is called the World Confederation of International Associations. This confederation is based on the complete autonomy of all associations which accept the fundamental principles of a free world.

JAPANESE Traveling Companion

By ADRIENNE THOMAS

WHEN I left Lisbon in September, 1940, I stood for a long while at the bow of the American steamer and looked back on Europe's last port. The brilliantly illuminated exposition area slid past, shimmering out into the night, not unlike a candle at the coffin of a continent sinking into obscurity. As I stood there, I sensed that someone was looking at me. I turned aside and saw the smiling countenance of an Asiatic—whether Chinese or Japanese I was unable to determine at the time. The man was no longer looking at me. His eyes went into the distance. *Perhaps he, too,* I thought, *finds it hard to tear himself away from this hapless Europe. Now that he must leave it all beyond the seas, perhaps he, too, is thinking of people close to him, of friendship he has received.* When I departed the yellow man was still leaning on the railing, smiling in the direction of the dwindling mainland. *Nostalgia,* I thought. *The same aching heart, whether a man weep in grief or smile, whether his skin be white or brown or yellow. It is the same ache.*

As I lay on a deck chair a couple of days later, I noticed that my neighbor was the nostalgic Asiatic. The name plate over his chair bore a Japanese name. I was somewhat discomfited by the discovery. These nimble little gentlemen were known to me from Geneva, where I had attended the League sessions during the early phases of the conflict in the Far East in a purely private capacity. I well knew who they were and of what they were always capable. And since I was never anything but a private person and needed to acknowledge no standards but those of right and wrong, my dislike of the sprightly little men did not have to wait upon a personal injustice. I was thoroughly irked by my neighbor. Of course, I told myself that the man beside me was in all likelihood in the same predicament as all of us aboard the ship—a plaything of collective world insecurity. I told myself that; yet I caught myself glancing again and again at the carefully tended fingernails and the well-tailored suit of the Japanese. Were there no bloodstains somewhere?

He was short and slim and very nimble. His hair was already sprinkled with gray. And he was always smiling. Whether he was just gazing before him or giving the steward an order, he was forever smiling—a polite smile with a trace of embarrassment. He took no notice whatever of me. Indeed, he did not exchange a word with a single person on board. Nor did anyone speak to him—not even the stewards. Every morning and every afternoon he rounded the promenade deck precisely thirty times, in small, hurried steps. He began at the same time and stopped at exactly the same time. Then he lay down in his chair, smiled, and read.

One day a young Portuguese sat down beside me, a naval officer whom his Government was sending on a visit to an American shipyard. In contrast to the Japanese, he knew everyone on board, and everyone knew him. He was always surrounded by bevies of young girls. The crew regarded him as one of their own. The stewards and bellboys rushed to comply with his every wish, as they did with no other passenger. He spoke broken Spanish, Italian, French, English, and German in wild confusion; but everyone understood him—espe-

cially the ladies. On this occasion, I soon noted, he had not come to tell me the latest shipboard gossip. His interest was focused exclusively on the reading matter of my Japanese neighbor. Without a trace of hesitation he rummaged under the blanket of the empty deck chair, unearthing the book over which the Japanese sat smiling day after day. It was a German book and by no means light reading. "War Strategy and Geopolitics," the Portuguese spelled out, tossing back the book and muttering in English something like "dirty dog" and "dirty stuff." I commented that one who read a nazi book was not necessarily a nazi sympathizer.

"You are a poet," the young officer replied —and it was not meant as a compliment—"but don't be too tolerant!"

Just then the Japanese returned, instantly taking in the disarray on his deck chair and its causes. And now he who never spoke to anyone turned to the Portuguese, smiling amiably, "Are you interested in my book?" The Portuguese, measuring him from head to foot with infinite arrogance, asked me—quite as if no one had spoken to him—whether he might call for me after dinner to escort me to a motion picture performance on the promenade deck. The Japanese smilingly resumed his seat, as though he had not in the least expected a reply.

That evening I did not hesitate to tell the Portuguese officer how greatly the incident had embarrassed me.

"Just wait and see," was all he offered by way of a reply.

As before, my neighbor paid no attention to me. But occasionally, when I had dozed off in my deck chair, I would start out of my sleep with a feeling that someone's eyes were on me; and each time it was the Japanese who was the cause of my uneasiness. As soon as I would look up, however, he would again immerse himself in his reading. This stare that could rouse a person from sleep was a peculiar, glassy, and calculating look, without one trace of human interest or even curiosity. It observed the human face as a mathematical equation to be solved. It was uncanny. I soon noticed that the Japanese looked at all people in this manner whenever he felt himself unobserved.

We had spent almost a week in such close propinquity, when the taciturn Japanese at last addressed me. In extremely poor French he told me that according to my speech I must come from the region of Nancy. So certain of his facts was this Asiatic, who himself barely spoke French, that he continued without waiting for confirmation. His own people, he said, had always shown a great preference for French women. It so happens that I do come from the region of Nancy, and I was more than surprised that a Japanese should recognize the dialects of the various French provinces. My neighbor was certainly not the kind of man who starts a casual conversation or pays meaningless compliments. He must have had quite different reasons for breaking the silence that had grown up between us. With a glance at the nazi book in his hands, I replied amiably that it seemed to me his people showed a decidedly greater preference for French colonies than for French women. His expression did not change. He smiled as before, and, though I had rebuffed him, I could not rid myself of the unpleasant feeling that somehow he had reaped some advantage from the conversation.

Some days later he asked me whether the French did not harbor greater resentment against the British than against the Germans. I replied that it was well known that the Nazis were hated throughout the world and asked why he should expect anything else from the French, who had to put up with the German occupation. He took note of my retort in silence, and only some time later did he take up the conversation again: his people could not understand how Britain and Germany, two peoples of Anglo-Saxon race, could time and again wage war against each other. I am no political casuist, and I was simply unable to make my answer comply to the rules of objective debate. All I felt was indignation at so much hypocrisy. "I suppose that must have greatly helped the Chinese to understand why you invaded their country," I sailed into him. "You people simply lie about your lust for conquest by calling it racial affinity. But this race obsession has not prevented the Nazis from entering into an alliance with nations of the yellow race, against the white race."

"The only thing we are concerned with here," he interjected, "is the principle of the new world order."

"The only thing we are concerned with here is that the Nazis of all races owe their existence solely to the stupidity of men whereby they can be convinced of almost anything."

I realized quite clearly that I had lost this debate even before I had allowed myself to be drawn into it. I lacked my opponent's equipment. Cunning and hypocrisy always have a

considerable initial advantage over the normal sense of right and wrong. The Japanese did not answer further. He smiled—politely and with a trace of embarrassment—looked at his watch and rose for his morning walk. Before he left, he offered me his blanket. I was chilly—but I refused the offer.

II

WE had a second lifeboat drill on board. Life preservers had to be donned and the passengers had to gather at assigned lifeboats. The Portuguese officer was surrounded by a throng of young girls who insisted on being assigned to his boat. There was much banter and laughter as he hugged three of his fair besiegers at once. But all at once he came to attention and every trace of his youthful good nature vanished from his face. He pushed the startled young ladies aside and stepped in front of the Japanese who was searching for his boat, his life preserver merely dangling from his arm.

"You are quite right in not even trying on the life preserver," the Portuguese said, his eyes narrow and angry. "You are quite right, for if it were the real thing instead of a drill you would have no need at all for a life preserver."

The features of the Japanese showed no trace of resentment or even surprise. He smiled, as always.

When we were leaving Bermuda, the Portuguese got into a vehement argument with the customs officers. Voices were raised during the debate, and when my Portuguese acquaintance joined me after leaving the officers he had not yet calmed down.

"There's every proof," he cried out, "that this fellow is a Japanese Gestapo leader, that he was in Germany in order to study the Gestapo methods. In passing he took a lot of pretty scenic pictures in other countries—including my own. How can the British allow such a man to travel on?"

"Are you referring to the man who . . ."

"Of course I am! For nine days you've had the pleasure of sitting alongside of an accomplice in murder and execution—a man just like this Himmler in Germany." He ranted on for a long time because they had not arrested this fellow in Bermuda, claiming that no one in the world was allowed to travel more securely than he and his ilk. International fear of political incidents virtually assured him of passports and safe conduct. The Portuguese put all his hopes in the United States. There, he felt, a Japanese would not even be able to brush his teeth without being watched.

I was hardly listening. I felt like someone who has just learned that his next-door neighbor is a hangman. I went back to my chair only to get my coat. Curiously enough, the secret Japanese agent was sitting there reading, but for the first time he was not smiling. For the first time I saw a serious expression on his face. He was reading a thick volume entitled "German Humor," a well-known collection of German jokes and anecdotes, dating back to pre-nazi times. This student of German concentration camps and torture chambers now turned the pages to discover how Germany once laughed—he who already knew so well how bitterly Germany is now weeping. True, the nature and subject matter of German laughter is almost a matter of history, to be looked up in books. The Japanese had such a book before him—a thick volume numbering at least three hundred pages. Page for page, line by line, he was scanning it for something cheerful and humorous. He found nothing. Here access is denied to him and his kind. No breath of joy can touch a spirit that is frigid.

My fellow traveler no longer smiled. He was sober. Had he begun to grasp that he was for all eternity excluded from the bright community of those who know how to laugh, that all he would bring back to the land of the rising sun would be no more than the gloomy twilight of Germany's eclipse?

—Translated by Heinz and Ruth Norden

The Unnamed Ally of the United Nations

BY LOUIS LIPSKY

THE vast economic resources of the American people are at last being absorbed in the grim business of warfare. A great effort in propaganda and organization was required to make America aware of the fact that it is directly involved in the most destructive struggle of all history. The nerves of the American people have been racked by excited comment (through press, radio and forum) on the developing strategies of the battlefield. The scene does not suffer a lack of clamor, alarm, and wild speculation. It will take some time to toughen Americans and make them feel in a killing mood. That dreadful task must be prepared for and resolutely faced. Enormous progress in that direction has been made. It is visible throughout the land.

As we become accustomed to this state of affairs, discussions of how the fighting is being organized become franker and more realistic. The amenities of a debating society cannot be maintained in the face of a rapid reorganization of our economic life, radical changes in daily habit and outlook—civilian defense, rationing, dimouts and blackouts, the mounting record of destruction and death. It will not take long for war to destroy established refinements in public speech and manners. The approach to the problems of peace will also have to become as real and brutal. Man to man talks are in order. The old diplomats have nothing further to contribute to the creation of the world of tomorrow. The wretched parts they have played have fallen out of the drama of life. A new routine will have to be invented and employed. Peace also will have to be made with iron and steel. The white heat of justice will have to consume the diplomatic approach and the legalistic technique of the past.

Candor and truth should dominate at least one part of the world scene where peace is being prepared. The discussions in London and Washington between leaders of the governments-in-exile play an important part in war and in peace. These men have seen the destruction of their homelands and the enslavement of their kinsfolk. They now taste the bitterness of exile and gather in foreign lands to see what they can do to redeem the broken world. They are encouraged by the democratic welcome accorded their hopes and aspirations. They have formed associations and agencies of propaganda to strengthen the morale of their exiled compatriots here, in England, and in South America. Their stimulating influence reaches out to the prisoners in the concentration camps of their homelands. They influence directly and indirectly the underground movements that are shaking the soil under Hitler's feet. They organize legions on foreign soil to join under their own national banners on every front. And they are engaged in talking of the future.

In these discussions there is accord on the unrelenting desire to see Hitler destroyed. There is unanimity and deep loathing of all he stands for. That about exhausts the scope of harmony. With regard to other subjects, there is still lacking the qualities of courage and directness and clarity. Those who take the floor skirt the edges of all prickly difficulties. They make vague allusions to things that are admittedly vital but which it would not do to mention now. There are too many subjects taboo. Reference to old feuds and racial disputes must be suppressed in order to concentrate undisturbed on the chief business of defeating the aggressor. The show window must be arranged to display a united front. Nothing must be allowed to spoil the public impression.

This state of affairs is ominous. The new world cannot be based merely upon hatred of Hitler. It cannot be balanced on that narrow

platform. Many inter-group hatreds and prejudices will have to be consumed in the fires of this war in order to establish a lasting peace. Now is the time for the democratic nations to rip off the masks of politeness and etiquette and get down to the rough business of eradicating the cankers of old feuds and rivalries and prejudices. It is easier to break the complacent mood when men are drawn together in adversity than later, at the end of the war, when selfish interests and ambitions again begin to reassert themselves. A lasting fraternity can be created when the victims of Hitler's crimes suffer a common exile and common misfortune. Comrades in arms can more easily come to an understanding when the fighting is hot, than when each one goes his own way and pursues his own interests. Now is the time for national error to be confessed and past sins to be forgiven. Peace is not served by making believe that these matters can be tackled later. The representatives of governments-in-exile should seal pacts of lasting friendship, conscious of historic realities, while they are in a common exile. It would do them all good to acquire the habit of frankness and friendliness with those who, yesterday, may have been the stealers of their territory, the oppressors of their minorities, miniature imitators of an execrated Hitler.

Included in these reservations is the problem of the Jewish people. This seems to be the blind spot in all discussions. The facts that reveal the active and passive presence of Jews in every corner of the fighting world are not given any place on the agenda. The use Hitler makes of anti-Semitism as the entering wedge of his Fifth Column invasions is overlooked; and no attention is paid to the vicious propaganda that the Jews are responsible for preventing the Democracies from making peace with the peace-loving Hitler. The policy seems to be: Don't make any replies in which Jews are implicated. The case of the Jews seems doomed to be dimmed out for the duration. Not that it is wholly suppressed. It is sensed in the overtones of all conversation. It overshadows the discussion of other problems. But it has no integrated existence of its own. Jews may be invited to sit in at informal round table conferences but, at these conferences, not even an oblique reference is made to what place, if any, they are to occupy in the world of tomorrow. In no part of the political field are they qualified to speak as parties in interest. There are good friends who suggest the tactfulness of not even pressing this point. Is not equal justice promised for all when peace comes?

The whole world is undergoing revolutionary changes. The Jews are the objects of an incredible crusade aiming at their extinction. They are defending themselves as far as it is humanly possible. But the traditional attitude toward them is still being maintained in all political circles. The status of the Jewish people is to be determined by competent authority at the end of the war. From a formal point of view, they have not been, and they are not now, members of any recognized group of states, nations, or peoples. When the day comes, they may apply for admission and their credentials will be scrutinized and passed upon. Consideration of their case will come up only after all of the other states and peoples have agreed to the order of business. The tragedy of the Jews is an incident in the domestic affairs of the peoples among whom they have found protection. Let the Poles and the Czechs dispose of their Jews; the English and the Americans have no Jewish problems of their own. It is considered sufficient merely to say that "the world of tomorrow will not know the shame of anti-Semitism." Indignation may be expressed on occasion toward racial persecution. The terrible plight of the refugees may find sympathy. It is better, however, to avoid too much emphasis even upon Jewish suffering. For the time being, what ails Jews should be fragmentized or isolated. The world problem of the Jewish people will be taken up by the international club after the registry has been agreed to and the constitution adopted.

The peace that dated from Versailles gave Poland its freedom and set up the new republic of Czechoslovakia. It dismembered the Austrian Empire, gave Hungary its independence, handed over Bessarabia and Bukovina to Rumania. It fixed up Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. All its unfinished business it transferred to a League of Nations, which was hamstrung by constitutional limitations and an amazing system of checks and balances. What is forgotten is that the same authority also confirmed and established the rights and status of the Jewish people. The decisions affecting the Jews are as valid as all other treaties and agreements created by the peace after the first World War. The makers of the new order do not propose to start from scratch, to take over the world Hitler has destroyed and regard that as the *status quo*. They will begin with the scraps

of the era after Versailles and patch up what is reclaimable or remake what is beyond repair. Whatever remains of the rights given to Jews at Versailles, therefore, cannot be overlooked either during the war or when peace comes, if the principles of justice and equality are to be applied without prejudice or discrimination.

Out of the first World War came recognition of the equality of Jews as such, in lands where lingual, cultural, or religious rights were accorded to minorities. The historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine was recognized and it was agreed to give them an opportunity under international guardianship to rebuild their national home in that land. It gave the Jewish people a national habitation as a matter of international justice. With the debacle of the states in which they were to be exercised, Jewish group rights have now disappeared. In the course of twenty years, the Mandatory Government, using Palestine as a pawn in a larger political game, reduced the meaning of the Mandate to the nullifying policy of the MacDonald White Paper, which proposed to place the Jews in Palestine in the status of a permanent minority. But whatever the implications of these destroyed rights, the United Nations, fighting for international justice, cannot in justice proceed on the theory that the Jewish people must start with those desiccated rights they had when Hitler began his conquest of the world.

II

THE savage efforts of the nazi gangsters to destroy the Jews in Europe has not succeeded. Jews are available as substantial assets in the global war effort. They have not lost their courage or their hope. Equally with all other conquered peoples, they are enslaved and oppressed, but wherever possible they make an effective resistance. In spite of the destructive efforts of Hitler, a substantial remnant of Jews carry on the active struggle.

The Jewish part in the fight of the countries now overrun by the Nazis is a record of heroism and valor. Wherever they could, Jews have stood up and fought to the last against the invading German armies. Poland was the first country to give battle to Hitler's hordes; the Polish Jews were the first to take up arms against the common enemy. The Polish Government had no time to mobilize more than a small part of its reserves. In addition to some 30,000 Jews serving normally with the Polish standing army, authoritative estimates indicate that only an additional 20,000 were called up at the outbreak of the war. At the same time many Polish Jews resident abroad enlisted with the Allied armies. It is estimated that in France alone by February, 1940, some 7,000 Polish Jews had registered for service. In the recent reconstruction of the Polish armies on Soviet soil, Jews have contributed a high percentage which, according to the estimate of General Anders, has brought up the Jewish ratio to 15 per cent of the new Polish force raised in Russia.

The number of Jews serving in the French Army and Foreign Legion before the collapse of France is estimated as high as 60,000. This represents the majority of Jewish adults of military age in France. A number of Jews later joined the Free French Forces in Syria and elsewhere. In the Greek fight Jews took a valiant part, which has been acknowledged by the Greek authorities. The number of Jews serving with the Greek armies is estimated at some 20,000. Jewish participation in the heroic guerrilla warfare now being conducted in Yugoslavia, Greece, and elsewhere should not be overlooked. In particular, their part in the partisan units in Soviet Russia is a stirring chapter of which the world at present knows too little. The heroic fight of the Jews of Poland, Greece, and Russia on the front and behind the lines is an epic story of amazing courage and daring.

Jewish volunteering in Palestine forms a chapter by itself. The sixteen thousand Jewish men and women who have volunteered for service with the British Army have provided pioneer companies which saw fighting on many fronts, including France; they supplied the personnel of drivers' companies, artillery units, R.A.F. ground staff, *etc., etc.* These Jewish soldiers have been cited for extraordinary bravery and gallantry in action by the commanding officers in the campaigns of Keren, Tobruk, Greece, and Crete. The Jewish National Home has not only been able to place in the field volunteers for the army and technicians for its specialized services at times when they were most needed, but it has also furnished a body of several hundred thousand men and women, absolutely loyal to the cause of the United Nations, at a point of strategic importance where they render the greatest service to the war effort.

In addition to providing this foothold of a

dependable population on the approaches to vital empire communications, the Jewish National Home gave outstanding service through the contribution of its industrial, scientific, and technical resources. It is worth noting that Jewish Palestine has been able to make some contribution to the vital battle of the seas. Many Jewish seamen have already given their lives for the common cause in Jewish ships that have been lost both on Atlantic routes and in local coastal navigation. Many other Jewish seamen are serving with the Royal Navy, the R.A.F. marine stations, and the merchant navy.

A discussion of the war effort made by the Jewish people throughout the world would be incomplete without reference to the many contributions, apart from that of combatant man power, made in the struggle against the forces of nazism. The Jewish people of many countries, particularly the five million Jews in the United States, have played a notable part in the moral rearmament of the Democracies. As the first victim of nazi aggression, Jewry has been most sensitive to the true character and real aims of nazism. It recognized the nazi designs against all free peoples; from the first it threw all its spiritual and material strength against the nazi tyrants. Jews served as awakeners of the forces of democracy and perhaps their outstanding contribution has been to aid in the slow but growing awareness by democratic peoples of the nazi bid for world mastery, which was at the same time an awareness of the futility of isolationism and of the necessity for collective security. They stressed these principles and they warned the Democracies of the increasing strength and danger of Hitler when these acts brought upon them the odium of warmongering. They braved this criticism when the cup of prejudice against them was already spilling over because they felt that it was their duty to play this part in mankind's struggle for freedom.

III

WHY has it not seemed in order to speak of these facts and to mention the Jews as active factors in the war? Has it been due to a subconscious desire to avoid arousing a sleeping anti-Semitism in the Democracies themselves? Or is it a remnant of the fatal wish to appear not to cross Hitler which lingers in the thoughts of many European statesmen? Or does this studied oversight mark a desire not to have Jews raise their heads as a people when the war ends?

In no way has this policy of evasion seemed more fantastic and inexplicable than in the attitude assumed toward the Jewish appeal to be allowed to form a Jewish Army in Palestine which would fight with the United Nations under its own flag to strengthen the defenses of Palestine and the Near East. From the beginning of the war an earnest effort has been made by recognized spokesmen of the Jewish people to persuade English authority, but decision has been stalled and the effort has failed. It was urged that the Arabs might be offended; that equipment was not available; that the Jews might, through such recognition of the right to arm themselves, make political demands at the end of the war. But common sense rejects all these explanations. They are not truthful explanations. Equipment could have been made available had the value of Jewish participation been recognized and appreciated. The Jewish people are the only people in the Near Eastern territory upon whose loyalty and devotion there can be absolute reliance. The Jews are the only inhabitants of Palestine pleading for the right to be registered among the recognized defenders of their land, which they regard as the bulwark of the democratic front. They stand alone as the unequivocal enemies of Hitler in a sullen sea of Arab treachery. The Arabs are not being appeased by refusing to allow Jews to be armed; the real appeasement of the Arabs would require the English evacuation of their positions in the Near East. From Cairo to Bagdad, the Arabs are waiting to spring to the aid of the Nazis and the Fascists at the first sign of collapse of the defenses of the United Nations around the Suez Canal.

The suppression of the facts of Jewish participation in the war is therefore unwarranted by any of the interests in the political field or in the war effort. To intimate that it is premature to raise the question is a denial of the general conclusion that present discussion of the pattern of the new world, in all its aspects, is an imperative preliminary to a just peace after the war. It is not proposed to construct the new world out of new material or newly discovered principles of justice and righteousness. These old principles have not been discarded. The reaction to the nazi revolution will produce a better understanding of these ideals, which are to be translated anew into the material of the new structure of international society. A sincere effort will have to be made once again to see whether justice and righteousness can overcome the depravity of the human race.

The rights Jews have acquired in the modern world have come after generations of struggle against tremendous odds. Their medieval status as aliens was altered with the French Revolution, the ideals of which were carried by Napoleon's legions all over Europe. Their recognition as citizens in the French Republic was the beginning of their emancipation in Europe. The last hundred and fifty years has witnessed a continual struggle to have their rights extended to their brethren in other lands; and they have had a fair measure of success. In 1918, they were accorded rights in every state in which democratic equality was given to individuals and to groups united by ties of race, religion, language, or culture. The Balfour Declaration, as subsequently integrated in the Mandate, recognized their right to establish their national homeland in Palestine. The concept of their nationhood was thus enlarged. Through the exercise of their rights in Palestine for over twenty years they have displayed their capacity for national life and self-government. Through the rights given to them as groups, the Committee of Jewish Delegations, an association representative of all European Jewish communities, took an important part in the development of the rights of minorities in the League of Nations. That accumulation of legal action and representation under international sanctions cannot now be regarded as of no importance and entitled to no consideration. The disregard of their acquired status is at variance with the professions of the United Democracies as enunciated by their leading statesmen.

The Jewish people are entitled to a place in the world order now, as a matter of justice and fair play. There can be no interregnum in an obvious case of justice so far as the United Nations are concerned. The Jewish people are entitled to be heard now. Not as fragments, not as individuals, but as a people. They have a stake as interested parties in the world's unfinished business. The points of order that are raised stem from practices which the new world is called upon to do away with for all time. Hesitation or equivocation will contribute to the impairment of the morale of the democratic forces. It is a flagrant violation of right that in the concert of nations now rallying to reassert the authority of justice in the modern world, the Jewish people—the carriers of the Hebraic conception of justice and righteousness—should be shoved back into what is tantamount to their medieval status, as if they were a horde of hapless refugees entitled to the charity of the world, but not to their inalienable rights. Least of all is it becoming for the smaller peoples now suffering oppression and exile to refuse to make room in their councils for the national representatives of the classic exiles of the world. Between these small peoples and the Jewish people, there is one distinction: the Jews have suffered more and for a longer time. They should cease to be the unnamed ally of the democratic nations.

PLANS
FOR THE FUTURE

In the August number of FREE WORLD, *we inaugurated this new section which will present the most important plans for the future formulated by government agencies and private organizations in the United States and abroad. We hope to secure from Europe and Asia, from free and subjugated countries, all the diverse proposals of future world organization which merit serious consideration. In this issue, we publish the fourth and fifth of these proposals, the program of the British Labor party's Central Committee for Reconstruction, and the studies made to date by the Institute of Pacific Relations.*

As we stated last month, the Editors feel that this is one of the greatest services which FREE WORLD *can render to its readers and to the public in general. Our publication of these plans, which will be summarized as they become available rather than in the order of their importance, will in no sense signify our approval of the proposals. In fact, we shall feel free to comment critically on each plan when we present it, and every so often, we shall publish a general survey with a view toward co-ordinating these proposals into a coherent whole.*

IV—The British Labor Party

CENTRAL COMMITTEE FOR RECONSTRUCTION

EMANUEL SHINWELL, *Chairman*
HAROLD LASKI, *Secretary*
CLEMENT ATLEE — HERBERT MORRISON
PHILIP NOEL BAKER — GEORGE RIDLEY
WALTER H. GREEN — ELLEN WILKINSON
BARBARA AYERTON GOULD
ARTHUR GREENWOOD

THREE resolutions adopted at the Annual Conference of the British Labor party, which convened in London, May 25-28, 1942, embody the present official opinion of the party on questions of post-war organization. Prof. Harold Laski, speaking on behalf of the Executive Committee for the resolution which he introduced on May 26, described the object of victory as the building of a new world, not a return to the old, and urged the ending of a system under which the many were the slaves of the few. The first resolution states the basic objectives as follows: "This conference affirms that there must be no return after the war to an unplanned competitive society, which inevitably produces economic insecurity, industrial inefficiency, and social inequality. It notes that the pressure of war has already necessitated far-reaching government control of industry, central planning of the nation's economic life, and the subordination of many private interests to the common good, and urges that this process be carried farther in order to achieve swift and total victory. It declares that measures of government control needed for mobilizing the national resources in war are no less necessary for securing their best use in peace, and must therefore be maintained after final victory is won. It regards the socialization of the basic industries and services of the country, and the planning of production for community consumption, as the only lasting foundation for a just and prosperous economic order in which political democracy and personal liberty can be combined with a reasonable standard of living for all citizens.

"The conference therefore affirms that it is urgent to undertake without delay the necessary preparation for the vital changes here proposed."

A second resolution expressed the party's feeling of solidarity with international labor: "The Conference recognizes that, in its approach to the tasks of rebuilding the world on foundations of economic and social justice and permanent peace, the British Labor Movement has a special responsibility to the international working class, within and through which the solidarity of the workers, cemented by the sacrifices and sufferings of these war years, will find permanent, effective and decisive expression."

Finally, a resolution was adopted criticizing the Government's neglect of the practical implications of the Atlantic Charter in these terms: "This conference, while welcoming the Atlantic Charter as an expression of good intentions, but remembering promises like 'the world made safe for democracy' were made during 1914-18 and were not honored, regrets that no indication has been given by the Government that during the present war the implications of the Charter will be implemented, believing that such an implementation is necessary, not only as an act of justice to people in this country, but also that they will bring hope to the victims of Axis oppression inside and outside fascist countries and assist materially in the shortening of the war, directs the National Executive Committee through the National Council of Labor, if possible, to bring all pressure to bear upon the Government to apply practically the spirit of the Charter in this country and the Empire during the war.

The New Society

THE basis for the resolutions adopted in the full sessions of the Annual Conference is a report issued in February by the Central Committee for Reconstruction, "The Old World and the New Society." Under the chairmanship of Emanuel Shinwell, this committee, which was appointed in August, 1941, submitted its findings for discussion in a series of local reconstruction conferences throughout the country. Its conclusions represent, with fuller detail than the resolutions of the conference, the official deliberations of the Labor party on reconstruction and post-war world organization.

The peace which follows victory must have two objectives: "It must make it impossible for the aggressor nations, for any period against which we can make provision, either to be able or to be willing to use war as an instrument of national policy; and it must at least begin to build the ground plan of an enduring peace."

Endorsing the Government's acceptance of the Atlantic Charter, the Labor party sets forth four conditions necessary to the realization of its aims: "We have to provide full employment; we have to rebuild a Britain to standards worthy of the men and women who have preserved it; we have to organize social services at a level which secures adequate health, nutrition, and care in old age, for all citizens; and we have to provide educational opportunities for all which ensure that our cultural heritage is denied to none. Unless we do these things, there will be, after the war, a repetition of mass-unemployment, the re-emergence of distressed areas, a rebuilding of Britain made mean and inadequate by the surrender of public good to private interest. The Labor party does not believe that the nation will accept peacefully a return to these conditions. They would endanger the whole purpose for which we are fighting."

To provide these essentials to an acceptable peace, the Labor party insists upon a planned economy, seeking "to adapt our society to the full possibilities of democratic life. We have learned in the war that the anarchy of private competition must give way to ordered planning under national control. That lesson is not less applicable to peace. The Labor party therefore urges that the nation must own and operate the essential instruments of production; their power over our lives is too great for them to be left in private hands. This common ownership does not commit us to a regimented bureaucracy. It means, on the one hand, that the technical expert has his proper place in the direction of economic affairs, and, on the other, that the skill and experience of the workers are fully utilized in all branches of administration and management."

Collective Security

BRITAIN'S partnership in the war with her Allies and, above all, with the Soviet Union and the United States, can be the basis of an international experiment from which a creative peace may emerge. The war has taught the simple but vital lesson that civilization will perish unless it can this time make the world truly safe for democracy. The Labor party draws ten fully stated conclusions on the subject of post-war international security:

1. The principle is laid down that aggressor nations must be disarmed and kept disarmed. "This involves the destruction of the social and economic relationships which make possible the alliance between military castes and economic privilege. But the prevention of aggression can only be permanently secured by a general international system which organizes collective security against all acts of lawless violence, from whatever quarter they may come."

2. The rebuilding of an international

organization, with the necessary instruments, judicial, executive, and legislative, is described. The organization must be equipped:

a. To complete the peaceful solution of international disputes;

b. To impose sanctions, both economic and military, against any nation-state which rejects such a peaceful solution;

c. To promote common action upon matters of common concern, and especially, in this realm, to protect the interests of minorities, both racial and religious, and of those peoples not yet able to stand alone;

d. To organize positive and continuous co-operation between states for the purpose of raising the international standard of economic life, and, particularly, of assisting, materially and technically, the less developed nations to a higher level of well-being;

e. To promote intellectual co-operation and understanding between states with a view at once of raising international cultural standards and of placing the latest results of scientific knowledge at the common disposal of all peoples;

f. To safeguard and extend, directly and indirectly, the application of the Four Freedoms to the peoples of all lands, without discrimination in race or color or creed.

3. The Labor party expresses the view that no principle of collective security can hope for permanent acceptance unless it is based on the recognition of the interdependence of nations. "This will mean the control of armaments and armed forces by the direct power of the international authority. As a stage to this end . . . the obligation of economic sanctions against an aggressor must be assumed by all states; and . . . steps be taken, within the framework of the international organization, to create defense zones for mutual protection of the states within those zones against the possible action of an aggressor." Particular attention is drawn to the need of utilizing the war-time experience of the Lend-Lease system and of the arrangements for the common defense of reciprocal interests of the United States and Great Britain.

4. The Labor party is convinced "that no experiment in peace can have the prospect of success which does not recognize the due rights of nations to security and independence; but it denies that this recognition can imply any nation's right to sovereignty in the sense that this was claimed and exercised by states in the inter-war years. It believes that all the authority the nations, great and small alike, require for their self-respect and freedom is fully compatible with their full participation in, and acceptance of, the making of international standards in matters of international concern. It particularly emphasizes the urgency of these standards in the field now covered by the work of the International Labor organization."

5. This point has to do with the full use of the experience in collaboration gained in the various organs of the League of Nations: "Many of them, when used to apply the principles for which the League was founded, produced practical results which represented a real advance in international government. Through their operation, there was a rapid development of international law; the foundations of a genuine international civil service were laid; important and difficult administrative functions were successfully undertaken; and, not least, the technique of public discussion was successfully applied to international affairs."

6. Full use of the special experience of international collaboration which has emerged in this war is urged: "Common action for defense; common planning in investment and distribution; for the utilization of raw materials; for the full interchange of scientific knowledge and personnel; all of this has proved fruitful and important."

7. The full application of democratic principles as the foundation of the new international institutions is insisted upon. "Experience has decisively proved that the most powerful instrument in securing social justice and social progress is the citizens' knowledge of how their representatives exercise their powers; thereby they can understand and control what is done in their name. That control protects their rights, and it is only effective where there is full public debate in the national legislature. . . . In the view of the Labor party it is equally vital that all citizens in every land should be able to scrutinize and to judge the actions of those who operate the new international institutions."

8. The Labor party approves the provision in the Atlantic Charter that the peoples of the enemy countries shall, after their defeat, nevertheless share in the prosperity which all nations will seek to organize. It declares that "it will be a party to no attempt to impose any peace of revenge, nor to impose upon the defeated any terms which deprive them of the right to that well-being which is the due reward of capacity and energy exercised in a peaceful way for peaceful ends."

9. The Labor party foresees widespread revolution in the countries now dominated by the Nazis, and maintains that "each

people is entitled to determine its own form of government subject only to its obligation to accept and respect the Four Freedoms and the international implications to which they lead. It will oppose any attempt on the part of the victors, at the conclusion of the war, to use their military or economic power against the determination of each people to shape its own destiny, apart from the obligation to which reference has been made."

10. The point is emphasized that the power of democracy in the future to maintain international peace is, in the long run, inseparable from the growth, in each country, of the common ownership of the main instruments of production and their coordinated planning for common ends. "This is no doctrinaire affirmation; it is the unescapable lesson both of the inter-war years on the one hand, and of the war itself on the other. The private empires of privilege, whether in oil or munitions, whether in land or minerals, whether in power or the basic means of transport, are bound on the evidence to frustrate the fulfilment of democracy at home and the maintenance of peace abroad. . . . Democratic relations of production are the highroad to freedom. The barriers in their way must be taken down that the nations may move swiftly to the goal for which they have sacrificed so much.

The Problem of India

SEPARATE sections of the party's interim report take up imperial questions. The supreme purpose of the whole process of government must be that of "fitting the native races to determine their own destiny." Colonial territories must be administered in the interest of the well-being, education, and development of native inhabitants and their training in every possible way so that they may be able in the shortest possible time to govern themselves. The application of the color bar as a factor giving inferior status to native populations in the colonies is strongly opposed, as well as compulsory labor in the territories and restrictions upon the right to acquire lands. On the specific question of Indian self-government, the Labor party urges the Government to promote agreement among the different interests in India. While believing that full settlement of the complex issue must await the close of the war, it states that "both at the center and in the Provinces Indians must be given full responsibility now," and that "Indians must take their full place alongside Dominion statesmen in the direction of the war effort. . . . Sooner or later, in the Labor party's view, Great Britain will have to concede the Indian demand; it is more honorable and more just to act now with magnanimity than to wait until our admission of the Indian claim has lost all character of grace and generosity."

These principles applying to the government of the colonies, the status of colonial peoples, and particularly the right of the Indian peoples to decide their own destiny were also embodied in resolutions adopted by the Labor party conference in May.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

"The Old World and the New Society" is a distinguished contribution to thinking about the post-war world, carrying with it the weight of the party which today holds the balance of power in Britain. Although the resolutions adopted by the full conference of the Labor party are less explicit than the report of the Central Committee for Reconstruction and reflect less concern for questions of international settlement, they are forthright in insisting upon the immediate adoption of means which will lead to the goal of democracy, in recognizing the common interests of the working class in all countries, and in urging increased socialization of production. The maintenance of a critical attitude toward the Govenment with which the Labor party is collaborating in the conduct of the war is a sign of healthy freedom from dictation.

In advocating a socialistic basis for post-war society, the Labor party is making no radical departure from its own tradition. Debate at the conference was in favor of more rather than less socialization during the course of the war. Likewise in urging the extension of democracy to colonial administration, the organization is merely reaffirming its previous attitude. In these questions of

social and economic planning the British Labor party appears to be bolder than many American advocates of a planned society. However, in the realm of future international settlements, the party makes no startling recommendations. Its recognition of the necessity of international control of armaments, international protection of minorities, and limitation of national sovereignty have by now become a part of common thinking.

The question which these deliberations raise is one of practical policy. How far can the Labor party succeed in its program while co-operating politically with the Government in prosecution of the war? This issue, which will continue to agitate party councils during the coming months, will determine to some degree whether these liberal proposals are ever to become the basis of a new society.

V—Institute of Pacific Relations

FOUNDED in 1925, "to facilitate the scientific study of the peoples of the Pacific Area," the Institute of Pacific Relations publishes studies in four fields embracing the political and economic conditions which have contributed to the present course of the policies of Japan, China, and the Western powers in the Far East and the probable political, economic, and social effects of the present conflict on the ultimate position of the Western powers in the Far East, on the post-war situation of Japan, and on the future developments in China. The fourth field comprises the major issues likely to require international adjustment in the post-war period and the most hopeful methods which might be devised to meet them; the necessary adjustments by the powers concerned; the basic requirements of a practical system of international organization which could promote the security and peaceful development of the countries of the Pacific area.

PACIFIC COUNCIL:

PHILIP C. JESSUP . . . . *Chairman*

E. C. CARTER . . . *Secretary-General*

W. L. HOLLAND . . *Research Secretary*

AMERICAN COUNCIL:

ROBERT G. SPROUL . . . . *Chairman*

W. W. LOCKWOOD . . . . . *Secretary*

The governing body of the Institute is the Pacific Council, which convenes private round-table conferences once in three years. In addition, executive committee meetings are held once a year or more often for decisions upon program, for the assignment of fields of investigation to writers, and for survey of available studies. The program is carried out under the direction of the International Secretariat. There are also branches of the Institute, called National Councils, in ten countries interested in the Pacific area. (Before the war with Japan, the Japanese Council was also a branch of the Institute.)

Since the Institute and the National Councils are precluded from expressing opinion on any aspect of national or international affairs, all studies published rest upon the individual authority of the writers, though the Institute exacts "a proper standard of sound and impartial scholarship." The extensive IPR series of books and pamphlets, together with its two journals, *Pacific Affairs* and *Far Eastern Survey*, constitute a library in themselves.

"Post-War Worlds"

THE Institute's most recent and most comprehensive discussion of the forms and institutions of the world to come is P. E. Corbett's "Post-War Worlds." In an attempt to stimulate preparation for the arduous work of settlement that must follow the war, Mr. Corbett suggests that the more that can be done while the war is still in progress the better the chance will be of an enduring peace: "It may well be that, with the memory of 1919 in men's minds, no single conference will be entrusted with the structure of world order. A provisional regime, set up by the victors, may afford time for more patient and solid building. But care must be taken that the provisional mechanisms of control and administration are not of a kind to perpetuate animosities and prevent a definitive organization. An agreed design, known to the peoples concerned as the ultimate purpose, will elicit active collaboration. It will also influence the form and operation of interim agencies so that these may merge naturally into the 'wider and permanent system of general security' contemplated by the Atlantic Charter."

Although the elimination of war and the establishment of a firm world order are one and the same thing in the opinion of Mr. Corbett, no uniformity of internal mechanism can be expected: "We must contemplate a world order embracing associations of states varying all the way from close-knit federal unions in some parts of Europe to the something less than confederation of Pan-America. Some members of these associations will be participants also in groups like the British Commonwealth, which defy geographical classification. The linking together of such unlikes into a workable unity is going to require creative imagination disciplined but not fettered by past experience."

A World Commonwealth which admits all political communities which its assembly deems fit for membership, which has fewer functions but more authority to decide and act than the League of Nations, "is the arrangement best adapted to the infinite variety and the ethnical and geographical distribution of the problems to be met. It combines the centralization of general direction with the decentralization of detailed control—a principle proved in democratic national government."

The legislative, judicial, economic, and social agencies to be maintained by the World Commonwealth may be summarized as follows:

1. An assembly composed of delegates from each member of the Commonwealth. "The original members of the Commonwealth would be all states accepting an invitation to be issued by the general peace conference held after a suitable interval following the cessation of hostilities in the present war. Thereafter new members would be admitted by two-thirds vote of the Assembly."

2. A world court, with compulsory jurisdiction in interregional disputes, and acting as the preliminary forum in claims for changes in the law of nations.

3. An economic and financial organization, embracing trade, development, and migration commissions, and a central bank.

4. A social organization embracing the International Labor Organization with its function of improving all working conditions, together with health and social services to carry on the work of the League of Nations in this field.

5. A territorial administration commission to supervise territories mandated in 1919 "together with the colonies to be surrendered to the World Commonwealth, and to ensure the development of all these communities toward autonomy."

6. A commission on transit and communications to carry on the much needed co-ordination inaugurated by the similar organization under the League of Nations.

7. A commission on intellectual co-operation "to continue the work of the League in the exchange of scientific knowledge and personnel, and the protection of the rights of intellectual workers in the product of their labors. This body should also take charge of the very necessary popular education in internationalism."

In the development of civil rights, Mr. Corbett sees no possibility of equality in the different parts of the globe, nor does he find world revolution aiming at the abolition of privilege and the suppression of boundaries conceivable. Socialization, he finds, "will not necessarily bring with it the cessation of interstate rivalry. The socialist nation, while suppressing the profit motive among its citizens, may continue to be aggressively acquisitive as a people. Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that socialism is a condition of peace, it does not follow that it is the sole condition." Rather than to a political miracle, sweeping away the separatism of centuries, Mr. Corbett looks to a

gradual process by which supranational institutions will be established on the basis of agreement of a dominant group of states. "The operation of such institutions, once they have been created, will extend the will to world peace and the sense of world community."

"Peace in the Far East"

A MORE specific study of the Pacific area is Nathaniel Peffer's "Prerequisites to Peace in the Far East," published by the Institute in 1940. Since the main conclusions of the book treat the conditions upon which lasting peace must be based, the outbreak of war has not changed them. The essential problem is not altered by war, as Mr. Peffer points out, although it "will be given at least temporary formulation by the result of the European war and the difficulties will be magnified or reduced, perhaps raised to insuperability or eliminated altogether, according as that war ends and depending on the kind of world it produces."

The prerequisites of peace in the Far East are clearly outlined:

1. Defeat of Japan in the present war and the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from China, Manchuria included.
2. The withdrawal of the Western powers from their pre-1937 position in China. This means "the voluntary abandonment of the territorial, political and economic positions maintained by Western countries in China up to the present. Concretely, such concessions and settlements as remain must be retroceded; fighting ships in Chinese waters and garrisons on Chinese soil must be withdrawn; extraterritoriality must be waived. European and American nationals must be content with a relationship of equality, residing in China subject to Chinese laws and trading with China as with any other independent country."
3. The avoidance of any obligation of China to any one power even in return for rescue, and the prevention of China's exhaustion. "Seen in the long perspective and judged by the criterion of the greatest good in the long run, it was better that China withstood the full force of the Japanese attack alone, engaged the whole of Japan's strength and for at least three years prevented the consummation of a Japanese victory. . . . Now, no matter what combination of circumstances may lead to action by third powers, the credit for repelling Japan is China's."
4. Adoption of measures which will make the societies of both Japan and China viable. Japan's internal economic problems must be recognized as in essence indistinguishable from those of the West; social reconstruction in China is a *sine qua non* of both internal equilibrium in China and international peace in the Far East.

EDITORIAL COMMENT

To estimate the value of the IPR research program would involve a survey of some twenty-three books in the Inquiry Series, a much larger number of detailed works in the International Research Series, several pamphlets published by the American Council, and the journals mentioned above. While the scientific method adopted in making these studies and the ambitious scope of the program is to be strongly approved, some integrating formulation of proposals, to be made by the Institute itself, is certainly due if public opinion is to be not merely informed but also influenced as deeply as the crucial times require. The Institute provides a body of factual material which needs to be made more readily available both to the public and to international policy makers. Certainly, upon such a solid foundation of investigation, the International Secretariat and the American Council could risk one volume of interpretation that would represent their agreed judgment, correct individual opinions, like Mr. Corbett's conclusions regarding the unimportance of civil liberties and of socialism in the establishment of permanent peace, and urge those policies concerning the future which they would be willing to endorse.

THE WAR about THE PEACE

Four Letters and an Answer

"Beginning of a Solution"

EDITORS FREE WORLD:

In an interesting article in your July number headed War About the Peace, Mr. Lin Yutang criticizes among others my book, "America and World Mastery." He says it is one of the best of a bad lot of recent publications advocating world domination through sheer military force by America in the exclusive company of Britain and excluding Russia and China and all other countries.

I do not resent criticism, especially when salted with such praise as Mr. Lin Yutang accords me. But perhaps he would value a statement that I most emphatically do not advocate world domination by sheer Anglo-American military force excluding Russia and China. For that very reason, in fact, I opposed my colleague Clarence Streit's "Union Now." It would be too close a union, which might invite the danger Mr. Lin Yutang fears, and would certainly alarm the rest of the world.

My book obviously left itself open to misunderstanding, which is a defect. The explanation is that I was not trying to solve all the world's problems but merely to prove that the beginning of a solution for Americans and Englishmen was to be found in an Anglo-American alliance. I said specifically that this alliance must not be exclusive. Of course there is danger to the world in such an alliance. But there has been disaster for the world in the fact that for the last forty years the unmistakable community of interest between the British Empire and the United States was never expressed in an open agreement. There was a tacit understanding, as one result of which the United States found herself at the beginning of this war with two coasts to protect and only a one-ocean fleet to protect them. But because the understanding was unwritten, it was never accepted by the American public or by Congress, though statesmen and chiefs of staff might base their policies on it at times. Had the alliance been clear and close it might have prevented this war. It would certainly have cleared the way long ago for Anglo-American agreement on the Open Door policy for China.

Why must an Anglo-American alliance be exclusive or directed against Russia? Surely it is obvious that neither Americans nor Englishmen could advocate world co-operation and world solidarity and in the same breath declare that they themselves were unwilling to make common cause. Surely a first and logical step toward large combinations is small combinations. Certainly if Americans and Englishmen cannot agree, the world will not agree.

In writing that I believe "that an Anglo-American alliance is the only alternative to an Anglo-German alliance against Russia after the war," Mr. Lin Yutang puts the cart slightly before the horse. I wrote that an Anglo-German alliance would be, for Britain, the sad but inevitable alternative to an Anglo-American alliance. Britain will emerge from this war, even if we win it, a bankrupt at least on paper. A valuable part of her empire and most of her foreign investments have gone. Nearly all her export trade has already been sacrificed in return for Lease-Lend help. Her dominions have learned to look to Washington instead of London for leadership. If the United States rejects a post-war English speaking alliance, Britain will count herself among the losers of this war. Is it not almost inevitable that she will be thrown in the direction of that other powerful losing nation, Germany?

About Russia: I am all for the closest possi-

ble co-operation with Russia. I still would not have her in a post-war League of Nations if she remained a dictatorship. To ask Russia, after all, to establish democracy after this war is to ask her only to realize communism, for the Marxian ideal was a democracy so perfect that the state would "wither away." By the time this war ends the dictatorship of the proletariat which Marx described as the necessary preliminary stage of communism will have existed nearly thirty years. If the Soviet Government really means democracy, it should be able to afford a large installment of it after a generation of preparation and a successful war. If it does not, then the Democracies cannot treat on equal terms with a totalitarian nation. Democracies wear their guns in plain view. But the totalitarian nation is always in a position to shoot from the pocket. The Russians still say that democracy is their ideal. I am prepared to believe them.

About China: China is a great nation but she will never be a great power until she has an industrial potential at least equal to that of Japan. She must have outside assistance to acquire it and the safest sources that occur to me, and perhaps to Mr. Lin Yutang, are America and Britain. Why, then, should an Anglo-American alliance be an influence in any way tending to exclude China from a larger combination?

John MacCormac

WASHINGTON, D. C.

"War and the Wise Guys"

EDITORS FREE WORLD:

Kindly allow me space to protest against Mr. Lin Yutang's comments on my new book, "Peace by Power," in your July issue. It is regrettable that a journal which has standards to maintain should publish and circulate that sort of intemperate abuse.

My general attitude Mr. Lin Yutang utterly falsifies. There is no sign of his having read beyond page 10. Geopolitics I abhor, and it is the language of Bedlam when the term fascist is applied to anything I have ever thought, said, or done.

My treatment of Anglo-American leadership in "Peace by Power," as well as in my previous book, "The Rise of Anglo-American Friendship," stresses the limitations no less than the urgency of English-speaking unity. Time after time I have stated that an exclusive hegemony should not be contemplated; that Britain and America must act with other men and nations of good will; that a free, strong France and the other liberated peoples will be as essential to the European picture as the fighting Allies of today. But their unique good fortune imposes special duties on America and the British Commonwealth; it furnishes them with the capacity to help others. Would Mr. Lin Yutang prefer them to quarrel, as they did in the past, or retire into a complete and selfish isolation? What that might again mean to China, Mr. Lin Yutang could learn from my "Rise of Anglo-American Friendship" where the diplomatic origins of China's tragedy are described. "Peace by Power" is mostly about other things, but there are on pages 11, 52, 61, and 151 random remarks which offer evidence of my pro-Chinese sympathies.

As for Russia, my views in "Peace by Power" on the importance of co-operation with her may be seen on pages 27, 86, 120-1, 127, and in the Appendix on pages 149-154. For this Appendix reproduces (London, March 1, 1938) my pre-*anschluss*, pre-Munich prediction of the alternative to it—namely, a Nazi-Soviet pact which would be the preliminary to German domination of the European continent, a first step towards German world power. The Anglo-Russian Alliance of 1942 is a full vindication of that early and solemn warning. It also confirms the analysis of world politics and of Anglo-American relations upon which "Peace by Power" ventures.

FREE WORLD ought to stand for free speech. When an argument does not support cherished notions, there is all the more ground to deal with it justly. FREE WORLD may or may not agree with "Peace by Power"; but some distinguished publications and some eminent critics have found that it deserves a fair hearing and reasoned dissent. Mr. Lin Yutang is a novelist and a popular moralist. As a moralist, he might be expected to observe elementary rules of ethics and not defame without cause the life and work of another man.

It is true that academic writers have misled many. But so have others with glib pens and closed minds. "Peace by Power" discusses them all in a concluding chapter under the heading War and the Wise Guys.

Lionel Gelber

TORONTO, CANADA.

"Beyond Page 10"

EDITORS FREE WORLD:

Thank you for letting me read these letters. I shall let Mr. Gelber answer Mr. Gelber. Kindly retain the page numbers to show that I have read beyond page 10. I shall not use a single adjective, since Mr. Gelber is so prolific with adjectives which he hurls at any one who dares to suggest that this is a war of ideologies primarily, and not "war for power"—which is the main thesis of his book.

On the war not being one of ideologies: "The idea that democracy must have a more stirring dynamic is not always voiced with any special one in sight." (p. 62). ". . . confusion may arise because of over-emphasis on the struggle as a conflict of ideologies. In reality the war is one for power—for power by the Democracies before it is a war for democracy itself." (pp. 67-68). "For this war, we are assured, is a 'different' sort of war. Certainly it is different in scale and scope; it is scarcely as different as all that. . . . For this theory of a 'different' war is, we may suspect, a rationalization." (pp. 137-8). "Much more refreshing is it to agree with Mr. Lindbergh that this war's prize is the balance of power. . . . Yet even while moving in the wrong direction . . . he is on the right track when he treats the war as one for power —a conflict of national systems before it begins to be a clash of ideologies." (p. 141).

On preserving the British Empire: "Is is not necessary to preserve the British Empire as presently constituted before it can be constituted in any other way?" (p. 53).

On maintaining the status quo: ". . . the deepest revolutionary force of modern politics . . . is allied to the much-maligned status quo. . . . We are prone to disparage the status quo as a brake on freedom. . . . For the status quo has been the concrete embodiment of world order." (p. 58). "For villification of the status quo was subversive of the world order by which the Democracies themselves have lived; yet to the hymn of hate against it many in the West blithely sang a chorus. . . . And that Mr. Sumner Welles should now adopt it is unfortunate." (p. 60).

On Versailles: "No new Versailles? No new Versailles for whom?" (p. 55.) "Foreign policy and legislation in English-speaking countries were influenced by the belief which ensued not only that the last war but that the peace settlement was also base." (p. 139).

On the war of imperialisms: "But, among the paradoxes of debate upon the war, few have been more odd than the tacit assumption of friend and foe alike that to call it a struggle between rival imperialisms was to belittle the Allied cause. Yet, as with the conflict of 1914-18, that is a perfectly accurate description. For there is nothing irremediably sinister in modern imperialism unless you make it so. It all depends upon whose imperialism you are talking about. If German imperialism is finally victorious, that will be horrible; if the imperialism triumphs which bred the concept of the British Commonwealth of Nations, mankind may breathe easily once again. A victory for Italian imperialism would have been execrable; the reinforcement of that American imperialism which, since the turn of the century, has rendered the United States more capable of defending the Western Hemisphere will be acclaimed by level-headed, free men everywhere." (p. 140).

What has been written has been written. I can only add that out of Oxford, the home of lost causes, which Mr. Gelber decries for what he calls that "notorious" question of not fighting for King and Country, and out of England in general, the home of liberalism, will a richer, better vision arise than Mr. Gelber thinks. England, I mean the true England, will yet surprise Mr. Gelber.

Lin Yutang

NEW YORK CITY.

"Open Letter"

EDITORS FREE WORLD:

If your space permits, I would like you to print the enclosed open letter to Mr. Lin Yutang.

DEAR MR. LIN YUTANG:

I have just settled down after a two-way convoy voyage across the North Atlantic, and, having myself sweated for a doctor's degree in my time, I read with gusto your piece against the amoral doctors and professors in the July issue of FREE WORLD.

The U. S. academic imperialists, living soft lives and passing edict on how America must dominate China and other Allies after the war, have their cousins in England. Over there, professors argue with "unemotional objectivity" that the small European nations, now resisting Hitler, have no title to independence after the war. No fool like a learned fool.

I agree that the assumption of unsentimental objectivity in human sciences is preposterous: it merely reflects personal cynicism. With souls of parchment, incapable of the healthy emotions of a truck driver, the academicians of the type you mention cloak their moral sterility in "science" and, true exhibitionists, delight in their own amorality. Comparing the fighting peasants of China, Russia, and the Balkans with professorial nonentities in America and England, I am inclined to believe that illiteracy has its human values, and that it mightn't be a bad idea to close certain American and British universities for the duration of the war.

Yet professors with Napoleonic complexes do not represent Western scholarship. They are not Western, for they are divorced from the Western common people; and they are no scholars, as their writings amply reveal. They are, in fact, a hangover from times long gone by—a pompous, would-be aristocracy in a democratic society.

Very wisely, Mr. Lin Yutang, you remark that you would rather consult a New York taxi driver than a Yale professor about international affairs—which is no compliment to the taxi driver. I would like to add that a single Norwegian merchant seaman on the North Atlantic has sounder ideas about the future peace than all the professors of America put together.

But why get excited? The American and the British professorial imperialists will have no say in the making of the future peace. Pathetically futile, they will be the one lost generation in this war, for they can't see that this is not a professor's war, but an ordinary, emotional, common man's war.

Stoyan Pribichevich

NEW YORK CITY.

"Exposing the Cancer"

EDITORS FREE WORLD:

I would like to congratulate you on your courageous and timely article by Doctor Lin Yutang, The War About the Peace.

As the mother of a son, (now in the Navy, but just out of college last year) I am sure there are hundreds and thousands of mothers like myself, who are hoping that this article will be read, inwardly digested, and *acted upon* by our leading college authorities.

The trend toward fascist teaching has been a matter of grave concern to me for the last four years—in fact, ever since my son entered college. I could not understand why the boys who came to my house were so lacking in patriotic enthusiasm, and so utterly indifferent both as to what went on in the world and as to the fate of their heritage of freedom.

We were not, ourselves, at war at this time. But it was apparent that the average college student felt himself beyond responsibility, and actually irritated at the thought of being interrupted in the achieving of his own personal ambitions.

The college was then as a whole insolationist in spite of the publicity put out about "officer training units," etc. The boys in the Architectural School were definitely and bitterly anti-British, this feeling being largely, as they themselves admitted, the influence of one Nazi student and one Syrian student who was certainly a Nazi tool. None of the boys ever asked for the removal of these two Nazis. But one other mother became alarmed to the extent of calling me one day and asking me to write to the Dean of the Architectural School. My reply assured me that the Syrian would be deported, but my son tells me this was never done. The Nazi student is now in our Navy, and the boys think it is rather a joke!

At this point I asked to read some of my son's class note-books, and it became plain instantly *why* these boys thought and felt as they did. Because the teaching was pure unadulterated fascism. At this point, I sat down and wrote to the President, telling him exactly what I have just related and received a definitely "reply-to-frenzied-Mother-Number 6-Form 10."

Fortunately, my own son, after teetering precariously on the brink of being a fine young fascist, entirely swung over, and has spent far too much time and energy trying to win over the hopeless ones, and there *are* hopeless ones! Many of his classmates are successfully or unsuccessfully working various schemes to render their duty of the noncombatant variety. They manage this very well.

It is for these varieties of reasons that I am so grateful to you for your foresight, and to Doctor Lin Yutang for his courage and wisdom in diagnosing and exposing the most dangerous cancer we possess—and one that is gnawing at our very vitals!

L. H. M. Thompson

NEW CANAAN, CONN.

THE UNDERGROUND REPORTER

THE huge poster announces the convention of the fascist Legion which has been created to protect Pétain and Laval. Its slogan is: Only one chief: Pétain • Only one means: the Legion. Underground workers painted in the following signs, reading from left to right: Death to the collaborators—Long live DeGaulle-Churchill—Long live Stalin—Long live Free France—Death to the traitors. Liberally sprinkled are the V's for victory and the Lorraine cross of the Fighting French.

AMONG the constant reports which we receive of the increasing determination with which the French are resisting, despite German and Vichy terrorism, is this revelatory letter sent to us in July by a prominent Frenchman.

"My country is undergoing a terrible Calvary. Oppression and misery increase every day. . . . We suffer from our present impotence, but the people hope. . . . There is a rumbling of the approaching mighty revolt. . . . The people wait for the *arrival of Americans in North Africa and in Europe*. . . .

"May I tell you that *the people think that America is too lenient toward the Government* [Vichy] *and that it does not accord sufficient help to the courageous Frenchmen who have taken the initiative of resistance?* . . .

"As for me, my heart has never lost faith. I was sorry to hear of your illness. Take care of yourself. . . . We will need you for the reconstruction of the world."

The few lines which we can reproduce without endangering the writer are of great significance. They answer a few important questions which we have asked some of our friends in France. It will be noted that the hopes and expectations of the French are centered on American help. Psychologically and materially, they have come to connect strong American participation and leadership with the invasion attempt in Europe.

Moreover, the feeling prevails in France that Vichy receives immense aid in its pro-fascist activities from the continued relations with the United States. Every effort to arouse the people to active resistance is greatly weakened by the fact that they must act against a Government which is still recognized by and has normal diplomatic relations with the greatest democracy in the world. The complaint about lack of sufficient support applies both to the Fighting

French and to the underground movements of resistance in France. The remark about not having lost faith is an answer to the Vichy propaganda which has been stressing the fact that many prominent people have abandoned hope of a United Nations victory.

The conclusion needs the following explanation: The letter was addressed to a distinguished member of our Editorial Board who is not French, but who is known in France for his interest in democracy and in international co-operation. Incidentally, it answers the question whether the underground movements are interested in future reconstruction. The answer from France is emphatically, "Yes."

Rations for Death

Warsaw, May, 1942.

WHEN the Warsaw occupation headquarters announced that coffins would be sold to Poles only on special ration cards, and posters with this joyous information were posted throughout the city, the people said: "Now there will be no more coffins. We shall be buried like the Jews, wrapped in newspapers."

The ration card is the basis of the German system of distribution. You can receive nothing without a card — not even the razor to cut your throat, not even the hook and string with which to hang yourself. But if a Pole were to lead his life in Warsaw or in other Polish cities according to the rules, within the framework of the ration cards, his family would be obliged to apply very quickly for the coffin card.

Each month, everyone in the cities—there are no cards in the villages — receives, for 10 grosze, a so-called food card. (One zloty, which before the war was worth 19 cents, is equivalent to 100 grosze.) This card has some hundred items, including all the commodities necessary for existence. The adults are entitled to get each week: 900 grams of bread, 100 grams of meat and sugar, flour, macaroni, jam. The rations for children are one-half that amount, minus meat. But German generosity consists only in designating these large rations. As a matter of fact, nobody in Warsaw receives even half the bread ration; as for meat, one may get 100 grams, including 20 grams of bone, once a month—and not every month. Sugar, jam, soap, groats, candy are distributed not more than two or three times a year in microscopical quantities.

The price of a kilogram of bread is 52 grosze, but the taste of the coin you pay is probably better than the taste of this acid, stinking loaf called bread. Only the bakers know what are the ingredients of this black, bitter poison. The official German regulations allow the addition of 33 per cent of sawdust, but who knows what is the composition of the other 67 per cent? The people get sick from this rationed bread which is called "dynamite." It gets worse and worse.

Germans Eat Better

OF course, the Germans have completely different ration cards. They receive not only an unlimited amount of good white bread, but also other food. They get meat four times a week, 500 grams per person; butter, sugar, flour, eggs, fruit, milk, fish, salami, cigarets, and brandy — two liters a month per person. There are more than a hundred stores in Warsaw serving Germans. On the doors there is a sign: Only Germans admitted.

The Poles have ration cards for potatoes, coal, clothes, and shoes; but only the Germans have cards which really entitle them to get things. In 1941, the Poles received 50 kilograms of coal per family for the whole winter; the Germans got 250 kilograms per person. The cellars of the German houses were filled with coal; the Poles had no coal and were forbidden to use electrical or wood stoves.

In Warsaw, there is a monthly distribution of cards for shoes, linen, and clothes, but that is merely a gesture. One of the big stores in Warsaw gets each month some 4,500 Polish orders for shoes, but is permitted to sell only between 80 and 100 pairs. At the same time, it sells a thousand pairs of shoes each month to Germans. The situation in Cracow is precisely the same as in Warsaw, but in the smaller cities, the Germans do not even take the trouble of going through this formality. Poles get only bread cards; the ration is about 100 grams a week and varies according to the humor of the local authorities.

There is no place in this "rationed" economy for free commerce. For selling a loaf of bread or a piece of meat one can be condemned to years in prison, even to death—not only the seller, but also the buyer. Nevertheless, you can buy in Warsaw practically everything you like. The people are living, are eating, are dressing—without German cards—in Warsaw and elsewhere. But for that you need money. The people who have the money and can buy the necessary articles from traders and smugglers do not complain.

Black Market Prices

BUT wage earners simply cannot manage on their salaries. The price of a pair of shoes in the black market of Warsaw is from 600 to 1,200 zlotys; a suit of clothes, from 3,000 to 5,000; a ton of coal, from 2,500 to 3,500; a piece of soap, the value of which before

the war was 30 grosze, now is worth between 40 and 60 zlotys; an egg, which used to cost 5 or 8 grosze, is now worth from 50 to 60 times as much.

And the salaries? An unskilled worker earns 6 grosze a day, a skilled one, 15. A city employee, who was paid 250 zlotys a month before the war, now receives only 125. With his monthly salary, he can buy at most five loaves of bread in the black market.

How do people manage in these conditions? It is almost impossible to answer this question. First of all, the people "have tightened their belts" to an extent unknown before the war. No more burghers with corporations. The people simply do without. But, most important, there is help from the country. Prices there are, for the moment, much lower. The people go out of town for their marketing, risking the confiscation of their little purchases during the trip. Relatives in the country send in packages. Whoever can, sends his family, or at least a part of it, to the country "in order to be able to eat for a while."

Furniture, jewelry, and furs are sold in order to buy food. As long as that lasts, everyone in Warsaw trades — officials, workers, peasants, the unemployed, and their wives and children — everybody, in and out of office hours. This traffic in forbidden goods, the tremendous oscillations in prices have brought about all kinds of speculation. "Fortunes" of many tens of thousands of zlotys appear and disappear. But the speculators and the great merchants continue to have a vast amount of money to spend. The number of merchants has increased enormously among the Poles since the establishment of the ghettos and the elimination of Jewish traders and middlemen. It is not necessary to have capital for this trade. It is only necessary to be enterprising and not timid about the risks involved.

But how do the people who have neither furs nor jewelry nor opportunities for speculation get along? The answer is cruel and terrifying: they are starving. On a lovely sunny day in front of every doorway in the central section of the city, emaciated children lie on the sidewalks, beside them a cap or a saucer for alms. These children are skeletons, their feet and hands thin as sticks, their stomachs swollen, their eyes glazed with approaching death. Babies are constantly abandoned by their mothers on the streets of Warsaw.

But children are not the only beggars. The old as well as the young, professional people, gentlefolk, students, Polish soldiers from the last war, all ring the bells in the better-class apartments and plead for a crust of bread.

Misery in the Ghetto

IF the misery is terrible in the Polish section, it is unbelievable in the ghetto, the overcrowded Jewish section where food is three times more expensive. People drop on the streets from hunger. And now, no one dares take care of the fallen because, according to general regulations, he who calls for help has to defray the expenses of the medical treatment or of the funerals. Typhoid fever, which is ravaging all Poland, is even more prevalent in the ghettos. The infected houses are isolated; the food for the inhabitants is passed in through special holes in the doors. Among the volunteer physicians who visit these houses, there are many Polish Gentiles. The German physicians, of course, do not help the Jews.

Both Jews and Poles live in a permanent atmosphere of terror. There is a systematic effort to demoralize them by arrests, raids, overnight expulsions of thousands of people from their homes, mass shootings, and execution of hostages. They know that the Nazis are deliberately trying to wipe out an entire nation, using every possible trick to demoralize it so that it may be more easily destroyed.

One of the favorite forms of disrupting the life of a community is the sudden, baseless raid, which the Nazis especially enjoy because it combines the excitement of a man hunt with opportunities for graft, robbery, and sexual bestiality. Here is how such a raid is operated.

A Matter of Luck

TWO military policemen stand near the door of some large building on a central thoroughfare, like New World Street in Warsaw. From time to time, they accost one of the passers-by and "ask" him politely to follow them into the house. After a few moments, they walk out alone. Then they choose another victim and the same thing takes place. When a "contingent" of about thirty persons is gathered, a great covered truck suddenly appears; the people are loaded in it and it drives away.

The "criminals" are put in prison. They will be there a day, a month, half a year. Some will be liberated; others sent to the concentration camp of Oswiecim—a living death; still others, shot. What determines the fate of most of these victims? Luck? But which are the lucky ones?

How is such a dragnet avoided? People who are watchful and able to show presence of mind in emergencies can do it. A friend of mine was walking along a street where he had no acquaintances when he noticed a cordon blocking off one end.

He immediately rang the bell of the nearest house. A lady came to the door.

"There is a raid going on. May I come in?"

In a moment he was sitting in the living room drinking "tea" made from wild strawberries, like any old friend come for a visit. The hostess and he quickly exchanged information about each other. They were soon ready for any questions.

Any Plumbing to Fix?

A SECOND ring. They nerve themselves to meet the questioners. But it is a worker who has sized up the situation at the end of the street. "Let me in please; you can tell them that I've come to fix the bath." Sure enough, he marches upstairs and begins to bang on the plumbing.

But not everyone acts this way. It takes good nerves. A woman was accosted on the street by two German soldiers. She fell in a dead faint. The Nazis looked sheepishly at the crowd that gathered; they had merely wanted to ask directions to a neighboring street.

The nervous people go through agonies. If some member of a family is ten minutes late in coming home, the anxiety becomes almost unbearable. If after eleven o'clock at night—*Polizeistunde*—there is a noise in the street outside, as of someone shutting a gate, or if there is a strange step on the stairs, the women tremble. Perhaps someone is coming to take the father or husband or son.

The situation of professional people and intellectuals is especially tragic. They have become either street pedlers or "ricksha" coolies. The Polish bicycle "ricksha" has come to take the place of the automobile, for there are few streetcars and no buses. It is equipped with a taxi-meter and even has signs, reading "free" and "occupied." And so the intellectual is reduced to pedalling this taxi for 40 grosze a kilometer—when he can get a "ricksha."

Famous singers and musicians with international reputations earn a few grosze by street concerts. There are at least one hundred street orchestras and choirs now in Warsaw and innumerable individual artists or small groups. These street concerts, given against the background of destruction, chaos, and starvation will be an imperishable memory of Warsaw under the nazi heel. They are the sole solace of the people who have no schools, no theaters, no radio, no Polish movies or books or periodicals.

Illegal News

THERE is of course the illegal underground press and somewhere someone must still own a radio. Death is the punishment for the possession of a radio or for listening to a prohibited radio program. One is permitted to listen only to the public loud speakers, which give the communiques of the German Information Bureau in Polish three or four times a day. And yet, when people come home from the factory or shop or office, they somehow know all the news reports broadcast by the greatest stations of the world the night before. Who listens to the radio? No one knows—but the news is known.

Similarly, people read the underground press at the risk of their lives. More than twenty secret and illegal weeklies are published regularly in Warsaw. I refer only to printed ones; there are hundreds of mimeographed ones. There is no literate Pole anywhere who does not read an illegal newspaper from time to time.

Next to news, people long for humor. When two friends meet, the first question will be: "What is the news?" Then, "Do you know the latest joke?" Most of the jokes and stories do not contain great wit nor much humor but, so long as they contain a stab at Hitler, Mussolini, the Nazis, or the collaborationists, they serve.

Who creates these jokes? Nobody knows. Yet they are all over Warsaw, and the smugglers carry them all over the country-side too. Such jokes contribute to the spirit of resistance and endurance. When there is a shortage of food and clothes and coal; when one can be arrested, ill-treated, or even shot for nothing each day, there must be something to maintain morale, to give strength and patience for the suffering one endures.

That "something," that spiritual food which compensates for all want and misery is faith in victory and hope of revenge. These find their expression in jokes. We know they are not very funny, but we laugh. We shall laugh these Nazis down.



A FREE WORLD CHECK LIST

of

BOOKS

WORLD ORDER, by Hans Kohn. XIV + 352 pages. Harvard University Press; $3.00

The two distinctive characteristics of the present war, which Professor Kohn describes as "a decisive battle between a totalitarian form of government and the liberal way of life, developed through the intellectual and social revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries," are the universal involvement in the conflict and the irreconcilable nature of the opposing forces. The latter are clarified in his thoughtful analysis of democracy and nationalism.

Dr. Kohn's arguments in favor of democracy strike an original note in their effective use of his profound knowledge of history. He projects these ideas into the future and he is conscious of the necessity of securing universal extension for democratic principles. In his discussion of nationalism, the author utilizes a happy comparison with the history of religion. The separation of religion from politics, which came as a result of religious wars, he points out, did not destroy the dignity of religion, but served to remove religion from the sphere of political conflict. He believes that if a similar transformation of the concept of nationality is achieved, "it may lose its connection with political organization and remain only as an intimate and moving sentiment."

The value of Dr. Kohn's book, however, is impaired by a serious inconsistency. After reading his views on democracy and the need of its dynamic expansion, it is surprising to find a chapter on empire, which contains an absolutely unjustifiable tolerance of imperialism. It softens the blow by discussing a "liberal" imperialism which has undergone a sort of self-limitation because of its Christian and liberal foundations and by virtue of the rationalism of our modern commercial civilization.

It is equally incomprehensible why the excellent conclusions reached by the author, containing the elements of a democratic world order, should be called "a new imperialism." If there is to be a new imperialism, the new democracy and the new nationalism which Dr. Kohn dreams about will certainly not come to pass.

LOUIS DOLIVET

DEVANT LA CRISE MONDIALE: Manifesto of European Catholics Living in America. 49 pages. New York: Editions de la Maison Française; $1.25

The thesis of this powerful manifesto, signed by such Catholics as the Belgians, F. J. Van Cauwelaert and Paul Van Zeeland, the Italian, Don Luigi Sturzo, the Frenchman, Jacques Maritain, the Norwegian, Sigrid Undset, and many others—Austrians, Dutch, Poles, *etc.*, is proved morally, politically, and historically. It is summed up in the statement that fascism and nazism "attack Christianity at its very roots."

The Catholics who have tried to compromise with fascism should meditate on the ringing words of this document:

> The truth is that the New Order of totalitarianism is founded on a conception of life and a spiritual attitude which is incompatible with Christian life and faith.
>
> It attacks Christianity at its very roots in denying and blaspheming mercy and charity and in sacrificing everything to the pride of power. Everywhere that our religion possesses any vitality whatsoever, it cannot but be a major threat to these regimes and they cannot help wanting to destroy us. We cannot avoid persecution except at the price of sterilizing Christian faith and of corrupting the Catholic world from within.

It is a pity that no one seems to realize how greatly an English edition of this valuable little book is needed for many honest but uninformed Catholics.

CARLO SFORZA

MISSION TO THE NORTH, by Florence Jaffray Harriman. 325 pages. J. B. Lippincott; $3.75

When Mrs. J. Borden Harriman set out on her trip as United States Minister to Norway in 1937, she was many things besides a public official. A grandmother and the author of "From Pinafores to Politics," she had decided to settle down to a quiet life as an "old lady," but the inauguration of the New Deal in 1933 drew her back to a public role which was to make the next decade busier than any other years of an eventful life. The record of her mission to Norway, 1937-1941, is a narrative crammed with action—sometimes merely the daily schedule of the Minister, sometimes the eager log of the traveler, sometimes the dramatic escape of the refugee of war.

Despite, or perhaps by means of, this emphasis on "what happened," the salient revelation of the book is that of the personality of the author. She put her mind first on being a good Minister, but in her conception of that task she included the richness of her special view of life —as a woman, as an American, and as a believer in democracy and freedom. She traveled and talked and thought in terms of these loyalties, which became stronger and more profound through her contact with Norway and its people. Faith in the soundness of Norwegian values became another fundamental tenet with her as a result of the tragic experience she shared with that country.

"Mission to Norway" will interest that large public which is fascinated by personalities in the news, many of whom are portrayed; it will hold even greater attraction for those who seek knowledge of other lands and people because here is everything Norwegian, from skiing to codfish, from mittens to Farmers' Co-operatives. For those who ask first for a story, there is the episode of the "City of Flint," the coming of the Nazis, and the trip home via Petsamo. Most of all, women will be won by the zest of a woman who was always aware that she was pioneering in her field, without becoming overanxious for success, and who could give a warm word of appreciation to the other pioneers whom she met on the way.

C. M.

THE WIND BLEW FROM THE EAST, by Ferner Nuhn. 300 pages. Harper; $3.00

As always in times of crisis, America is now passing through a period in which the fundamental values for which she stands emerge into sharper focus. Just what does America mean, we ask ourselves, in terms of her traditions? Mr. Nuhn approaches this problem, so important to all of us, after having read widely and meditated at length. That his conclusions lack precision is due less to a deficiency in the author's perceptions than to the nature of the school of criticism which he follows.

That school is the Romantic one of the early nineteenth century in Germany. Though there is only one reference to "the world spirit," the thinking upon which the book is based abounds in similar concepts. These abstractions are convenient; but unfortunately they mean whatever you want them to mean. To use them as a basis for precise thought about cultural values is as precarious as for an economist to try to evolve a tenable theory about depressions without using any more precise terms for them than "hard times."

Mr. Nuhn has further limited himself in his generalizations about American culture by considering only literary figures, and among those, confining himself mainly to Henry James, Henry Adams, and T. S. Eliot—three very special figures indeed. When Lewis Mumford covered similar cultural ground, he offered a more representative view through the inclusion of architecture and painting. Yet one must not deny Mr. Nuhn credit for a courageous attempt to map a relatively uncharted field. Nobody knows what American culture is, in the sense that we know what English culture is, or French. Any attempt to define America is a worthy project.

R. W.

GLOBAL WAR—AN ATLAS OF WORLD STRATEGY, by Edgar Ansel Mowrer and Marthe Rajchman. 128 pages. Morrow; $1

The authors of this book, a journalist and a geographer, have produced a documentary study replete with maps, diagrams, and statistics, which is not dull. In fact when you get into such things as the discussion of methods by which the United States will be invaded, if it is invaded, you find the exposition pretty exciting.

Broadly we have here also an objective and detached survey of the real wealth of the great powers, the streams of world communication and the natural invasion routes for every power, with a final brief chapter entitled The Revolution of Warfare. There are 70 maps and charts and there is a good index.

The authors tell some unpalatable truths realistically. For instance, neither time nor natural wealth are on our side unless we show the intellectual acuity to use them for victory to our advantage. There is no reason to expect the collapse of the other side either from malnutrition, lack of raw materials, or exhaustion of man power.

That our side can lose the authors are refresh-

ingly frank to admit. They write too: "In one area United Nations' forces have been pushed back three times in almost identical manner by an enemy possessing virtually the same superior equipment, the German 88-millimeter all-purpose gun. . . . There was no wild scramble on the part of United Nations leaders to imitate or surpass it." They also point out that "Numerous newspapermen foresaw just about what happened in Malaya, Burma, and the Dutch Indies —and were ignored by the experts."

T. S. H.

CAMPAIGN OF TREACHERY, by Henry Torres. 256 pages. Dodd, Mead; $3.00

Already in his book on Laval, Mr. Torres proved that he was not only a brilliant lawyer, but that he definitely has something of the great prosecutor. In his new book he enlarges the field of his indictment to the whole Fifth Column. Excellently written, with a rare inside knowledge of government circles, this work gives many entirely new illustrations of the nazi technique. The Franco-German society, its conventions and discussion groups, its dinners and meetings are constantly on the spot. There is an interesting sidelight on the pro-nazi activities of Gaston Henry-Haye, the Vichy Ambassador in Washington.

One cannot read without deep emotion the pages about Bordeaux and about the arrival of the author in North Africa, where the fascist virus began to penetrate via the traitors of Bordeaux. The author tells how in 1934 he warned Pétain, at that time Minister of War, against the Italian fascist agents, and how the Maréchal promised to take action—but did nothing. The description of the difficulties the author found in the Information Ministry are of great value not only to know the past but as a warning to the present. Mr. Torres' book is an extremely useful and interesting contribution to the fight against Fifth Column activities everywhere.

L. D.

THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, edited by Leonard D. White. ix + 274 pages. University of Chicago Press; $3.50

When Professor Merriam retired from the chairmanship of the Political Science department at Chicago, it was fitting that some of his many former students should give him the customary academic tribute of a memorial volume of essays. It is a tribute to Professor Merriam's leadership and varied interests that the present well-planned collection is far better than many a volume which has been published under similar circumstances. The contributors—Harold Lasswell, Albert Lepawsky, John Vieg, Leo Rosten, Harold Gosnell, Louise Overacker, V. O. Key, Jr., Joseph Harris, Leonard White, Hyman Cohen, and Frederick Schuman—have covered almost the entire range of governmental problems in the United States. The essays are all thoughtful and informative, and some of them are brilliant. Professor Merriam has prefaced the volume with a characteristic autobiographical sketch entitled The Education of Charles E. Merriam.

THE ORIGIN OF MANCHU RULE IN CHINA, by Franz Michael. viii + 127 pages. The Johns Hopkins Press; $2.00

This small volume, published under the auspices of the Page School of International Relations, is primarily a study of the penetration of Chinese influence into the borderland regions, particularly during the declining years of the Ming dynasty. The author is chiefly preoccupied with the way in which this influence helped to shape the development of the Manchus, and the effects thereof when after 1644 the Manchus constituted the new ruling class in China. There is much material of interest to students of Far Eastern history, and the layman will be especially interested in the post-conquest relations between the Manchus and the Chinese. A first-rate monograph.

A WREATH FOR EUROPA, by Paul Tabori. 336 pages. Washburn; $3.00

It is said that a drowning man momentarily relives his entire life. Many a European, struggling desperately amid the nazi flood, has had a similar review of things past forced upon him, and has lived to write about it. The standard of these autobiographies of a culture and an era has been remarkably high. The "good European" was the flower of a great cultural tradition. May we one day see him firmly re-established!

Meanwhile, there are his life-stories, such as this of Mr. Tabori's, to remind us of the sort of personal development which Europe once made possible. The author, a Hungarian, was immersed in the world of Debussy, Picasso, Wasserman, Reinhardt, Stanislavsky, Joyce. He knew at first hand Jugoslavia, Italy, Spain, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, Scandinavia, Austria. Wherever he went, he observed shrewdly and liberally. His anecdotes, even when trivial, are told as by a born teller of tales. The "good European" was an attractive specimen of the *genus homo;* and Mr. Tabori remains always a good European.

WHO'S WHO IN THIS ISSUE

ONE of the rare phenomena of our time is a scientist in public life, yet in this issue we present two such contributors from England. *A. V. HILL,* chairman of the executive committee of the National Physical Laboratory, secretary and Foulerton Research Professor of the Royal Society, is Member of Parliament for Cambridge University.

JULIAN HUXLEY, eminent English biologist, writes with equal authority on political affairs. He contributed the article, Things to Come in Britain, to our February issue.

FROM the distant Pacific Coast came the eloquence and symbolism of *EDITH KELLOW's* poem on Czechoslovakia. The illustration was drawn by a native of that country whose home was not far from the unfortunate but immortal village that it memorializes. *TOM* is, of course, the pseudonym of one whose name cannot be published for fear that his relatives in Prague may suffer for the trenchant way in which he has been portraying nazi brutality in the pages of FREE WORLD.

AS president of the Union for Democratic Action and chairman of the International Co-ordination Council. *DR. FRANK KINGDON* is untiring in his efforts to enlighten public opinion on the stakes and issues of this war.

LOUIS LIPSKY, member of the Honorary Editorial Board of FREE WORLD, has been active in the Zionist and other Jewish movements for more than three decades. He is a former president of the Zionist Organization of America and is now chairman of the Governing Council of the American Jewish Congress.

KARL O. PAETEL, whose anti-nazi activities led to the loss of his German citizenship and to exile, is an authority on German education and the history of the nazi movement.

IMMEDIATELY on turning in the manuscript of his article, *COUNT CARLO SFORZA,* former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, left for Montevideo, where the Pan-American Free Italy Conference has been convened to establish a Free Italian Government-in-exile. The appointment of a national council was delayed pending his arrival.

ADRIENNE THOMAS, author of "Catherine Becomes a Soldier," a novel published in fifteen languages, is at work on a historical novel about the conquest of Austria and France.

ATWOOD H. TOWNSEND, professor of Engineering English at New York University, writes with the fervor of a veteran of the last war. He drove an ambulance with the A.E.F. for two years.

ONE of the founders of co-operation in the United States, *DR. JAMES PETER WARBASSE,* surgeon, economist, and author, is now director of the Rochdale Institute National Training School in Consumer Co-operation. He has published "Co-operation, a Way of Peace," "The Doctor and the Public," and other books.

Americans want to know what more they can do toward final victory

HERE IS THE ANSWER

The American people have a chance to become of decisive importance in shortening the war and winning the peace. The American Section of the Free World Association offers a channel through which their voice may be heard and their power felt.

—By joining the American Section of Free World you can help to build morale and to win the peace in giving concrete evidence of overwhelming American support for a democratic victory and a world organization.

—By insisting that Free World principles are presented at your clubs, your institutes, and your discussion groups; at your church and union meetings.

—By writing your favorite radio station and requesting that they put on a Free World program.

—By helping to organize at least one public meeting in your town during the month of September. (Where local speakers are not available, Free World can supply them.)

This is a psychological war as well as a military war. Passion, conviction, reverence for our great democratic principles, and a missionary spirit in the finest sense of the word are among our best weapons. You are not fighting on all the home fronts unless you do your part in this psychological warfare whose ammunition is persuasion.

MRS. J. BORDEN HARRIMAN, *Chairman*
55 West Forty-second Street, New York City

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

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